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INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that the practice of assessing 
the sufficiency of the evidence is constitutionally required as a con­
comitant of the Winship principle l and the presumption of inno­
cence.2 It is a presupposition of the Winship principle that no person 
may be constitutionally convicted except upon sufficient proof of 
guilt--evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact be­
yond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the 
charge.3 Until Jackson v. Virginia,4 the concern for the enforcement 
I. The term .. Winship principle" as used in this article refers to the due process 
principle which protects defendants in criminal proceedings from conviction except by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the crime charged. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
2. See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) (citing In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970». ' 
3. 	 Id at 316. 
4. 	 443 U.S. 307 (1978). 
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of this constitutional requirement focused on jury instructions that 
accurately described the Winship principle. The Winship principle 
had not been viewed as necessarily involving a correlative standard 
of evidentiary sufficiency. The only evidentiary requirement re­
garded as essential to fundamental fairness was the "no evidence" 
rule of Thompson v. Louisville,5 which served as a safeguard against 
completely arbitrary convictions by requiring that some relevant evi­
dence underlie each element of the crime.6 The due process clause 
was not viewed as requiring state courts to assess evidentiary suffi­
ciency. Therefore it neither imposed a minimum legal standard of 
sufficiency nor any strictures on whatever sufficiency assessment pro­
cess a state might choose to provide. 
The ruling in Jackson departed sharply from the view that the 
Winship principle should be so limited. The Court recognized that to 
enforce a burden of persuasion7 it is necessary to enforce a burden of 
5. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
6. The holding of Thompson as refined through a series of holdings ending with 
Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974), was that "a conviction based upon a 
record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a crucial element of the offense 
charged" is arbitrary and violates due process. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314. 
Following Winship, the Court's consideration of other burden of persuasion issues in 
criminal litigation, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972), and the relation be­
tween the Winship principle and the rule of jury unanimity, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 
U.S. 356, 360-63 (1972), led it to intimate that the Winship principle may make eviden­
tiary sufficiency a due process issue. See a/so Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111 
(1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
Indeed, the disputes within the Court over the proper scope and application of the 
Thompson principle suggested that the "no evidence" rule necessarily involved the courts 
in assessing sufficiency at some level. See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 
480 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see a/so Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 
(6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting). 
7. As used in this article, the term "burden of persuasion" refers to the responsibil­
ity imposed on a party to prove a particular issue to a specified level of certainty. The 
specified level of certainty is the "standard of persuasion", e.g., beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The party to whom the burden of persuasion is assigned bears a corresponding 
risk of nonpersuasion-that is, losing on the issue if he or she fails to persuade the fact 
finder to the specified level of certainty. 
Each party has a burden of persuasion on each issue being litigated; these burdens 
are reciprocal. When one party has the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt 
the opposing party necessarily has a burden of persuasion to establish a reasonable 
doubt. 
The term "burden of production" refers to the respo~ibility of producing evidence 
on a particular issue. The failure to produce evidence leads to loss on that issue. Thus 
the assignment of a burden of persuasion on an issue entails imposition of a risk of loss 
from nonproduction. As with the burden of persuasion, the standard of persuasion pro­
vides a necessary reference point for determining whether the evidence produced is suffi­
cient to satisfy the party's burden of persuasion. For example, this article deals primarily 
with the prosecution's burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the defend­
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production, and the only way to enforce a burden of production is to 
measure the sufficiency of the evidence produced against the stan­
dard of persuasion that the party having the burden of persuasion is 
required to meet.8 The Court's view that the burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is necessarily incorporated by the presumption of 
innocence9 established the constitutional necessity of assessing the 
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence and doing so against a stan­
dard which "gives concrete substance" to the Winship principle. IO 
The trial judge's task in reviewing the sufficiency of the prosecu­
tion's evidence is to insure that that evidence provides a reasonable 
basis upon which a jury might reasonably convict the defendant of 
the crime charged. The judge must apply the required constitutional 
standard: whether the evidence being assessed is such that a reason­
able juror might find that each essential element of the crime 
charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this 
manner, the judge safeguards the Winship principle by insuring that 
if the jury's verdict is guilty it will not necessarily be unreasonable. I I 
The Court in Jackson, however, did not consider the problems 
of administering the sufficiency of the sufficiency assessment process 
at the trial level. I2 The Court's entire discussion of the sufficiency 
assessment was cast in terms of state appellate and federal habeas 
corpus review, J3 which, of course, corresponds to the procedural con­
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in 
Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. 
REv. 321, 326-39 (1980); McNaughton, Burden ofProduction ofEvidence: A Function ofa 
Burden ofPersuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955). 
8. 443 U.S. at 318-20. 
9. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 558 
(1898). 
10. 443 U.S. at 315 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970». 
II. The Jackson standard does not by itself guarantee that a verdict must be rea­
sonable. The judge will find the prosecution's evidence sufficient if a reasonable convic­
tion on the evidence is possible; the standard does not authorize the judge to insist that 
the evideIice be so strong that an unreasonable conviction could not result. The intersti­
tial protection needed to safeguard against unreasonable judgments on sufficient evi­
dence is provided by proper jury instructions. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 227, 
232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
12. The sufficiency assessment process, however, like the process of proof which it 
parallels, is very complex and is administered by internal rules which are designed to 
separate the roles and responsibilities of the judge and jury in the fact-finding process. 
While these rules vary with the jurisdiction, in their general import they instruct the 
judge to give the evidence the most favorable interpretation available to the prosecution 
and to refrain from usurping the jury's fact-finding function. The obvious purpose of the 
new standard is to impose a constitutionally required level of restraint on the jury's fact­
finding discretion. 
13. 443 U.S. at 313-24. 
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text in which the issue had been presented. The Supreme Court ap­
parently assumed that the sufficiency process already utilized in the 
various state court systems could vindicate the Court's new constitu­
tional concerns by simply substituting the newly articulated standard 
of legal sufficiency for the state's customary standards. 14 
Shortly after Jackson was decided, the new Rules of Criminal 
Procedure went into effect in Massachusetts and the supreme judicial 
court determined that the Massachusetts standard of sufficiency, as it 
was currently articulated and administered, required no modifica­
tion to comply with the Supreme Court's new mandate. IS Not sur­
prisingly, the supreme judicial court did not consider whether the 
usual rules governing the sufficiency process were similarly compati­
ble with the principle of Jackson. 
Part Two of this article is addressed to that question. It surveys 
the procedures codified in Rule 25 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedurel6 and then examines the manner in which the 
14. The Court no doubt strengthened this impression by incorporating the familiar 
"prosecution's best case rule" into its statement of the sufficiency standard to be applied 
at the habeas corpus level. 443 U.S. at 319 n.12. In the context of habeas corpus litiga­
tion, this rule serves the "federalism" policy of insuring deference to the factual determi­
nations of the state courts, and it presupposes that conviction has occurred. Id 
The tension and conflict between the Jackson standard of sufficiency and the tradi­
tional administrative rules of the sufficiency assessment process documented in Part I of 
this article were forseeable. The Supreme Court acknowledged that its new standard 
"impinges on jury discretion." 443 U.S. at 319. The chief purpose of the traditional rules 
of the assessment process is to preserve jury discretion. See Curley v. United States, 160 
F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). The conflict between them 
is a constitutional problem which will surface frequently in state courts. 
IS. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-79, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-75 
(1979). 
16. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25 reads: 
(a) Entry by Court. The judge on motion of a defendant or on his own mo­
tion shall enter a finding of not guilty of the offense charged in an indictment or 
complaint or any part thereof after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on the charge. 
If a defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty is made at the close 
of the Commonwealth's evidence, it shall be ruled upon at that time. If the 
motion is denied or allowed only in part by the judge, the defendant may offer 
evidence in his defense without having reserved that right. 
(b) Jury Trials. 
(I) Reservation ofOecision on Motion. If a motion for a required finding 
of not guilty is made at the close of all the evidence, the judge may reserve 
decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion 
before the jury returns a verdict, after the jury returns a verdict of guilty, or 
after the jury is discharged without having returned a verdict. 
(2) Motion Ajier Oischarge 0/Jury. If the motion is denied and the case is 
submitted to the jury, the motion may be renewed within five days after the jury 
is discharged and may include in the alternative a motion for a new trial. If a 
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sufficiency assessment process is affected by related practices that 
regulate the manner in which evidential issues are raised, joined and 
focused. It then examines the sufficiency assessment process step-by­
step, including the manner in which that process is affected by com­
monly used proof-facilitating devices. This examination demon­
strates that the effectiveness of a sufficiency assessment process in 
vindicating the Jackson principle is compromised by both the ad­
ministrative rules that govern the process and by proof-facilitating 
devices that are usually scrutinized for the constitutional impact only 
as to the effect upon the jury's decisional process. 
This article concludes that the "prosecution's best case" rule 
and the rule prohibiting a trial judge from considering issues of cred­
ibility and relative weight of the evidence in assessing the prosecu­
tion's evidence are chiefly responsible for the shortcomings in the 
sufficiency assessment process as it is currently administered in Mas­
sachusetts. These rules do not permit the judge to protect the de­
fendant from unreasonable jury judgments in areas in which the 
most difficult and decisive disputes in the trial are commonly 
presented: judgments involving evidentiary weight, credibility and 
inference questions. Moreover, these rules may interact with the 
practice of requiring the defendant to raise an elemental defense is­
sue by producing evidence (either in addition to, or as an alternative 
to pleading the issue) thereby relieving the prosecution of the onus of 
producing evidence sufficient to meet its burden of persuasion to dis­
prove the issue. By this practice, the defendant is required to defend 
before the presumption of innocence has been completely dispelled. 
The defendant may also lose the opportunity to have a favorable, 
verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on motion set aside the verdict and 
order a new trial, or order the entry of a finding of not guilty, or order the entry 
of a finding of guilty of any offense included in the offense charged in the in­
dictment or complaint. . 
(c) Appeal. 
(I) Right ofAppeal Where Motion/or Reliifunder Subdivision (b) Is Al­
lowedAjier a Jury Verdict ofGuilty. The Commonwealth shall have the right to 
appeal to the appropriate appellate court a decision of a judge granting relief 
under the provisions of subdivisions (b)(l) and (2) of this rule on a motion for 
required finding of not guilty after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty or on 
an order for the entry of a finding of guilt of any offense included in the offense 
charged in the indictment or complaint. 
(2) Costs upon Appeal. If an appeal is taken by the Commonwealth, the 
appellate court, upon the written motion of the defendant supported by affida­
vit, may determine and approve the payment to the defendant of his costs of 
appeal together with reasonable attorney's fees, if any, to be paid on the order 
of the trial court upon the entry of the rescript. 
Id 
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final sufficiency determination made before being required to submit 
to the risk of an unreasonable conviction if the judge reserves ruling 
on the matter until after the jury has returned a verdict. Similarly, 
the use of presumptions, inferences and other proof-facilitating de­
vices to satisfy the prosecution's burden of production on an issue, 
operating singly or in combination, may exempt the prosecution's 
evidence from the sufficiency assessment on that issue. 
The use of these practices, rules and devices often compromises 
the effectiveness of the sufficiency assessment process on key issues, 
leaving open and sometimes promoting the possibility that the jury's 
decision on such an issue will not be reasonably founded on evi­
dence presented to it. Thus, the Jackson principle seems to demand 
that the customary sufficiency assessment process be revised in order 
to make it compatible with the new constitutional standard of suffi­
ciency. Part Two proposes specific modifications in the structure of 
the process and its administrative rules designed to make it more 
compatible with the Jackson principles and legal standard of 
sufficiency. 
The provisions of Rule 25 also establish a postconviction mech­
anism and review authority which is designed to serve as a safeguard 
against unjust convictions. The second sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) au­
thorizes the judge to review the evidence and either revise the verdict 
or order a new trial if it appears that justice has not been served. 17 
Moreover, when exercising this authority the judge is permitted to 
weigh the evidence and otherwise review the jury's exercise of its 
fact-finding discretion. IS It is possible, then, to view Rule 25 as pro­
viding two complementary mechanisms designed to equip the trial 
judge with a mechanism to regulate the quality of the evidence, to 
safeguard against the injustice of an unfounded conviction and to 
avoid the reproach that justice may not have been done. 
Part Three considers the trial judge's post conviction authority 
to revise a jury's guilty verdict. The history and purposes of the 
supreme judicial court's analogous statutory powers under Massa­
chusetts General Laws, Chapter 278, Section 33E are examined. 19 A 
proposed system of standards is presented in this article for deter­
mining when it is appropriate to exercise this authority and what 
form of relief will best serve the ends of justice. Finally, it is pro­
17. Id. 2S(b)(2). 
18. See id. 
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). These statutory powers 
are hereinafter referred to as the section 33E powers. 
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posed that this verdict-revising authority be used as a vehicle for 
supplementing the sufficiency assessment process in order to cure the 
shortcomings and inconsistencies in the sufficiency assessment pro­
cess which are discussed in Part Two. 
I. RULE 25 PROCEDURES 
Rule 25 of the new Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
establishes five points in the trial process at which the adequacy of 
the evidence of guilt may be placed in issue.2o In addition to estab­
lishing procedures under which an accused's claim for requiring 
findings of not guilty are to be evaluated, the rule enlarges upon and 
transfers to trial judges a very broad discretionary authority under 
which they may evaluate the justice of a jury's guilty verdict by con­
sidering, among other factors, the weight of the evidence.21 The rule 
itself addresses only points of procedure.22 The standards to be em­
ployed in making the various decisions Rule 25 authorizes must be 
derived from other sources. 
This section surveys and explores the procedural applications of 
Rule 25 and the variations in extent of authority as well as standards 
of decision that are employed at various points in the process. This 
section also inquires whether discernible patterns can be identified in 
the types of factual and legal issues that can be raised under Rule 25. 
A brief discussion of the sufficiency assessment process will set the 
stage. 
A. The Process ofAssessing the Sufficiency ofthe Evidence 
In practice, the sufficiency judgment frequently cannot be iso­
lated from other issues. Pretrial disputes over such matters as the 
sufficiency or multiplicity of the charging papers, the constitutional­
ity of the prosecution or the admissibility of evidence may resurface 
20. See supra note 16. The phrase "adequacy of the evidence" will be used in this 
paper generically to include the concepts of legal sufficiency defined in Jackson v. Vir­
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676­
79, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-75 (1979), and of satisfactory weight "consonant with justice." 
Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 320, 431 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982); Common­
wealth v. Gaulden, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1123, 1136-38,420 N.E.2d 905, 912-13; if. Com­
monwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1,7,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (1980); Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 416, 378 N.E.2d 429, 432-33 (1978). Depending on when the 
issue is raised, the evidence evaluated may be limited to the prosecution's evidence or it 
may include all of the evidence. See, Commonwealth v. Kelley, infra note 29. 
2l. See supra note 16. This power was formerly exercised only by the supreme 
judicial court. 
22. Id. 
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in view of the prosecution's evidence. Other similar issues such as 
variances between the charge and the evidence or the adequacy of 
the prosecution's efforts to "connect up" evidence admitted de bene 
may have to be resolved as a preliminary step to determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Disputes may surface over the proper 
definition of statutory terms. The injection of "affirmative defenses" 
through pleadings or evidence may lead to disputes about which is­
sues the defendant is entitled to challenge on sufficiency grounds. 
The prosecution's partial or complete reliance on presumptions or 
inferences to satisfy its burden of production may raise thorny dis­
putes on constitutional due process issues.23 
In this section each of these issues is mentioned in the sequence 
in which it is likely to arise: preliminary "clean up" issues, definition 
of statutory terms, allocation of the burden of production and identi­
fication of the issues on which the defendant is entitled to a suffi­
ciency determination, and assessment of the permissible impact of 
presumption. The presupposition of this scheme of organization is 
that typically the judge will structure the sufficiency assessment by 
first surveying the elements of the charge, then surveying the evi­
dence being considered, applying the "prosecutions best case role" 
and the remoteness limitation on inferences to clarify the facts, and 
then applying the rational fact finder and reasonable doubt stan­
dards to reach a conclusion. 
The logical first step in evaluating a sufficiency claim is to sur­
vey the elements of the offense charged, at least to the extent the 
evidence directed to the proof of certain element is disputed.24 It is 
important for several reasons that the reference sources for this in­
quiry include both the charging document-indictment or com­
plaint-and statutory or case law definitions of the nominal 
offense.25 
For one, the indictment must state a triable offense and estab­
lish the jurisdiction of the court over the offense stated. If the indict­
ment fails to allege facts constituting each essential element of the 
23. The fact that these disputes will arise while the trial is in process makes it even 
more important for counsel and the judge to try to identify them in advance. 
24. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 
Mass. 368, 371-72, 162 N.E. 729, 731-32 (1928). 
25. It is the substance of the allegations in the charging document rather than the 
statutory definition of the offense it refers to that determines the charge to be tried. Com­
monwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 396, 372 N.E.2d 282, 283 (1978). Generally, an 
offense must be tried as charged. Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863,434 N.E.2d 
633 (1982). 
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offense it is subject to dismissal at any time.26 Challenges to the ju­
risdiction of the court may be founded on statutory limitations of the 
court's authority to try only specified offenses27 or specified defend­
ants,28 or on statute of limitations grounds. The courts are generally 
in agreement that such defects in the charging document do not form 
the basis for a double jeopardy bar to retrial,29 Even so, such claims 
are generally best raised as early as possible to avoid subjecting the 
defendant to the functional equivalent of double jeopardy in the 
form of a trial which must be repeated if a valid judgment is to be 
obtained. 
In contrast, a directed verdict may result when the prosecution's 
evidence varies materially from the offense charged in the indict­
ment.30 This possibility arises from the fact that a statute may define 
more than one offense and from the fact that the drafter of a charg­
ing document may allege an offense which does not suit the prosecu­
tion's evidence as it develops at trial,31 
Simlarly, in most cases the constitutionality of a prosecution 
under a statute thought to be vague or overbroad is initially a pre­
trial issue. But even where a claim that the statute is unconstitu­
tional on its face fails, presentation of the case may establish grounds 
for challenging the impact of the statute as applied to the 
defendant.32 
The motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of 
the prosecution's case may also mark the occasion for reconsidera­
26. Commonwealth v. Bums, 8 Mass. App. 194, 392 N.E.2d 865 (1979). 
27. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 26 (West 1983) (limiting jurisdiction of 
district courts); see Commonwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 372 N.E.2d 782 (1978). 
28. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 52-63 (West 1978) (defining jurisdic­
tion of juvenile courts); see Commonwealth v. Chase, 348 Mass. 100, 105, 202 N.E.2d 
300,303 (1964). 
29. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 381 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lovett, 
374 Mass. 394, 397, 372 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1978); Commonwealth v. Chase, 348 Mass. 100, 
104,202 N.E.2d 300,302 (1964). But see Culberson v. Wainwright, 453 F.2d 1219, 1220 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied407 U.S. 914 (1972); Robinson v. Neil, 366 F. Supp. 924, 928­
29 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). 
30. A variation is material when it substantively alters the grand jury's accusation 
so as to prove an offense different from that alleged in the indictment (the latter em­
braces, of course, lesser included offenses). Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 
866, 434 N.E.2d 633, 635 (1983); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 381 Mass. 420, 424, 409 
N.E.2d 776, 778 (1978). A variation which is not material in the sense of proving a 
different offense may nevertheless be prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Ohanian, 373 
Mass. 839, 841, 370 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1978). The remedy is new trial. 
31. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 9 Mass. App. 813,398 N.E.2d 504 (1980). Seealso 
Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978); Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1948). 
32. See, e.g., Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
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tion of important contested ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 
It is particularly important, of course, that the trial judge consider at 
this point whether the prosecution has "connected up" all evidence 
admitted de bene, such as hearsay statements of persons alleged to 
have been the defendant's co-conspirators.33 Evidence which has 
not been satisfactorily connected should be stricken and not consid­
ered in evaluating the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. Sim­
ilarly, events following a trail judge's initial decison to admit 
testimony (or following the direct examination of a witness whose 
competency is not in dispute) may establish grounds for a motion to 
strike testimony or evidence.34 All such exclusionary issues should 
be considered and decided before the sufficiency evaluation is made. 
Other problems with the statement of the offense in the indict­
ment may arise at this point either because they were overlooked by 
counsel before trial, or because the prosecution's evidence revealed 
the problem for the first time or brought it into sharper focus. In a 
variety of situations questions may arise concerning the number of 
offenses established by the prosecution's proof. A defendant charged 
with participating in multiple, closely-related conspiracies should 
frame a challenge to the prosecution's definition of the proper "units 
of prosecution" in terms of sufficiency of the evidence.35 One benefit 
of dealing with problems of duplicity and multiplicity in indictments 
at the directed verdict stage is the double jeopardy impact of the 
ruling. 
B. Motions for Required Finding ofNot Guilty 
Although the opportunity to move for a required finding of not 
guilty does not arise until the close of the prosecution's case-in­
chief,36 counsel for both parties must consider sufficiency issues and 
arguments before trial. In district court trials, uniform jury instruc­
33. P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 442 (5th Ed. 1980). 
34. See Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981); Commonwealth v. Funches, 
379 Mass. 283, 397 N.E.2d 1097 (1979). 
35. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 40, 54 (1978) (judgment of acquittal 
entered at close of government's evidence on indictment erroneously interpreted by trial 
judge bars retrial on related charge found to have been included in multiplications 
indictment). 
36. Unlike some jurisdictions, Massachusetts does not permit defense counsel to 
move for a required finding of not guilty on the basis of the prosecutor's opening state­
ment. Commonwealth v. Brattman, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 580, 410 N.E.2d 720, 722 
(1980). But see Commonwealth v. Clark, 393 Mass. 361, - N.E.2d - (1984) (sufficiency 
of contemplated evidence may be assessed where affidavits or stipulations place prosecu" 
tions entire case before the court). Compare Brooks v. United States, 396 A.2d 200, 206­
07 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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tions provide useful guidance to the elementary issues of proof in a 
caseY While uniform instructions are not available in Massachu­
setts superior courts, it may be possible to determine in advance a 
particular judge's standard instructions. In either court, the charging 
papers identify the elements which the prosecution's evidence must 
establish.38 
1. 	 Required Finding of Not Guilty After the Evidence on 
Either Side is Closed 
Rule 25(a) requires that the trial judge enter a finding of not 
guilty after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence at the 
time the matter is considered is insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain a conviction.39 The use of the mandatory "shall" makes the 
remedy-a finding of not guilty-nondiscretionary when insuffi­
ciencyappears.4o Absent a defense motion, however, the sufficiency 
assessment is discretionary; the judge may, but is not required to, 
consider the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte.41 
The second sentence of Rule 25(a) provides that if the defend­
ant moves for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the 
37. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, DEP'T. OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES TRIED IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT DEPARTMENT (1980). 
38. It is preferable to prepare a written motion for a required finding of not guilty 
in advance and when possible to prepare a brief written memorandum in support. Some 
revision of the motion may be necessary to include unanticipated evidentiary develop­
ments in the prosecution's case-in-chief; the judge may be willing to grant a mid-day or 
overnight continuance to permit counsel to present more exact claims. See Common­
wealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 597, 266 N.E.2d 314, 317 (1971) (supreme judicial 
court refused to consider on appeal an insufficiency theory not presented to the trial 
court). The motion should be presented at the close of the prosecution's evidence, at the 
close of the defendant's evidence, and at the close of the prosecution's rebuttal, if any. 
The motion should be renewed post-trial if it has been reserved and then denied. See 
supra note 16. 
The defendant's right to present evidence is not compromised by a motion for a 
required finding of not guilty, so there is nothing to be lost in making an unsuccessful 
motion. Moreover, so long as it is made before a guilty verdict is returned, a finding of 
not guilty bars both appellate review and retrial on double jeopardy principles. See 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,575-76 (1977) (directed verdict 
after jury deadlocked and mistrial declared barred appeal and retrial). 
39. 	 See supra note 16. 
40. In Commonwealth v. Cote, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 238-42, 444 N.E.2d 1282, 
1288-90, appeal denied, 388 Mass. 1104,448 N.E.2d 766 (1983), the appeals court ruled 
that this provision does not abridge the trial judge's discretion to permit the prosecution 
to reopen its case to cure insufficiency. See also Commonwealth v. Ierardi, 17 Mass. 
App. Ct. 297, 303, 457 N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (1983), appeal denied, 391 Mass. 1102, 459 
N.E.2d 826 (1984). 
41. 	 See supra note 16. 
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Commonwealth's evidence, it shall be ruled upon at that time.42 
42. Id. In Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 431 N.E.2d 915 (1982), the 
defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the prosecution's 
case. The trial judge allowed the motion as to the charge of first degree murder, took the 
balance of the motion under advisement and then denied it "during the course of trial." 
Id. at 315, 431 N.E.2d at 916. This procedure was improper, but the supreme judicial 
court merely described it without comment, possibly because the defendant did not make 
a claim of error on appeal on this point. The plain language of the rule requires a ruling 
on the entire motion before the trial may proceed. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a); see supra 
note 16. This requirement had earlier been imposed by the supreme judicial court in 
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368, 370 n.1 (1976). The 
Reporter's Notes to the rule state that the rule adopted the Kelley requirement. MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 25 Reporter's Notes; see also Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 407 n.4, 
348 N.E.2d 794, 798 n.4 (1976). 
The court in Kelley suggested that "as a practical matter it makes no difference. . . 
whether the defendant's rights are assessed at the earlier time when he filed his motions 
or the later time [at the close of all the evidence) since the Commonwealth's position as to 
proof clearly did not improve with the presentation of the defendant's case." 370 Mass. 
at 150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 370 n.l. There are two serious objections to accepting this 
approach as a general practice. First, it ignores a basic due process right guaranteed the 
defendant. Through the operation of the presumption of innocence and the burden of 
production imposed on the prosecution by that presumption, the defendant is protected 
from being required to make a defense until the prosecution has met its burden to pro­
duce evidence sufficient to convict him. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n.12 
(1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Second, as a 
practical matter it is not generally true that the Commonwealth's position as to proof will 
not improve during the defendant's case. See Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 
408,348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976) (testimony of the defense witnesses provided compelling 
support to the prosecution's case.). Nor can the trial judge reasonably expect to be able 
to accurately determine, without the aid of a verbatim transcript, whether the defense 
evidence enhanced the Commonwealth's case. The trial judge is simply not in the posi­
tion to make this assessment the wayan appellate court can. The requirement of the 
rules that the sufficiency determination be made before further proceedings are held 
should be scrupulously followed. 
The appeals court has taken the view that the "no-reservation" provision of Rule 
25(a) does not abridge the trial judge's discretion to permit the prosecution to reopen its 
case and introduce evidence needed to meet its burden of production where inadvertence 
or "some other compelling circumstances" justify the reopening, and the defendant will 
not suffer substantial prejudice. Commonwealth v. Cote, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 241-43, 
444 N.E.2d 1282, 1290-91 (1983). The trial judge had not ruled on the defendant's mo­
tion. The court found that the prosecution's mistake of law that the defendant had the 
burden of production on the elemental issue in question (nonconsent) justified the re­
opening and that the defendant had not been subjected to double jeopardy, presumably 
because the motion had not been granted. Id. at 241, 444 N.E.2d at 1290. It was error, 
the court found, to require the defendant to present.his defense before the prosecution 
completed its case and the defendant's motion was ruled. The error was considered 
harmless because the defendant defended on a claim of ignorance rather than consent. 
Id. at 243 n.ll, 444 N.E.2d at 1291 n.ll. The best procedure, the court advised, is to 
require the prosecution to complete its case, rule on the motion and then permit the 
defendant to go forward. Id. The appeals court eroded the protections of Rule 25(a) and 
the presumption of innocence further in Commonwealth v. Ierardi, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 
297,303,457 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (1983) where it ruled that the trial judge acted permissi­
bly in permitting the prosecution to reopen its case after having rested without offering 
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This second sentence renders explicit what the "reservation of deci­
sion" provisions in other jurisdictions merely imply.43 When no de­
fense motion is made at this juncture, Rule 25(b)(I) authorizes the 
judge to reserve ruling on the sufficiency issue and submit the case to 
the jury.44 In contrast, because it must be ruled upon before the trial 
can proceed, the defense motion made at this point invokes a "no 
reservation" rule which secures important, practical, and constitu­
tionally guaranteed interests of the defendant. The defendant's 
practical interest is in taking advantage of bringing the proceedings 
to a final conclusion without being required to defend the charges or 
run the risk of conviction that attends the submission of the case to 
the jury. The constitutional protection of these interests is derived 
from established due process and double jeopardy principles. 
In Jackson v. Virginia,45 the Supreme Court held that a defend­
ant is protected by due process principles from being convicted ex­
cept upon evidence that persuades a jury that each element of the 
crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.46 It is the 
trial judge's duty to insure that, as far as possible, this burden and 
standard of proof are "given concrete substance."47 The Court's 
view of the "concrete substance" of the Winship principle is essen­
tially that developed by Professor J. Thayer in his Preliminary Trea­
tise on Evidence.48 Professor Thayer reasoned that the prosecution's 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt formula was a com­
pound of the presumption of innocence and a standard of persuasion 
which together emphasize the weight of evidence and strength of 
persuasion necessary to make out proof in a criminal case: 
[T]he rule includes two things: First, the presumption; and sec­
ond, a supplementary proposition as to the weight of evidence 
which is required to overcome it; the whole doctrine when drawn 
out being, first, that a person who is charged with crime must be 
proved guilty; that, according to the ordinary rule of procedure 
evidence on an essential element. The defendant had moved under Rule 25(a) and the 
judge had allowed the motion (the opinion does not say whether a finding of not guilty 
had been entered). The appeals court ruled that the defendant's double jeopardy rights 
were not violated. Id at 303, 457 N.E.2d at 1131. 
43. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); UNIFORM R. CRIM. P. 522 (1975). Contra 
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.5(6) comment at 108-09 (Approved 
Draft 1968) (generally the same as the reservation of decision provisions). 
44. See supra note 16. 
45. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
46. Idat319. 
47. Id at 315. 
48. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW, 551-76 app. (1898). 
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and of legal reasoning, presumiturpro reo, i.e., neganti, so that the 
accused stands innocent until he is proved guilty; and, second, that 
this proof of guilt must displace all reasonable doubt.49 
The Winship formula thus expresses both a rule of procedure and a 
standard of persuasion for overcoming the presumption of 
mnocence. 
A necessary corollary to Winship is that the prosecution is not 
entitled to have its case decided by a jury; it must earn its audience 
with that body by producing evidence sufficient to overcome the pre­
sumption of innocence.50 The constitutional office of the judge in 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is to insure 
that a case is not submitted to the jury if the evidence cannot meet 
the Winship standard.51 Thus, one of the due process rights accorded 
an accused by the presumption of innocence is the right not to de­
fend unless the prosecution has presented a prima fade case. This 
right was articulated in Taylor v. Kentucky.52 
It is now generally recognized that the "presumption of inno­
cence" is an inaccurate, shorthand description of the right of the 
accused to "remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has 
taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persua­
sion; i.e., to say in this case, as in any other, that the opponent of a 
claim or charge is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another 
form that the proponent of the claim or charge must evidence 
it."53 
In short, the presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to 
produce evidence sufficient to establish the accused's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 54 Until this has been done-that is, until the pros­
ecution has presented a primafade case-the defendant may not be 
required to defend. 
The initial assessment of sufficiency may result in a finding of 
49. Id. at 558. 
50. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1978); if. Curley v. United States, 
160 F.2d 229, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
51. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-18; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63,68 (1965). 
52. 436 U.S. 478 (1978). 
53. Id. at 484 n.12 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 407 (3d ed. 1940». See a/so, 
Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318, 321 n.2, - N.E.2d - n.2 (1984) (The purpose 
of the rule is to protect a defendant's right to insist that the Commonwealth prove every 
element of the crime charged before he decides to rest.) 
54. J. THAYER, supra note 9, at 560-63; see a/so Commonwealth v. Madieros, 255 
Mass. 304, 315-16,151 N.E. 297, 300 (1926). For a definition of the term "prima facie" 
case and a discussion ·of the prosecution's burden of persuasion, see Commonwealth v. 
Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 331 N.E.2d 901 (1975). 
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not guilty on all or part of the charge. While such a finding is not 
appealable by the prosecution,55 the defendant may appeal a deci­
sion to permit further proceedings on the remaining charge if the 
trial results in a conviction. 56 Before making the motion for a re­
quired finding of not guilty, the defendant need not reserve the right 
to present a defense and the evidence presented by the defendant 
may not be considered by an appellate court reviewing the correct­
ness of the initial sufficiency ruling. 57 In short, the defendant's right 
to an acquittal if the evidence at this point is insufficient as a matter 
of law is fixed and the defendant's position on this issue cannot dete­
riorate thereafter, even on appeal. 
The defendant's right to some of these considerable benefits of 
Rule 25(a) may depend upon defense counsel's having made a 
timely motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the 
prosecution's case. While such a motion may be filed later, the judge 
need not rule upon it before submitting the case to the jury; when the 
ruling is made, it will be on the state of the evidence at the time the 
motion was made.58 If a ruling favorable to the defendant is made 
before a verdict is returned it is not appealable; if a verdict preceeds 
the ruling, the prosecution may appeal,59 Thus, the failure to move 
at the close of the prosecution's case deprives the defendant of the 
valuable right to have sufficiency determined at that time on the 
prosecution's evidence alone thereby possibly bringing the matter to 
a final close.60 Defense counsel, therefore, should file a written mo­
55. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 
369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962). 
56. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149-50 & n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368, 
370 & n.1 (1976); Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 407 n.4, 348 N.E.2d 794, 798 
n.4 (1976). 
57. See cases cited supra note 50. 
58. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149-50 & n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368, 370 & 
n.1 (1976). 
59. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(c)(I); see Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 543, 
535,420 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (1981); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1977). 
60. The failure to make this motion would almost certainly constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if the evidence at that point was in fact insufficient, particularly if 
the shortcoming was subsequently cured. But see Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 
283, 296-97, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1979) (counsel's failure to appeal denial of motion 
for directed verdict created substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where prose­
cution's evidence was insufficient; defendant therefore entitled to acquittal). Compare 
Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1,7, 10,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1103, 1104 (1980) (appel­
late counsel raised sufficiency issue as weight of the evidence issue by appealing denial of 
motion for new trial rather than denial of motion for directed verdict; court intimated 
that evidence was insufficient, granted new trial rather than acquittal); Commonwealth v. 
DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 596-97, 266 N.E.2d 315, 316-17 (1971) (court will not address 
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tion for a required finding of not guilty as provided in Rule 25(a) in 
every case in which a serious claim of insufficiency can be made re­
garding any issue that the prosecution must prove to convict. 
2. 	 Required Finding of Not Guilty at the Close of All the 
Evidence 
Depending upon whether the defendant presents evidence and 
if so, whether the prosecution presents rebuttal evidence, the "close 
of all the evidence" may arrive at any time after the prosecution's 
case-in-chief has been completed. The sufficiency of the evidence 
may be raised at this point by the judge sua sponte or on the defend­
ant's motion, whether or not the issue was raised or considered at the 
close of the prosecution's evidence. At this juncture, the judge may 
rule immediately or, in his or her discretion, reserve ruling and sub­
mit the case to the jury. The judge may rule on the reserved motion 
at virtually any time thereafter before the jury returns a verdict, after 
it is discharged without returning a verdict or after it returns a guilty 
verdict. 
In providing that the judge "on his own motion shall enter a 
finding of not guilty. . . after the evidence on either side is closed if 
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law," Rule 25(a) suggests 
that the judge should make the determination again at the close of 
the defendant's case whether or not the defendant requests it.61 The 
defendant is entitled to move for a required finding of not guilty 
after presenting his or her evidence even if no motion was made at 
the close of the prosecution's case.62 Without addressing the point 
directly, the rule also suggests that the judge's ruling upon a defend­
ant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, made at the close of 
the defendant's evidence, may be reserved and the case submitted to 
the jury.63 This suggestion arises from the fact that in many cases a 
motion made at this point constitutes a motion at the close of all the 
evidence. Rule 25(b)(1) expressly permits the judge to reserve ruling 
on such amotion.64 
theory of insufficiency on appeal which differs from theory of insufficiency asserted in 
trial court). 
61. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). The judge's obligation to insure that a case is not 
presented to a jury on insufficient evidence rests on a responsibility that serves a greater 
purpose than the protection of an individual defendant's rights; it is an indispensible 
component of a fair trial in the adversary system of adjudication. See Jackson, 443 U.S. 
at 316. 
62. 	 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). 
63. 	 See id 
64. 	 Id 25(c)(l); see supra note 16. 
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The defendant's position is usually weakened in several respects 
at the close of all the evidence. Because the standard applied to the 
judgment remains the same as applied at the close of the prosecu­
tion's case, the judge will view all the evidence in terms most 
favorable to the prosecution. If a sufficiency judgment was made at 
the close of the prosecution's case, the defendant's position cannot 
deteriorate in the eyes of the judge; that is, an incorrect ruling cannot 
be cured by virtue of the fact that the defendant's evidence may have 
filled in gaps in the prosecution's case.65 If a sufficiency judgment 
was not made at the close of the prosecution's case, the sufficiency 
judgment at the close of all the evidence will be made upon the view 
of all the evidence and the defendant's evidence may have strength­
ened the prosecution's case so as to meet the sufficiency standard.66 
Thus, the defendant whose counsel delays moving for a required 
finding of not guilty until all the evidence is closed loses the valuable 
right to have a sufficiency determination made on the strength of the 
prosecution's evidence alone and foregoes the opportunity to avoid 
having to present a defense to the charge being tried. 
A second major danger to the defendant at this stage arises 
when the trial judge reserves ruling on the sufficiency motion and 
submits the case to the jury. The defendant loses a measure of 
double jeopardy protection because the prosecution may appeal a 
favorable sufficiency ruling made after the jury's guilty verdict.67 If 
a motion for a required finding of not guilty is granted before a jury 
verdict, the prosecution cannot appea1.68 By foregoing the right to 
65. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149-50,346 N.E.2d 368, 370 (1976); 
Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 408, 348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976). This principle 
is, obviously, one governing appellate review since it describes a situation unlikely to 
occur at trial. But see Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 77-78 (1978); Common­
wealth v. Corridori, II Mass. App. Ct. 469, 470-71, 417 N.E.2d 969, 970-71 (1981). 
66. See Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 408, 348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976). 
The prosecution's case may, at least in theory, have deteriorated since it closed its case, 
and the court should determine whether that has occurred. Commonwealth v. Basch, 
386 Mass. 620, 622 n.2, 437 N.E.2d 200, 203 n.2 (1982); Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 
Mass. 73, 83, 375 N.E.2d 693,700 (1978); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 150 
n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368,370 n.1 (1976). This might occur where the defendant has effectively 
injected an affirmative defense other than lack of criminal responsibility into the case 
and the prosecution has not countered with sufficient rebuttal evidence to disprove the 
issue beyond a reasonable doubt. 
67. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a)(I); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 
(1975); Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 531, 420 N.E.2d 897, 898 (1981). If 
the appellate court disagrees with the trial judge it can reinstate the guilty verdict. Ther­
rien, 383 Mass. at 532, 420 N.E.2d at 899. 
68. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, II (1978); see Commonwealth v. Therrien, 
383 Mass. 529, 535-36, 420 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1981); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 
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move for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the prosecu­
tion's case, then, a defendant may have lost the opportunity to obtain 
an acquittal from the trial judge that is final. 
The question of what factors should guide the judge's discre­
tionary decision to reserve ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence at 
the close of all the evidence involves several important considera­
tions. Because the question is, in effect, whether to submit the case 
to the jury, the decision ought to be carefully weighed. Both the 
United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court have suggested that it is preferable to reserve ruling and 
submit the case to the jury when the question of sufficiency appears 
close.69 If the jury acquits, the issue is moot. If there is a conviction, 
the judge may allow the motion without depriving the prosecution of 
an opportunity to appea1.7° The principal flaw in this approach is 
the risk it creates that the protective functions of the sufficiency de­
termination will be defeated or diluted. The defendant's interest in 
the pre-verdict sufficiency determination includes finality, which is 
secured by the double jeopardy prohibition. Where the defendant 
has been unable to secure a Rule 25(a) determination because of the 
operation of a proof-facilitating device,71 the practice of reserving 
the ruling on the motion may deprive the defendant of the opportu­
nity to secure a pre-verdict sufficiency determination.72 Finally, the 
pre-verdict determination conserves judicial resources by insuring 
that unwarranted prosecutions are terminated as early as possible. 
The judge should consider these factors when deciding whether to 
reserve ruling on a motion made at the close of all the evidence. 
If the trial judge does reserve ruling on the motion as provided 
for in Rule 25(b)(l), the finality of a ruling favorable to the defend­
ant will probably depend in large part upon precisely when it is 
made, although the law on this point is not settled. At any time 
before a jury verdict is returned, entry of a required finding of not 
(5 Gray) 185,207-08 (1855); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 212, 214 
(1849); see also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,69 (1978); Fong Foo v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1961). 
69. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975); Commonwealth v. Ther­
rien, 383 Mass. 529, 531, 420 N.E.2d 897, 898 (1981). 
70. See cases cited supra notes 55-56. 
71. See infra notes 178-220 and accompanying text. 
72. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(I); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149­
51,346 N.E.2d 368, 370-71 (1976). The "no-reservation" policy emphasizes and secures 
the importance of this opportunity. 
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guilty is final and not reviewable on appeaP3 If the jury is dis­
charged without having returned a verdict, the judge is empowered 
nevertheless to enter a required finding of not guilty. This ruling, 
too, is an unreviewable acquittaP4 After the jury returns a guilty 
verdict, the judge still, pursuant to Rule 25(b)(l), may enter a re­
quired finding of not guilty on the basis of the insufficiency of the 
evidence.75 Defense counsel should be sure to secure an express rul­
ing on a reserved motion, if possible before a verdict is returned, but 
at least before judgment is entered because this ruling will be 
appealable.76 
If a motion based on insufficiency is made and denied at the 
close of all the evidence, and the case is submitted to the jury, the 
motion may be renewed within five days after the jury is discharged 
and may include an alternative motion for a new trial. 77 This is the 
equivalent of a request for a judgment non obstante verdicto and the 
ruling upon it is not precisely the same as a ruling on a reserved 
motion. Read literally, the first sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) does not 
authorize the renewal of a reserved motion nor does it authorize the 
alternative relief of a new trial to a defendant whose reserved motion 
has been denied.78 The trial judge's ruling on a reservedmotion con­
73. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); Common­
wealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 535-36, 420 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1981). 
74. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977). 
75. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(I); see supra note 16. This ruling is distinct from one 
made pursuant to Rule 25(b)(2). See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. 
76. Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 531,420 N.E.2d 897,898 (1981). 
77. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2). 
78. ld.; see supra note 16. That is not to say that the courts will interpret Rule 25 so 
literally. In Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 431 N.E.2d 915 (1982), the judge 
had reserved and then denied the defendant's Rule 25(b)(1) motion made at the close of 
all the evidence. The defendant later moved pursuant to Rule 25(b)(2) for a required 
finding of not guilty and pursuant to Rule 30(b) for a new trial. Still later he moved 
pursuant to Rule 25(b)(2) for a new trial and a reduced verdict. The supreme judicial 
court in its opinion drew a clear distinction between Rule 25(b)(I) and 25(b)(2) (first 
sentence) motions on one hand and 25(b)(2) (second sentence) motions on the other. 
Although the point was not discussed, the court appeared to take the view that Rule 
25(b)(l) relief was available to the defendant. ld. at 317-18, 431 N.E.2d at 917. The 
court's view of Rules 30(b) and 25(b)(2) (second sentence) motions for new trial narrows 
the importance of this distinction to the continued availability of "sufficiency" relief 
where the Rule 25(b)(1) motion has been reserved and denied after the jury is dis­
charged, as in Keough. If no verdict was returned and a mistrial was declared, the judge 
acting under 25(b)(2) (first sentence) can enter an unreviewable finding of not guilty. See 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977). The second sen­
tence does not authorize this form of relief regardless of whether a verdict was entered. 
A defendant whose motion is reserved and denied after a mistrial is declared cannot 
renew it under the first sentence of 25(b)(2) and so can obtain no further trial court 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
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stitutes the last occasion authorized by Rule 25 for considering the 
sujJiciency of the Commonwealth's case. If the defendant's motion at 
the close of all the evidence is denied rather than reserved, Rule 
25(b )(2) allows the motion to be renewed, thus affording the defend­
ant one further opportunity to contest the sufficiency issue.79 
In some cases, the grounds for asserting the insufficiency of the 
prosecution's evidence may crystallize for the first time after the jury 
has been instructed. This occurred in Commonwealth v. Sherry,80 a 
case in which three co-defendants were each charged with three 
counts of rape. The Commonwealth submitted evidence sufficient to 
show that each had raped the victim once and that each rape was 
accomplished with the aid of the other two defendants. The prose­
cution did not request, and the trial judge did not give, instructions 
regarding the liability of accessories before the fact, so the verdicts 
convicting each defendant of three charges could not stand on this 
ground.81 Arguably, each of the defendants could have moved for 
required findings of not guilty on two of the rape indictments against 
him after the instructions had been given, but the remedy of required 
findings of not guilty was not available until after the verdicts had 
been returned. 82 
3. Appellate Review 
A convicted defendant's right to appellate review of an insuffi­
ciency claim is dependent upon having properly presented the issue 
to the trialjudge.83 The defendant who has moved at the close of the 
prosecution's case is entitled to appellate review of that evidence 
standing alone.84 The sufficiency ruling is reviewed as one that is a 
question of law and thus, in effect, is reviewed de novo. The failure 
79. The defendant may also request a new trial. The supreme judicial court sug­
gests this be sought by separate motion. Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 317, 
431 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1982). 
80. 386 Mass. 682, 699-700, 437 N.E.2d 224, 234 (1982). 
81. ld at 700 n.9, 437 N.E.2d at 234 n.9. 
82. ld Until that time, supplemental instructions could have remedied the 
problem. 
83. Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 597, 266 N.E.2d 314, 316-17 
(1971) (supreme judicial court refused to consider a theory of insufficiency not presented 
to trial judge, although general claim of insufficiency had been presented). The defend­
ant need not have refiled or renewed the motion at any later point in the trial. Common­
wealth v. DeBrosky, 363 Mass. 718, 725, 297 N.E.2d 496, 501-02 (1973); 30A MASS. 
PRACTICE § 1916 (K. Smith 2d ed. 1983). 
84. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 676, 677-78, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374 
(1979). The same standard of sufficiency is applied at trial and on appeal. Common­
wealth v. Nickerson, 388 Mass. 246, 251-52,446 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1983). 
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to raise the issue at trial constitutes a procedural default that de­
prives the defendant of appellate review under this standard as a 
matter of right. Notice will be taken of the claim, either by collateral 
attack or on direct appeal, only if necessary to prevent "a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice."85 The supreme judicial court has 
not been consistent in the form of relief granted under the "miscar­
riage ofjustice" standard: It ordered an acquittal on direct review in 
one case86 and a new trial on collateral review in another. 87 
From 1974 through 1980, the supreme judicial court made its 
sufficiency review on the state of the evidence as it would have been 
had the trial judge correctly ruled on the evidentiary issues raised by 
the defendant.88 That is, if the court concluded that the trial court 
had incorrectly admitted prosecution evidence, the appellate court 
disregarded that evidence in reviewing the sufficiency of the evi­
dence.89 If the court concluded the trial court had incorrectly admit­
ted prosecution evidence, it disregarded that evidence in reviewing 
the trial judge's sufficiency determination.90 In 1981, the court began 
modifying that approach to permit retrial if the court found the evi­
dence insufficient by virtue of an appellate evidentiary ruling, unless 
it found that the prosecution would be unable to present sufficient 
admissible evidence if afforded another tria1.91 
C. Relieffrom Unjust Verdicts 
The remaining provisions of Rule 25 empower the trial judge to 
exercise an authority which, until the enactment of the rules, had 
been reserved to the supreme judicial court as part of its exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction to review convictions in first degree murder 
cases.92 Under the rules, if the jury returns a guilty verdict, the trial 
85. Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1,2,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (1980) (ap­
pellate review of motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 294 
n.14, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 n.14 (1979) (direct appeal); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 
Mass. 556, 564, 227 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1967). 
86. Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 297, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1979). 
87. Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. I, 11,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1105 (1980). 
88. Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 296-97 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1979); 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 410-11, 318 N.E.2d 895, 901 (1974). The 
Supreme Court has reserved ruling on whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires this 
approach. Green v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 26 (1978). . 
89. See cases cited supra note 88. 
90. Id 
91. Commonwealth v. Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 608-09, 451 N.E.2d 128, 130 (1983) 
(retrial permitted). 
92. Between 1962 and 1979 the supreme judicial court exercised exclusive appel­
late jurisdiction over all cases in which the indictment charged first degree murder. In 
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judge is empowered to set the verdict aside on motion and to grant 
anyone of three forms of relief: a new trial; an acquittal (finding of 
not guilty); or a finding of guilty of "any offense included in the 
offense charged in the indictment or complaint."93 The defendant 
need not have made any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
as a prerequisite to seeking the relief.94 In Commonwealth v. 
Gaulden95 and two subsequent cases,96 the supreme judicial court 
commented briefly upon the scope of two aspects of this unusual re­
medial power of the trial courts, the manner in which it should be 
invoked by defendants and exercised by trial judges, and the nature 
of the appellate review to be conducted of decisions made in reliance 
on it.97 
In Gaulden and Commonwealth v. Keough98 the trial judges had 
reduced the juries' second degree murder verdicts to manslaughter 
and resentenced the defendants.99 The prosecution's evidence in 
each case was determined to have been sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. lOo In Gaulden, the prosecution argued that because 
the evidence was sufficient, the trial judge could do no more than 
grant a new trial. The prosecution's procedural argument was that 
because the rule tied the judge's post-verdict powers to an initial mo­
1979 the legislature restricted the scope of this jurisdiction to convictions for first degree 
murder. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981); Commonwealth v. 
Davis, 380 Mass. I, 12-13,401 N.E.2d 811, 818-19 (1980). 
93. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2) (second sentence); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
278, § 11 (West 1981). 
94. See Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 552, 420 N.E.2d 905, 911 n.6 
(1981). BUI see Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 687, 437 N.E.2d 224, 234 
(1982). 
95. 383 Mass. 543, 420 N.E.2d 905 (1981). 
96. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682,437 N.E.2d 234 (1982); Common­
wealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 431 N.E.2d 915 (1982). 
97. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13; Commonwealth v. 
Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 316-21, 431 N.E.2d 915,917-20 (1982). 
98. 385 Mass. 314,431 N.E.2d 915 (1982). 
99. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 544, 420 N.E.2d at 913; Keough, 385 Mass. at 316, 431 
N.E.2d at 917. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 1970), mandates the imposition of a life 
sentence on one convicted of second degree murder. The convict is eligible for parole 
after serving 15 years of this sentence. fd ch. 127, § 133A (West 1974 & Supp. 1983­
1984). Section 13 authorizes a sentence of 20 years for a manslaughter conviction. fd 
ch. 265, § 13 (West 1970). Generally, the convict so sentenced will be eligible for parole 
after serving two-thirds of this sentence. fd ch. 127, § 133 (West Supp. 1983-1984). The 
Parole Board occasionally exercises its discretion to grant parole after one-third or more 
of the sentence has been served. See MASS. BD. OF PAROLE POLICY, PROCEDURES AND 
GUIDELINES 10-14 (1978). 
100. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 544, 420 N.E.2d at 913; Keough, 385 Mass. at 319, 431 
N.E.2d at 919. 
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tion for a required finding of not guilty, a reduced verdict could be 
ordered only when the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. 101 The court rejected both the argument and its procedural 
premise. 102 Conceding that Massachusetts General Laws ch. 278, 
§ II could be read to support the prosecution argument, the court 
distinguished the authority granted to the trial court in the first sen­
tence of Rule 25(b)(2) from that authority granted in the second sen­
tence. The former, to the court, was invoked by a renewed motion 
for a required finding of not guilty but the latter-the power to set 
the verdict aside-was not. 103 
Drawing upon the Reporter's Notes to Rule 25 and the legisla­
ture's modification of Massachusetts General Laws ch. 278 § 33E, 
the court found that the 1979 rule and statutory revisions had ef­
fected a significant redistribution of authority to grant post-convic­
tion relief from a jury's verdict from the supreme judicial court to 
the trial judges. 104 Section 33E had previously authorized the 
supreme judicial court to conduct a plenary review of the justice of 
jury verdicts in cases tried on first degree murder indictments result­
ing in either first or second degree verdicts. This authority was nar­
rowed by the 1979 amendment which made the review applicable 
only where first degree murder verdicts were returned. lOS Rule 
25(b)(2) (second sentence) authorized trial judges to exercise a simi­
lar power to enter a finding of guilty on any lesser included offense 
in all cases. 106 The supreme judicial court has exercised its section 
33E authority in cases in which the evidence was sufficient to support 
the verdict, when the court concluded that justice required the entry 
of a lesser verdict. 107 The trial judge is to exercise the Rule 25(b )(2) 
(second sentence) authority to reduce a verdict similarly and so is 
101. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 552, 420 N.E.2d at 910-11. 
102. Id. at 554-55, 420 N.E.2d at 912. 
103. Id. at 553-54, 420 N.E.2d at 911. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Both the reporter's notes and the court's discussion in Gaulden indicate that 
this grant of authority to trial judges is to be exercised both in the interest of distributive 
justice for individual defendants and the interest of judicial economy. See MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 25 reporters notes at 503; Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13. 
In granting relief where the evidence is not legally sufficient, a judge will avoid the need 
for a new trial. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 554-55 n.8, 420 N.E.2d at 912 n.8. In granting a 
reduced verdict where the evidence is sufficient, an appeal of the conviction may be 
avoided, although it is clear that such an appeal is still possible. The existence of this 
authority also opens up post-trial plea bargaining possibilities. See id. at 552 n.5, 420 
N.E.2d at 910 n.5. 
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free to grant relief under this provision even when the evidence is 
legally sufficient. los 
Some of the discussion in Gaulden regarding the trial judges' 
new powers suggests that these new powers might be exercised a lit­
tle more liberally than the supreme judicial court has exercised its 
section 33E authority to modify verdicts. 109 Because it considers the 
weight rather than sufficiency of the evidence, the supreme judicial 
court has not been bound by the formal strictures that govern the 
sufficiency determination-the rational factfinder and the prosecu­
tion's best case rules. The trial court, in exercising its relief-from­
verdict powers, also considers the weight of the evidence and is free 
to make credibility judgments based upon its opportunity to hear 
and observe the witnesses. The supreme judicial court's ability to 
determine credibility is limited because its review is upon a written 
record. Institutional constraints aside, the trial judge considering a 
motion for relief from a verdict is in as good a position to judge 
credibility, weigh evidence and draw inferences as is the jury.110 In 
exercising this power the trial judge should have in mind the dual 
objectives of individual justice and uniformity of treatment for simi­
larly blameworthy conduct. 111 
The appellate court's role in this scheme is to regulate the trial 
court's exercise of discretion in the interest of uniformity. In 
Gaulden, the court ruled that the Commonwealth could appeal an 
order granting a verdict reduction, commenting only that it per­
ceived no distinction between such an appeal and the prosecutorial 
appeal of a trial judge's order to enter a required finding of not 
guilty on a reserved motion under Rule 25(b)(1).1l2 The court stated 
explicitly that it would not engage in a de novo review of a request 
for a verdict reduction but would consider only whether the trial 
court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. ll3 To facil­
108. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 553, 420 N.E.2d at 911. 
109. See id at 553-54, 420 N.E.2d at 913. 
110. See id 

Ill. Id at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 913. 

112. Id at 550, 420 N.E.2d at 909. In Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 
420 N.E.2d 897 (1981), the court ruled that such an appeal did not violate double jeop­
ardy principles. Id at 531-32, 420 N.E.2d at 898 (relying on United States v. Wilson, 420 
U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975); and Jenkins v. United States, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975». 
113. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 557, 420 N.E.2d at 913. The standard of review for 
abuse of discretion is whether a conscientious judge could reasonably have acted as the 
judge whose ruling is being reviewed acted. The court affirmed the trial judge's action in 
Gaulden, stating "we accept the reasonableness of the judge's decision to order the entry 
of a finding of guilty of manslaughter." Id at 558, 420 N.E.2d at 914. 
Review ofthe trial judge's decision on a Rule 25(b)(2) reduction of verdict motion is 
942 WESTERN NEW ENGLANJ) LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:917 
itate this review, the trial judge must state the reasons for his or her 
action in terms consistent with the supreme judicial court's exercise 
of its section 33E powers. 
II. THE LEGAL STANDARD OF SUFFICIENCY 
A premise of the Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson v. Vir­
ginia l14 is that the Winship principle and the presumption of inno­
cence cannot be adequately enforced through jury instructions 
alone. 115 The Constitution imposes the further duty upon the trial 
judge to assess the prosecution's evidence to insure that it is sufficient 
to establish "the essential elements of the crime" beyond a reason­
able doubt. I 16 The task of identifying the "essential elements" of the 
crime charged is the task of identifying the factual issues. The pre­
sumption of innocence requires the prosecution to satisfy a burden 
of production or suffer a required finding of not guilty on such is­
sues. The logical first step in the sufficiency assessment, then, is to 
identify the "essential elements" of the crime charged. Within broad 
due process limits, the power to define crimes is reserved to the 
states. This includes the power to eliminate issues relevant to guilt 
from the definition of the offense, designate them as "affirmative" 
defenses, and assign to the defendant the burden of production and/ 
or the burden of persuasion on them. ll7 In Massachusetts, the bur­
dens of production and persuasion on "affirmative" defenses are 
commonly divided between the parties, with the burden of produc­
tion assigned to the defendant and the burden of persuasion assigned 
to the prosecution, regardless of whether the claim contests an essen­
tial element of the crime charged. I 18 Because the burden of persua­
distinct from the supreme judicial court's obligation under section 33E to review a mur­
der conviction under that statute. The trial judge's decision to reduce such a verdict, if 
affirmed on appeal, removes the case from the supreme judicial court's section 33E re­
view. Id at 558 n.ll, 420 N.E.2d at 914 n.ll. If the trial judge denied relief; that ruling 
would likewise be reviewed for an abuse of discretion in all cases. If the case was also 
subject to section 33E review, the supreme judicial court would independently determine 
whether to reduce the verdict or grant a new trial. Id at 557 n.lO, 420 N.E.2d at 913 
n.lO. 
114. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
1\5. See id at 318. An excellent presumption of innocence jury instruction is 
found in Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39,45-47,434 N.E.2d 997, 1003 (1983). 
116. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
117. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977). 
118. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-89, 352 N.E.2d 
203,205-06 (1976) (defendant has burden of producing sufficient evidence to put claim of 
self-defense in issue; prosecution then has burden of disproving self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt because claim of self-defense contests essential element of unlawfulness 
of killing); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406-09, 361 N.E.2d \308, 1311-13 
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sion remains with the prosecution on all defense claims, there are, 
properly speaking, no "affirmative" defenses in Massachusetts. 119 
The impact upon the defendant's due process protections of as­
signing the burden of production to him or her is, however, function­
ally similar to that of an affirmative defense. Accordingly, because 
the constitutionality of assigning the burden of production to the de­
fendant depends upon whether the issue could be treated legiti­
mately as an affirmative defense, the due process limitations on this 
practice will be addressed in both contexts. First, however, it is nec­
essary to establish how, under state law, the essential elements of a 
crime are identified. 
A. Jdenttfying the Essential Elements of the Crime Charged 
Under Massachusetts law, the essential elements of the crime 
consist of "every material fact or ingredient, which the law requires 
in order to constitute the offense."120 Ordinarily the task of indenti­
fying these essential elements is relatively simple. From the applica­
ble statute, as modified by judicial interpretation, one identifies the 
conduct (act or omission, together with mens rea, if any), attendant 
circumstances or result of such conduct that is described in the defi­
nition of the offense, or which negates an excuse or justification for 
the forbidden conduct; or negates a statute of limitations defense; or 
establishes jurisdiction. l2l However, case law and statute may re­
quire different treatment of some defensive issues which could other­
wise be considered elemental. 
For example, Massachusets General Laws chapter 278, section 7 
provides: 
A defendant in a criminal prosecution, relying upon a license, ap­
pointment, admission to practice as an attorney at law, shall prove 
the same; and, until so proved, the presumption shall be that he is 
(1977) (claim of license to carry firearm is an affirmative defense and absent sufficient 
evidence of possession of license by defendant, neither prosecution nor jury need address 
issue; once issue of license raised by evidence, prosecution must prove absence of license 
beyond reasonable doubt even though absence of license is not an essential element of 
the crime). 
119. An affirmative defense is an issue upon which the defendant bears the burden 
of persuasion. The Model Penal Code endorses the Massachusetts practice of defining as 
affirmative defenses those issues on which the defendant has the burden of production 
and the prosecution the burden of persuasion. Allen, supra note 7, at 27; W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 152 (1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2)(3) (Proposed Offi­
cial Draft 1962). 
120. Commonwealth v. McKie, 67 Mass. (l Gray) 61, 62 (1854). 
121. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). 
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not so authorized. 122 
The effect of this statute must be independently accounted for be­
cause it may work to change what appears to be an element of an 
offense into an affirmative defense. 123 For example in Common
wealth v. Jones,124 the supreme judicial court affirmed its earlier 
holding that the absence of a license was not an element of the of­
fense of unlawfully carrying a firearm, despite the terms of the stat­
ute which provided for the punishment of one who "except as 
provided by law, carries on his person ... a firearm ..." or coming 
within the scope of exempted persons or uses.t25 Under the Model 
Penal Code approach, the possession of a license is a justification for 
the otherwise prohibited conduct of knowingly carrying a firearm. 
Accordingly, the absence of a firearm would be an essential element 
of the offense, but for the effect of chapter 278 section 7. Before 
considering the due process limitations on designating as "affirma­
tive defenses" such issues that are relevant to guilt or degree of guilt, 
it is appropriate to consider whether-and if so, when-the burden 
of producing evidence may be assigned to a defendant on a defense 
claim which contests an essential element of the crime. 
B. 	 The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden ofProduction on 
Elemental Issues 
The necessity of limiting the power to shift to the defendant the 
burden of production on an elemental issue was recognized by the 
supreme judicial court as early as 1854, when the court ruled in 
Commonwealth v. McKie126 that the presumption of innocence, to­
gether with "the form of the issue" (the use of a general denial to 
join the issues in a criminal case) "necessarily imposes on the gov­
ernment the burden of showing affirmatively the existence of every 
material fact or ingredient, which the law requires in order to consti­
tute an offense."127 The defendant in McKie was charged with as­
sault and battery and defended on the ground of justification. 128 
122. 	 Id. 
123. Redefinition of an offense to effect a reallocation of the burden of persuasion 
on an issue was approved in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,2\0 (1977). 
124. 	 372 Mass. 403, 361 N.E.2d 1308 (1977). 
125. Id. at 405-06, 361 N.E.2d at 1310 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, 
§ \O(a) (West 1975)). 
126. 	 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 61 (1854). 
127. 	 Id. at 62. 
128. Although the adequacy of this justification was not contested in the trial 
court, the supreme judicial court clearly stated that it did not constitute a recognized 
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The trial judge had instructed the jury that if the prosecution had 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McKie had struck the victim, 
the burden was then on McKie to prove his justification. 129 The 
supreme judicial court reversed, noting that, under Massachusetts 
law, "assault and battery consists in the unlawful a~d unjustified use 
of force and violence upon the person of another, however slight." 130 
Thus, one of the essential elements of assault and battery is the de­
fendant's unjustifiable, unlawful intent and if the evidence "fails to 
show the act to have been unjustifiable, or leaves the question in 
doubt, the criminal act is not proved, and the party charged is enti­
tled to an acquittal."131 
The court's ruling on this point is simply an early application, as 
a matter of state law, of the familiar Winship principle that the prose­
cution bears the burden of persuasion on each essential element of 
the crime.132 The court continued, however, to consider the impact 
of the presumption of innocence and the burden of persuasion on the 
prosecution's burden of production: so long as the contested issues 
relate "solely to the original transaction constituting the alleged 
criminal act, and forming part of the res gestae," the prosecution's 
evidence must negate any defense which contests an essential ele­
ment of the crime. 133 On a charge of assault and battery, for exam­
ple, the prosecution's evidence must be sufficient to support a 
conclusion that the physical contact was not accidental. 134 This evi­
defense. Because the adequacy of the defense was not material to the issue raised, the 
court addressed the merits anyway. Id. at 62. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 63. 
131. Id. 
132. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
133. McKie, 67 Mass. (I Gray) at 64. 
134. 	 Id. at 64. 
If therefore the evidence fails to show the act to have been unjustifiable, or 
leaves that question in doubt, the criminal act is not proved, and the party 
charged is entitled to an acquittal. To illustrate this; it is clearly settled, that 
when an injury to the person is accidental, and the party defendant is without 
fault, it will not amount to an assault and battery. . . . Now in a case of this 
sort, if the evidence offered by the government leaves it doubtful whether the 
injury was the result of accident or design, there can be no question of the right 
of the defendant to an acquittal, because it is left doubtful whether any criminal 
act was committed. But can the government, in such a case, on proving simply 
the injury to the person, rest their case, and call on the defendant to assume the 
burden of proof and satisfy the jury that it was accidental, or else submit to a 
conviction? If so, then a criminal charge can always be shown by providing 
part of a transaction, and the burden of proof can be shifted upon the defend­
ant, by a careful management of the case on the part of the government, so as to 
withhold that part of the proof which may bear in his favor. 
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dence must be presented in the case~in~chief, or the prosecution has 
not satisfied its burden of production. 135 In contrast, the burden of 
proof (production and persuasion) on a defensive claim, which de­
pends upon proof of facts separate and independent of the alleged 
criminal transaction, may be imposed on the defendant. 136 
The McKie principle, that the defendant may not be required to 
assume the burden of producing evidence of a defensive claim which 
contests an essential element of the crime charged, is a necessary co­
rollary to the Jackson requirement that the prosecution produce suf­
ficient evidence to prove each essential element of the crime. As the 
McKie opinion implies, imposing a burden of production upon the 
defendant imposes a burden of persuasion upon him or her as 
well.137 Although the standard of persuasion-the level of certainty 
which the proponent must meet to satisfy the burden-is lower, the 
assignment of a burden of production may be decisive on the issue 
for which the burden was imposed. Imposing the burden of produc­
tion upon the defendant shifts, from the prosecution to the defend­
ant, the duty to present evidence and persuade the judge that that 
evidence is sufficient to support a favorable decision by the jury on 
Id 
135. Id 
Suppose a case, where all the testimony comes from the side of the prose­
cution. The defendant has a right to say that upon the proof, so introduced, no 
case is made against him, because there is left in doubt one of the essential 
elements of the offense charged, namely, the wrongful, unjustifiable, unlawful 
intent. The same rule must apply where the evidence comes from both sides, 
but relates solely to the original transaction constituting the alleged criminal 
act, and forming part of the res gesta. 
Id at 64. 
136. 	 Id at 65. 
There may be cases, where a defendant relies on some distinct, substantive 
ground of defence [sic) to a criminal charge, not necessarily connected with the 
transaction on which the indictment is founded, (such as insanity, for instance,) 
in which the burden of proof is shifted upon the defendant. But in cases like 
the present, (and we do not intend to express an opinion beyond the precise case 
before us,) where the defendant sets up no separate independent fact in answer 
to a criminal charge, but confines his defence [sic) to the original transaction 
charged as criminal, with its accompanying circumstances, the burden of proof 
does not change, but remains upon the government to satisfy the jury that the 
act was unjustifiable and unlawful. 
Id 
137. Imposing a burden of production on the defendant need not entail a shift in 
the burden of persuasion. The practice in Massachusetts is to impose the burden of per­
suasion on the prosecution even on issues which constitutionally could be left to the 
defendant to prove, such as license and criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (1977); Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 
Mass. 516, 532, 350 N.E.2d 444, 455 (1976). 
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that issue. On this issue, under Massachusetts procedure, the de­
fendant is thereby deprived of the right to a sufficiency assessment 
based solely on the prosecution's evidence, before the case is submit­
ted to a jury. Consequently, the defendant is also deprived of the 
opportunity to win an unappealable insufficiency ruling on that is­
sue. 138 If the judge determines that the defendant has not satisfied 
the burden of production on a particular issue, the judge will not 
instruct the jury on that issue in effect, directing a verdict against the 
defendant. The prosecution will be relieved of its constitutional duty 
to disprove the claim to the jury's satisfaction beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 139 
The practice of imposing on the defendant a burden of produc­
ing evidence on a defensive issue which contests an essential element 
of the crime will frequently be inconsistent with the rulings and ra­
tionales of McKie and Jackson. This is, nonetheless, the current 
Massachusetts practice. l40 The Supreme Court's earlier comments 
on this issue are consistent with an interpretation of Jackson which 
would prohibit shifting the burden of producing evidence on an ele­
mental defense unless the evidence presented by the prosecution in 
its case-in-chief would support a finding by the factfinder that the 
issue (e.g., self-defense) has been disproved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
138. The only opportunity afforded the defendant by Rule 25 to have the suffi­
ciency of the prosecution's evidence assessed standing alone is that provided at the close 
of the prosecution's case under Rule 25(a). If the burden of production is on the defend­
ant, the "prosecution's best case" rule will foreclose consideration of the defendant's evi­
dence on that issue even if the defendant succeeded in satisfying the burden of 
production through cross-examination. If the defendant satisfies the burden of produc­
tion and the prosecution presents rebuttal evidence, the sufficiency issue will be deter­
mined on all the evidence, but the defendant's evidence will be considered in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676­
78, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-75 (1979). 
Similarly, on the defendant's motion, the judge is required to assess the sufficiency 
of the prosecution's evidence at the close of its case-in-chief before the case can proceed. 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). On a motion at any later point in the process, the judge has the 
discretion to reserve ruling until after the jury returns a verdict. lei. 25(b)(1). A required 
finding of not guilty entered before a verdict is fin~l; such a ruling after a verdict is 
appealable. Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 532-33, 420 N.E.2d 897, 899-900 
(1981). 
139. The foregoing analysis of the effect of shifting the burden of production to the 
defendant draws heavily on Allen, supra note 7, and McNaughton, supra note 7. 
140. See, e.g., Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786, 790-91, 400 N.E.2d 862, 
865 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-88, 352 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 
(1976) (self-defense); Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-17, 287 N.E.2d 122, 
128 (1972) (alibi). 
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The Court's dictum in Mullaney v. Wilburl41 is not to the con­
trary. The Court stated that its holding that the Winship principle 
did not permit the state to shift the burden ofpersuasion to the de­
fendant on an elemental defense was not intended to affect the com­
mon practice of assigning the defendant a burden of production on 
such issues. 142 The Court also acknowledged that its earlier deci­
sions had established the proposition that procedural devices that 
shifted the burden of production to the defendant must satisfy cer­
tain procedural safeguards. 143 In one of those earlier decisions, 
Barnes v. United States, 144 the Court acknowledged that the prosecu­
tion must first produce sufficient evidence to establish a "rational 
connection" between its evidence and the fact upon which the de­
fendant would be required to produce evidence. 145 That "rational 
connection" was satisfied in Barnes because the prosecution's evi­
dence was sufficient to prove the issue beyond a reasonable doubt. 146 
In the other early case, Turner v. United States,147 the Court re­
fused to approve a shift in the burden of production to the defendant 
on the elemental issue when the government's evidence at the time of 
the shift was not sufficient to convict on that issue. 148 
The difficulties with the suggested approach are obvious: if 
the Government proves only possession and if possession is itself 
insufficient evidence of either importation or knowledge, but the 
statute nevertheless permits conviction where the defendant 
chooses not to explain, the Government is clearly relieved of its 
obligation to prove its case, unaided by the defendant, and the 
defendant is made to understand that if he fails to explain he can 
be convicted on less than sufficient evidence to constitute a prima 
facie case. 149 
Barnes and Turner teach that there is a necessary prerequisite to us­
ing a procedural and evidentiary device which indirectly gives the 
defendant the burden of producing evidence on an elementary issue: 
141. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
142. Id at 701 n.38. 
143. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 702 n.31; see Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 
n.1l (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 406 n.6 (1970). 
144. 412 U.s. 837 (1973). 
145. Id at 843. 
146. Id at 845. 
147. 396 U.S. 398 (1970). 
148. Id at 423. 
149. 396 U.S. at 408 n.8 (citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943». 
The Court noted that it had ruled similarly in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33-34 
(1969). 
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the prosecution's evidence must be "rationally connected" to the ele~ 
ment to be proved. The holdings of McKie and Jackson support the 
proposition that this rational connection must be strong enough to 
support a conviction without artificial assistance. Similarly, the bur~ 
den of production on an elemental issue also cannot be directly as~ 
signed to the defendant until the prosecution has satisfied its 
constitutional burden of production as to that element. The princi~ 
pIe of Jackson v. Virginia lSo imposes the same limitation. lsl 
The practice of imposing the burden of production on a defend~ 
ant who wishes to defend upon grounds that negate an essential ele~ 
ment of the prosecution's case does not serve any legitimate purpose 
that would not be served by another readily available device. The 
principal purposes of imposing this burden upon the defendant are 
twofold: to notify the prosecution that the issue is being contested, 
and to relieve the prosecution of the onus of proving unknown nega~ 
tives. To the extent the practice is used to assess the sufficiency of 
the defendant's evidence, the due process principle of Jackson is of­
fended by any standard more demanding than that which questions 
whether the evidence might raise a reasonable doubt on some ele­
ment of the defense. ls2 The notice and issue-narrowing functions 
served by the practice of imposing defensive burdens of production 
on an elemental issue can be served by slightly enlarging the scope of 
the notice requirements of Rule 14(b)(2) to include all affirmative 
defenses. ls3 In the case in which the defendant has notified the pros­
ecution that an elemental issue will be contested by a claim ofjustifi­
cation or excuse, there usually will be no reason why the prosecution 
should not be required to offer its evidence on that issue as part of its 
150. 443 U.S. 307 (1979); see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. 
151. The supreme judicial court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 
286, 292-99, 331 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1975), is based on reasoning consistent with this con­
clusion, but its finding that the evidence in that case satisfied the standards articulated is 
dubious in the extreme. See id. at 288-89, 292 n.7, 331 N.E.2d at 903-04,905 n.7. 
152. This is a logical application of the principle that a burden of production is a 
function of the corresponding burden of persuasion. Allen, supra note 7, at 329; Mc­
Naughton, mpra note 7, at 1390. 
The allocation of the burden of producing evidence is best understood as in alloca­
tion of the risk of non-persuasion of the judge. McNaughton, mpra, at 1383-84; 
J.THAYER, supra note 9, at 355 (1898); see a/so, Bailey v. United States, 444 U.S. 339, 415 
(1980). When the prosecution's burden of persuasion on an issue is beyond a reasonable 
doubt the defendant's burden of persuasion is to raise a reasonable doubt. If the defend­
ant's evidence is sufficient to do so, he or she is entitled to have the jury hear it and 
decide the issue because the jury could reasonably acquit. 
153. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(2) provides that notice be given of the intent to assert 
the following "defenses": insanity, license, alibi. 
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case-in-chief.154 This practice will facilitate a more orderly and ef­
fective sufficiency assessment by increasing the likelihood that the 
issues will have been joined on a factual level rather than simply on 
the more abstract "elemental" level. I55 Such an approach will make 
it more likely that the court will be able to determine whether the 
prosecution's evidence furnishes a rational factual basis upon which 
the defendant might be convicted. Finally, this practice would elimi­
nate the possibility that the defendant would have the burden of pro­
duction on an issue that might lead the jury to infer that the 
defendant also bears a burden of persuasion greater than of estab­
lishing a reasonable doubt on that issue. 156 These relatively minor 
changes in the proof process are necessary to render the sufficiency 
assessment process capable of fully protecting the due process pro­
tections guaranteed criminal defendants through the presumption of 
innocence and the Winship principle. 
154. In Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 677 n.7, 405 N.E.2d 927, 903 n.7 
(1980), the supreme judicial court noted that "as a matter of discretion" the trial judge, 
on the defendant's motion, required the prosecution to present affirmative evidence of 
criminal responsibility in its case-in-chief after the defendant had complied with the no­
tice requirement of Rule 14(b)(2). 
Generally, evidence raising an issue of self-defense or accident may be introduced 
by either party. The defense may unavoidably inject the issue through the victim's testi­
mony, Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 8 Mass. App. 228, 234-35, 392 N.E.2d 1207, 1211­
12 (1979), or pretrial statements of the defendant, Commonwealth v. Dilone, 385 Mass. 
281,283,431 N.E.2d 576,578 (1982); Commonwealth v. Fluker, 377 Mass. 123, 127,385 
N.E.2d 256, 259 (1979); Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 689-90, 127 N.E.2d 
294,295 (1955). The defendant may testify to the facts, Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 
Mass. 786, 787,400 N.E.2d 862, 863 (1980); Connolly v. Commonwealth, 377 Mass. 527, 
528-29,387 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1979); Commonwealth v. Collins, 374 Mass. 596, 598, 373 
N.E.2d 969, 971 (1978); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583,586-87,374 N.E.2d 87, 
90-91 (1978); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 686, 352 N.E.2d 203, 204 
(1976); Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 643, 341 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1976); Com­
monwealth v. Lacasse, 365 Mass. 271, 272, 310 N.E.2d 605, 606 (1974), or eyewitness 
testimony may provide the evidence, Commonwealth v. Lowe, 15 Mass. App. 262, 263, 
444 N.E.2d 1314, 1316 (1983); Rodrigues, 370 Mass. at 686,352 N.E.2d at 204; Martin, 
369 Mass. at 643, 341 N.E.2d at 888; Houston, 332 Mass. at 687, 127 N.E.2d at 295. 
155. In Jackson, the Court retreated from its articulation of the Winship principle 
in terms of the "facts necessary to constitute the crime" to the "essential elements of the 
crime." Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) with Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. 
This shift in emphasis may have been necessary in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977), to facilitate the resolution ofjury instruction issues which arose from the decision 
in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1978). In the sufficiency context, consequence of 
stating the legal standard in terms of elements rather than facts is that the impetus to 
assess the issues factually is deflected and the judge's scrutiny of the prosecution's case 
will not be as exacting as it should be. 
156. The possibility of this type of confusion entering the case by the manner in 
which the issue is injected and presented is most acute in self-defense cases because ofthe 
difficulty of instructing the jury on the elaborate criteria and structure of this issue with­
out creating the impression that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion. 
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C. 	 The Burden ofProduction and Sufficiency of the Evidence on 
Affirmative Defense Issues 
In Massachusetts, an affirmative defense practice is a claim that 
raises issues not generated by the charge; that is, a claim recognized 
in law as exculpatory but raising matters that are not placed in issue 
by any element of the crime. In the absence of evidence sufficient to 
put the matter in contest, it will not be an issue in the case. IS7 The 
sufficiency assessment on such an issue stands on different constitu­
tional footing than it does when an elemental issue is addressed. By 
definition, the presumption of innocence is not implicated because 
due process principles would not be offended by a conviction that 
does not include consideration of the issue. But the sufficiency pro­
cess also protects the integrity of the burden of persuasion by insur­
ing that the jury has sufficient evidence to support a finding on the 
issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process requires that jury de­
cisions on affirmative defense issues rest upon sufficient evidence 
and not on speculation, bias or other non-evidentiary bases. ISS The 
sufficiency process is an essential guardian of this policy. In addi­
tion, the no-reservation policy of Rule 25(a)-which applies only to 
the assessment made at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief­
secures an important double jeopardy protection: It guarantees a fi­
nal decision favorable to the defendant when made at that point. 
Two questions arise with regard to affirmative defenses, then: what 
due process principles limit the state's authority to treat an issue rele­
vant to guilt or punishment as an affirmative defense; and how 
should the process of assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's 
evidence on these issues be structured? 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court have held that Morrison v. California (Mor­
rison lI)1s9 articulates the due process limitations on the state's 
157. q: Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977) (An "affirmative de­
fense. . . does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in 
order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is 
required to carry the burden of persuasion ...."); see also Allen, supra note 7, at 327. 
As noted earlier, Massachusetts law imposes only a burden of production on the defend­
ant; the prosecution is required to disprove properly raised affirmative defenses beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 
(1977). 
158. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-20; Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 
816, 822-23, 323 N.E.2d 294, 297-98, 301-02 (1975). The fact that the prosecution must 
prove an issue beyond a reasonable doubt does not by itself make that issue an essential 
element of the crime. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 & n.20 (1982). 
159. 	 291 U.S. 82 (1934) (hereinafter cited as Morrison II). 
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power to reallocate burdens of persuasion (and therefore production) 
by treating factors relevant to guilt as affirmative defenses. 160 Morri­
son II condemned the use of astatutory presumption in prosecutions 
under a California law which prohibited the use of real property 
within the state by one who was both a non-citizen and ineligible by 
race for United States citizenship.161 The statute required the state 
to charge the defendant with being an ineligible non-citizen but per­
mitted the jury to convict upon proof that the defendant was a land­
user.162 The defendant was required to prove his eligibility or citi­
zenship to the jury's satisfaction. 163 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Cardozo contrasted this statutory scheme to the one approved the 
previous term in Morrison v. California (Morrison 1).164 The statute 
in Morrison I created a similar presumption of ineligibility and non­
citizenship but was triggered upon proof by the prosecution that the 
defendant was a land-user and a member of an ineligible race. That 
is, the defendant was required to prove that he or she was exempt 
from the general prohibition. 165 
Because the Supreme Court in both Morrison cases was dealing 
with the permissibility of shifting the burden of production to the 
defendant upon elemental issues, its classic statement of the limits of 
reason and fairness that regulate the practice must be read with the 
Winship principle in mind as a qualifier. 166 The burden of produc­
tion on an issue considered determinative of guilt or degree of guilt 
may be assigned to the defendant only when the elements upon 
160. Id. at 88-89. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,203 n.9 (1977); Com­
monwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 408, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (1977); see also Rossi v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1933); United States v. Chodar, 479 F.2d 661, 663 (1st 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973) (state is not required to allocate to it~e1f the 
burden of producing evidence that would tend to disprove an affirmative defense not 
established by the defendant). 
As late as 1950, the Morrison II doctrine was applied to burden of persuasion issues. 
See Fleischman v. United States, 339 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1950); see also id. at 376-77 
(Black, J., dissenting) (relying in part on Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943». After 
Winship and Mullaney, of course, Morrison II cannot be applied to elemental burden of 
persuasion issues. 
161. 291 U.S. at 96. 
162. Id. at 84. 
163. Id. at 84, 88. This statute clearly illustrates the manner in which a statutory 
presumption or inference shifts to the defendant the burden of producing evidence on the 
issue it addressed. See Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 292-99, 331 N.E.2d 901, 
905-09 (1975), for an exposition on the supreme judicial court's views on this issue. 
164. 288 U.S. 591 (1933) (hereinafter cited as Morrison 1). 
165. See Morrison II, 291 U.S. at 84. 
166. The Court, however, approved the Morrison II principles without qualifica­
tion in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,203 n.9 (1977). 
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which the prosecution bears the Winship burden of proof "make it 
just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved 
with excuse or explanation ...."167 This test is most clearly met in 
cases like Commonwealth v. Jonesl68 where the statute created a gen­
eral prohibition subject to authorized exceptions. 169 Under such 
statutes, the Morrison II is most likely to be met: either the defend­
ant enjoys an advantage over the prosecution in possession of, or 
access to, the information l70 needed to prove the issue or shifting the 
burden will aid the prosecution without subjecting the defendant to 
hardship or oppression. l7l The likelihood of such a problem arising 
in Massachusetts, on any matter outside the reach of Massachusetts 
General Laws, ch. 278, § 7 is remote, given this jurisdiction's policy 
of requiring the prosecution to assume the burden of persuasion be­
yond a reasonable doubt to disprove matters of justification, mitiga­
tion and excuse.172 Because only the burden of production is shifted 
on affirmative defenses, the possibility that a defendant will be seri­
ously disadvantaged by the rule is likely to appear only in cases in 
which he or she must testify in order to place that matter in issue. 
The effect on the sufficiency assessment of assigning the burden 
of production to the defendant is not entirely clear. Rule 25(a) re­
quires the trial judge to determine whether the evidence, under con­
sideration at the time a motion for a required finding of not guilty is 
made, "is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on 
the charge."173 The standards of legal sufficiency in Jackson and 
Commonwealth v. Latimorel74 are articulated in terms of "the essen­
tial elements of the crime."175 Arguably, if the scope of the required 
sufficiency assessment is limited to elemental issues, a defendant is 
not entitled to the assessment on any issue that is legitimately char­
167. Morrison If, 291 U.S. at 88-89. 
168. 372 Mass. 403, 361 N.E.2d \308 (1977). 
169. fd at 405-07, 361 N.E.2d at \310-11. This test generally validates the applica­
tion of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 7 (West 1981). 
170. This is not so where the privilege against self-incrimination would be compro­
mised. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973); Commonwealth v. Pauley, 
368 Mass. 286, 297-98, 331 N.E.2d 901, 908 (1975). 
171. In this respect it is relevant to consider that the Morrison principles applied to 
the practice of shifting the entire burden of proof, both production and persuasion, to the 
defendant. The fact that the prosecution has the burden of persuasion might be relevant 
to whether it is unfair to assign the defendant the burden of production. 
172. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thurber, 383 Mass. 328, 331, 418 N.E.2d 1253, 
1256 (1981) (defense of necessity to charge of prison escape). 
173. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). 
174. 378 Mass. 671, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979). 
175. Jackson, 443 U,S. at 319; Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-77, 393 N,E.2d at 374. 
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acterized as an affirmative defense. That literal reading of Jackson 
and Latimore, however, is inimical to the underlying rationale of 
each case, which is to insure that jury verdicts are reasonably sup­
ported by persuasive evidence. 176 The practice of assuring the suffi­
ciency of the evidence also serves to safeguard the integrity of the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of persuasion. Finally, the suf­
ficiency judgment plays an indispensable role in securing important 
double jeopardy interests for defendants. 177 Although the reasons for 
allowing the defendant to satisfy the burden of production on an 
affirmative defense by pleading it under Rule l4(b) are not as com­
pelling as they are in the case of elemental issues, such a practice 
would promote consistency and eliminate unneeded complications 
in the sufficiency assessment process. 
D. 	 The Use ofProof-Facilitating J)evices to Satisfy the 
Prosecution -s Burdens ofProduction and Persuasion 
Statutory and common law devices called presumptions, prima 
facie cases and inferences are commonly used in Massachusetts to 
facilitate the proof of difficult issues by clarifying or declaring the 
relationships commonly perceived to exist between proven facts and 
legal conclusions. These devices are ordinarily introduced into the 
proof process through the judge's instructions to the juryl78 and con­
sist of a predicate (the facts which trigger the presumption or infer­
ence, or establish the prima facie case) and a conclusion. 179 The 
176. This concern has long been considered integral to the mission of the Massa­
chusetts courts to see that justice is done. See Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 
687, 437 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1982); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 488, 265 
N.E.2d 496, 499 (1970); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 812,323 N.E.2d 294, 
295 (1975). . 
177. 	 See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977). 
178. While all three of these devices are nominally used in Massachusetts criminal 
cases, after Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and Ulster County Court v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), each has been modified to eliminate any mandatory effect it 
might have on the fact-finder's reasoning process and none is given artificial evidential 
value. P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETfS EVIDENCE 53-59 (5th ed. 1981). Pre­
sumptions such as that created by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 7 (West 1981), 
which assign the initial burden of production to the defendant, are not applied to ele­
mental issues. Bul see Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 89, 283 N.E.2d 840, 845 
(1972). 
In short, such devices must leave the fact-finding process to the jury, which may 
draw inferences from the evidence as suggested by the device used, provided the jury is 
satisfied of the existence of the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. P. LIACOS, 
supra, at 59. 
179. An example of an inference which does not directly address an essential ele­
ment ofa crime is found in Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 513, 404 N.E.2d 643 
(1980). There, the court stated: 
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object of the device is to delineate an acceptable path by which the 
jury may find that an important fact, usually but not necessarily an 
essential element of proof, has been established. 
The impact of such proof-facilitating devices on the sufficiency 
assessment process may be direct or indirect, but, in any event, will 
shift the burden of production of evidence to the defendant on the 
issue in question. This in turn will deprive the defendant of the one 
mandatory review-guaranteed by the "no-reservation" provision of 
Rule 25(a)--of the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence on the 
facts relevant to that issue. The sufficiency assessment on this issue 
will be deflected from specific factual issues to the more general ele­
mental issues and the prosecution will be afforded the strategic ad­
vantage of being permitted to present its primary case on the issue as 
rebuttal to the defendant's evidence. In effect, this shift in the bur­
den of production creates the appearance, jury instructions to the 
contrary notwithstanding, that the defendant bears the burden of 
persuasion on that issue. 
The burden-shifting effect of the use of a presumption or rule of 
prima jacie evidence is illustrated by the facts in the case of Com­
monwealth v. Pauley.180 Pauley was charged with being the driver of 
a motor vehicle who used the Callahan Tunnel and deposited a cop­
per slug in a meter at the end of the tunnel, with intent to evade 
payment of the toll. By stipulation, only the identity of the driver 
was contested. The prosecution's evidence was that the complaining 
officer had heard the meter signal a false deposit and noted the li­
cense plate number of the car. He had only a momentary side and 
rear view of the operator whom, he observed, had shoulder length 
hair and wore glasses. No arrest was made; the charge was brought 
on a complaint against Pauley, to whom the car was registered. At 
the bench trial, Pauley appeared with short hair and without glasses; 
he presented no evidence. The following provision was invoked to 
establish that Pauley was the operator of the car: "If a vehicle is 
Now, as to the matter of a witness by the name of Raymond Bednarz, a poten­
tial witness in this case not appearing and testifying. You may draw a negative 
inference adverse to the defendant from the defendant's failure to call Ray­
mond Bednarz as a witness for the defense. You are not compelled to do so. 
You may and that is for you to say, and by that I mean it's an inference that if 
Raymond Bednarz did testify, then he would testify adversely to the defendant. 
Id at 523-24, 404 N.E.2d at 649. A serious flaw in this particular instruction was the trial 
judge's failure to tell the jury that the inference must be based on predicate facts, and to 
identify what those must be. That is, the jury should have been told: "Ifyou find X then 
you may conclude Y." 
180. 368 Mass. 286, 331 N.E.2d 901 (1975). 
956 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:917 
operated within tunnel property in violation of any provision of 
these rules and regulations and the identity of the operator of such 
vehicle cannot be determined, the person in whose name such vehi­
cle is registered shall be deemed prima facie responsible for such 
violation." 181 
The supreme judicial court construed this device as authorizing, 
but not requiring, the factfinder to infer from the fact that Pauley 
was the registered owner-"nothing else appearing"-that he was 
responsible for the violation. 182 A /ortioran: the evidence that 
Pauley was the registered owner would have been legally sufficient 
to require denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty 
made at the close of the prosecution's evidence. 183 The burden of 
producing evidence that he was not the operator was thereby shifted 
to Pauley. 
The effect of a formal common law or statutory inference is sim­
ilar. The facts of Commonwealth v. Johnson184 illustrate how the 
common law inference permitting the jury in a homicide case to in­
fer malice solely from the fact that the defendant used a deadly 
weapon to cause the decedent's death operates like an affirmative 
defense designation, relieving the prosecution of its burden of pro­
ducing actual evidence of malice and deflects the inquiry from the 
facts to the abstract elements of the offense. 
Several preliminary points must be made. First, under Massa­
chusetts law, a homicide is punishable as murder or manslaughter 
only if it is unlawful. I85 Malice distinguishes murder from man­
slaughter in an unlawful homicide. 186 Ordinarily the jury will decide 
whether a killing was malicious, and therefore murder, by consider­
ing the circumstances to determine what they disclose about the 
killer's frame of mind; for example, whether the circumstances show 
that the fatal blow was purposefully and wrongfully inflicted or 
181. Id at 289, 331 N.E.2d at 903-04. 
182. Id at 291, 331 N.E.2d at 905. 
183. The evidence that the officer's description of the driver did not match the 
defendant's appearance was considered only to establish the first predicate needed to 
trigger the prima facie evidence device: that the identity of the operator cannot be deter­
mined. Id at 289, 231 N.E.2d at 903. In short, when the prosecution did not have suffi­
cient evidence of this essential element, the device made proof of another fact­
registration-sufficient unless the defendant produced evidence that he was not the oper­
ator. As Professor Allen observes, another effect of this kind of device (presumptions 
work similarly) is to artificially increase the weight of the prosecution's evidence. Allen, 
supra note 7, at 322. 
184. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 326 N.E.2d 355 (1975). 
185. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 688, 352 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1976). 
186. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 380 Mass. 858, 865,406 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 (1980). 
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rather the result of chance or human frailty.'87 If the defendant 
claims that the killing occurred in circumstances that show sudden 
combat, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
they did not. 188 Second, the presumption of innocence and the "no 
reservation" provision of Rule 25(a) combine to provide a defendant 
a fundamental set of protections against a conviction on insufficient 
evidence. The "presumption of innocence" is a term used to de­
scribe the defendant's fundamental due process right to 
remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its 
burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion; i.e., to say 
in this case, as in any other, that the opponent of a claim or charge 
is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another form that the 
proponent of the claim or charge must evidence it. 189 
The defendant thus is entitled not to be required to defend until the 
prosecution has satisfied its burden of production. This right is se­
cured by the requirement of Rule 25(a) that the trial judge rule on a 
motion for a required finding of not guilty made at the close of the 
prosecution's case before proceeding further. 
The facts of Johnson illustrate the purposes of these protections 
and how the use of inferences can jeopardize their effectiveness. The 
prosecution's case-in-chief consisted primarily of a transcribed state­
ment taken by the police from the defendant shortly after the victim 
was killed. In the statement, Johnson admitted killing the victim, 
but claimed he did so in self defense. Johnson explained that the 
victim had attacked and stabbed him with a knife. Johnson then 
stabbed the victim, using either the victim's weapon or one handed 
to him by bystanders. The other evidence offered by the prosecution 
was consistent with this account and to some degree corroborated it 
(a police officer testified they found Johnson by following a trail of 
blood from his wounded hand).'90 The trial judge denied of the de­
fendant's motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge, but the 
187. "Manslaughter under circumstances of sudden combat is not committed as 
the result of a deliberated act, but is homicide in the heat of blood, a perturbation of 
mind palliating the intent to inflict injury." Id 
188. An intentional killing in self-defense is not unlawful; such a killing in sudden 
combat is unlawful, but not malicious, and therefore constitutes manslaughter rather 
than murder. Compare Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 689, 352 N.E.2d 
203, 206 (1976), with Commonwealth v. Hodge, 380 Mass. 858, 865, 406 N.E.2d 1015, 
1020 (1980). 
189. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978) (quoting H. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2511 (3rd Ed. 1940». Accord J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 552. 
190. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 227, 326 N.E.2d at 356. 
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appeals court reversed. 191 
The appeals court viewed the issue as being unprecedented in 
Massachusetts: whether the defendant is entitled to a directed ver­
dict where the evidence adduced to establish the predicate for the 
inference of malice 192 shows the intentional killing to have been 
without malice. 193 The court reasoned that the only evidence ad­
duced by the prosecution demonstrated that the killing occurred in 
circumstances which showed at least a sudden fight in which the de­
cedent was the aggressor and in which the defendant's intention to 
kill was formed "in the heat of sudden combat."194 Ordinarily, of 
course, the jury would be free to accept or reject whatever parts of 
the defendant's statements they chose, but in this case the appeals 
court saw no basis (such as inconsistency or implausibility) upon 
which the jury might reasonably have accepted the portion of the 
transcribed statement which discriminated rationally between the in­
criminating and mitigating portions of the statement. In these cir­
cumstances, the court ruled, the prosecution failed to meet its burden 
of production on the issue of malice; it made out no more than 
manslaughter. 195 
A preferable basis for the appeals court's ruling might be that 
191. ld at 233, 326 N.E.2d at 360. This ruling was not appealed to the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court. 
192. Malice may ordinarily be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly 
weapon. Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 809, 323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975). 
"[R]educed to its lowest terms, malice in murder means knowledge of such circumstances 
that according to common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that death 
will follow the contemplated act, coupled perhaps with an implied negation of any ex­
cuse or justification." Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245,252,54 N.E. 551, 554 
(1899). 
193. Johnson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 232, 326 N.E.2d at 359-60. 
194. ld at 233, 326 N.E.2d at 360. 
195. ld The court also commented that Johnson's statement did not make out a 
claim of self defense because it did not show that Johnson had no avenue 'Of escape or 
that he availed himself of all proper means to avoid combat or that he used no more 
force than necessary to defend himself. ld 
This ruling demonstrates the effect of imposing on the defendant the burden of pro­
ducing evidence of an elemental exculpatory issue. Under the rule of Commonwealth v. 
McKie, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 61 (1854), if the prosecution's evidence left the issue in doubt, 
it failed to prove the unlawfulness of the killing. See id at 64. The statement itself was 
sufficient to put the prosecution on notice that self-defense might be an issue. The prose­
cution's evidence was that Johnson had been attacked by an armed man. It offered no 
evidence that he had a safe avenue of retreat, was able to avoid the fight or could have 
defended himself without killing the decedent. By offering sufficient evidence to prove 
anyone of these propositions beyond a reasonable doubt the prosecution could have 
satisfied its burden of production on the issue of unlawfulness. 
It is interesting to note that Johnson was confined in a mental institution from the 
date of his arrest until the day of trial, and that the prosecution failed to produce one 
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the prosecution's evidence did not reasonably support an inference 
that the killing was malicious. 196 Where the inference is directed to 
an essential element of the crime, it cannot be employed to satisfy 
the prosecution's burden of persuasion unless the facts upon which it 
is based (the predicate) provide sufficient evidence to support a jury's 
conclusion that the inferred fact has been established beyond a rea­
sonable doubt. 197 An inference of malice, based solely on the de­
fendant's intentional use of a deadly weapon to cause death, cannot 
rationally be drawn from the Johnson facts. 
Malice is demonstrated by circumstances that reasonably sup­
port an inference that the defendant was aware that his actions were 
likely to kill and was acting without excuse, justification or mitiga­
tion. The circumstances of the Johnson killing presented by the 
prosecution could be parsed, and facts isolated to support a conceiv­
able predicate from which malice might reasonably be inferred. For 
example, that Johnson had started the fatal encounter or had venge­
fully killed the victim after disarming him. From what the opinions 
reveal about the record, and what both the appeals court and 
supreme judicial court accepted as given, the prosecution's substan­
tive evidence was the defendant's written confession. 198 There was 
no factual basis disclosed upon which the jury could discriminate 
and sort out those parts of the statements it wished to believe or dis­
believe. On the facts known to the jury, the two actual inferences 
suggested above are speculative, based on surmise. The prosecu­
tion's case must be judged on the res gestael99 and if the issue of 
unlawfulness or malice is "left in doubt," the evidence is insuffi­
cient.2°O The jury may not be instructed that it might rely on the 
inference alone to convict; it must be instructed to consider all the 
witness to the stabbing, although numerous bystanders were present when the police 
arrived. 3 Mass. App. at 227 n.l, 326 N .E.2d at 356 n.l. 
196. In the course of explicitly repudiating the appeals court's ruling, in Johnson, 
the supreme judicial court stated: "Evidence of an intentional killing by the defendant, 
absent any evidence of justification, is sufficient to permit the jury to infer that it was a 
killing with malice-i.e., murder in the second degree." Commonwealth v. McInerney, 
373 Mass. 136, 146,365 N.E.2d 815, 821 (1977) (emphasis added). 
197. In United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), the Court held that statutes 
which make proof of specified facts sufficient evidence to authorize a conviction "author­
ize but do not require the trial judge to submit the case to the jury when the Government 
relies on [the predicate facts) alone, authorize but do not require an instruction to the 
jury based on the statute, and authorize but do not require the jury to convict based on 
[the predicate facts) alone." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398,406 n.6 (1970); Com­
monwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 293-94 n.lO, 331 N.E.2d 901, 906 n.1O (1975). 
198. Johnson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 228, 326 N.E.2d at 357. 
199. McKie, 67 Mass. (I Gray) at 63. 
200. In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the Supreme Court observed 
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circumstances surrounding the killing in determining whether the 
defendant acted maliciously.20I Such narrowly-drawn inferences are 
likely to promote irrationality in decision-making;202 they are inimi­
cal to the constitutional office of the sufficiency assessment which is 
to help insure that convictions will be rationally supported by 
evidence.203 
Similarly, the effect of the malice inference was to shift the focus 
of the sufficiency of the evidence from a factual level to an abstract 
"elemental" level. The factual shortcomings of the prosecution's 
case were ignored through resort to an abstract proposition which 
was anchored to an isolated fact considered out of context. The de­
fendant was thus required to defend even though the sufficiency of 
the prosecution's evidence was never actually scrutinized.204 
The Winship principle requires that the trial judge instruct the 
jury that the inferences it draws be reasonably supported by the evi­
dence.205 In most situations, one or more reasonable inferences will 
be available from the evidence. Unless such a basis is presented 
(and that is part of the prosecution's burden of production), the pros­
ecution's evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.206 
that juries cannot be instructed that it is permissible to infer intent from an isolated fact. 
Id. at 523. 
201. See Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200-01, 207 N.E.2d 276, 280 
(1965) (where the prosecution's evidence leaves the jury with no basis other than specula­
tion for choosing between equally supported inferences of guilt or innocence, the prose­
cution has not proven its case supports this conclusion). 
202. See Allen, supra note 7, at 332-36. 
203. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-18. 
204. There were a number of witnesses to the killing in Johnson. The defendant in 
his statement gave the police the names and addresses of witnesses who, he said, would 
corroborate his account of the event. The record indicated that the police had talked to 
some of the people who were at the scene when they arrived. The prosecution produced 
documentary evidence of one of these witnesses at trial, which occurred almost precisely 
one year after the killing. A police officer indicated no others could be found. 3 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 227 n.I, 326 N .E.2d at 356 n.1. 
The defendant testified at trial that he had not made the statements attributed to him 
and asserted that he had not killed the decedent. He claimed he had been cut breaking 
up a fight between the decedent and two other men. He had, however, developed such 
severe psychiatric problems shortly after his arrest that he was hospitalized for a compe­
tency evaluation. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 227 n.2, 326 N.E.2d at 356 n.2. While his bizarre 
testimony may account for the jury's verdict, it is irrelevant to the issue of the sufficiency 
of the prosecution's evidence of murder. 
205. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) .. 
206. Both Massachusetts courts which discussed Johnson viewed the issue as one of 
credibility. The appeals court found that there was no reasonable basis on which the jury 
could believe the part of Johnson's confession that he killed the victim and disbelieve his 
account of the circumstances in which it had occurred. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 233, 326 
N.E.2d at 360. Therefore the prosecution had failed to prove malice. The court's sugges­
961 1984] 	 MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 
E. 	 The Use ofProof-facilitating Devices to Satisfy the 
Prosecution -s Burden ofPersuasion on Affirmative Defenses 
The practice of imposing a burden of production on the party 
having the burden of persuasion protects the presumption of inno­
cence by insuring that the prosecution's case rests on evidence. A 
burden of production gives the standard of persuasion "concrete 
meaning" when it requires that the weight of the prosecution's evi­
dence be sufficient to rationally satisfy that standard. A standard of 
persuasion which is not accompanied by a burden of production will 
be reduced in practice to a meaningless, unenforceable form of 
words. The Massachusetts experience with its efforts to moderate the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of persuasion in insanity 
cases by dispensing with a corresponding burden of production of­
fers a clear demonstration of the unworkability of any scheme which 
ignores this necessary relationship. 
Long before Winship was decided it had been the Massachusetts 
practice to dilute the prosecution's burden of persuasion on the issue 
of insanity by giving it the benefit of a presumption of sanity. This 
practice was challenged as being inconsistent with Winship in Com­
monwealth v. Kostka,207 the defense arguing that the prosecution 
tion that self defense was disproved, however, indicates that it imposed a burden of pro­
duction-the risk of nonproduction---on the defendant on both issues. See id. Because 
the prosecution's evidence established the predicate for the mitigating factor of sudden 
combat, the prosecution had to offer sufficient evidence to disprove that possibility be­
yond a reasonable doubt. Because the prosecution's evidence did not offer evidence to 
place each criterion of the self defense claim in issue, the prosecution did not have to 
offer sufficient evidence to disprove self-defense. 
In rejecting the appeals court's reasoning on the credibility issue in Johnson the 
supreme judicial court stated flatly "the jury have the sole power to believe or disbelieve 
any or all such evidence (as Johnson's confession)." Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 
Mass. 136, 145, 365 N.E.2d 815, 821 (1975). This apparent rejection of the idea that the 
jury's credibility judgments must have a rational factual basis is inconsistent with the 
Jackson principle that the courts must insure that some reasonable factual basis is 
presented for the conclusions (inferences) the prosecution asks the jury to draw in order 
to convict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
207. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 536-37, 350 N.E.2d 444, 458 (1976). 
The defense had presented the testimony of two experts (psychiatrists); one testified that 
the defendant was insane at the time the crimes were committed. The prosecution 
presented no countervailing expert opinion, relying instead on cross-examination of the 
defense experts, the testimony of witnesses depicting the defendant's conduct before, dur­
ing and after the killing as deliberate and planned, and the presumption of sanity. Id. at 
522-23,350 N.E.2d at 449. The court ruled that, with the evidence in this posture, it was 
exclusively the jury's province to decide what relative weight to give the expert's testi­
mony against the circumstances shown by the prosecution. Id. at 538-39, 350 N.E.2d at 
459; see also Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 577-83, 350 N.E.2d 678, 698-700 
(1976). 
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constitutionally could not rely, in whole or in part, upon the "pre­
sumption of sanity" to satisfy its burden of proving sanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The defense argument was that the due process 
principles derived from Winship prohibited the prosecution from re­
lying upon any presumption or inference to meet its burden of per­
suasion unless it could be said with a reasonable degree of assurance 
that the fact inferred (sanity) flowed logically from the facts upon 
which it was based.208 The supreme judicial court responded that 
such a requirement was imposed only when the inference or pre­
sumption was utilized to assist the prosecution in proving an element 
of any given crime;209 the issue did not bear "any necessary relation­
ship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental ele­
ments" of any offense in Massachusetts law.210 Rather, insanity is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded.2l1 Even when pleaded it 
does not become an issue until some evidence of lack of criminal 
responsibility is adduced.212 
208. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 526, 350 N.E.2d 444, 451 (1976). 
The defense relied on Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United 
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Kostka, 370 
Mass. at 533, 350 N.E.2d at 455. In each case the Supreme Court held that the inferred 
fact must "more likely than not" flow from the predicate facts and implied that the re­
quired relationship might be beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 843; Tur­
ner, 396 U.S. at 405; Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. In Leary the inference failed the more likely 
than not standard. 395 U.S. at 52-513. In Barnes and Turner the predicate facts alone 
were sufficient to support the inferred conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes, 
412 U.S. at 845; Turner, 396 U.S. at 417. Hence the issue of which standard was mini­
mally required was left open. The supreme judicial court's interpretation of the due 
process requirements of these cases is set out in Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 
331 N.E.2d 901 (1975). 
209. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 532, 350 N.E.2d 444, 455 (1976). 
This position is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling on the Winship limitation on 
the designation of affirmative defenses in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), 
and with its discussion in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), regarding states' freedom to 
assume the burden of persuasion on an issue without necessarily making it an element of 
the offense by operation of due process law. 
2\0. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 533, 350 N.E.2d 444, 455 (1976). 
After Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. \07 
(1982), it may be that the question of whether a particular relevant circumstance must be 
considered an element of the crime charged is not its logical relevance to an established 
element but: (1) whether the state legislature intended that it be elemental; and 
(2) whether that legislative judgment is reasonable in Morrison II terms. See supra notes 
157-65 and accompanying text. 
211. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(2). 
212. Rule 14(b)(2) imposes the pleading requirement. Id The supreme judicial 
court has not determined how much evidence the defendant must produce to activate the 
issue, though it has noted that such evidence may be introduced during the prosecution's 
case in chief and that, in the majority of jurisdictions in which criminal responsibility is 
considered a "Winship fact" the defendant must raise a reasonable doubt on the issue in 
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The presumption of sanity, employed in Massachusetts has pro­
cedural qualities and is given an evidentiary impact which collec­
tively prevent effective sufficiency review of the issue. 213 
Procedurally, the presumption withholds the issue from controversy 
in cases in which it is not raised; that is, it places a burden to produce 
evidence of insanity on the defendant. In addition, where the issue 
has been raised, the presumption gives evidentiary weight to what is 
most accurately described as an assumption or premise, "'the fact 
that a great majority of [people] are [criminally responsible]' " and a 
possible inference which might be drawn from that premise: "'the 
probability [is] that any particular [person] is [criminally responsi­
ble].' "214 The presumption is not weighed as evidence itself; how­
ever, "facts" that are not in evidence are nonetheless considered to 
be before the jury: "the jury's 'common experience that most people 
... are sane.' "215 The supreme judicial court has held that the pre­
sumption alone affords a sufficient basis for submitting the issue to 
order to overcome the presumption of criminal responsibility (at which point the pre­
sumption disappears from the case and the issue is decided on evidence). Common­
wealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 527 n.7, 528 n.ll, 350 N.E.2d 444, 452 n.7, 453 n.ll 
(1976). 
Under the procedure described in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 677 n.7, 
405 N.E.2d 927, 930 n.7 (1980), the trial judge may discretionarily require the prosecu­
tion to assume its burden of persuasion in its case-in-chief where the issue of sanity has 
been pleaded. 
213. The supreme judicial court has reasoned that, although the term "presump­
tion" is used for convenience to describe the unique procedural-evidentiary device em­
ployed in structuring criminal responsibility in Massachusetts, it is not a true 
presumption but a hybrid one because it "shares but is not limited to, the characteristics 
of both presumptions and inferences." Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530-31, 
350 N.E.2d 444, 454 (1976). Many devices called presumptions both operate procedur­
ally (burden-allocating) and have an evidential impact, to the extent they rest on proof of 
facts offered in evidence. See, Allan, supra note 7, at 325-26; Jeffries & Stephan, 88 YALE 
L.J. 1325, 1335-38 (1979); see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). 
A distinguishing, but not unique, feature of the device used in Massachusetts is the 
nature of its foundation, which is described as factual but is not evidential; that is, it need 
not consist of evidence presented to the jury from which the inference of criminal respon­
sibility is drawn. Kostka, 370 Mass. at 530-31, 350 N.E.2d at 454. 
214. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530-31, 350 N.E.2d 444, 454 (1976) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E. 641, 645 (1935». 
215. Id. (quoting United States v. Dube, 520 F ..2d 250, 255 (1st Cir. 1975». Then 
Judge Burger described the presumptive device utilized in the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals in similar terms: 
The presumption of sanity, whatever may be its evidentiary value and weight, 
does not banish from the case, as [defendant) would have it. That presumption 
is grounded on the premise that the generality of mankind is made up of per­
sons within the range of 'normal,' rational beings and can be said to be account­
able or responsible for their conduct; this premise is rooted in centuries of 
experience, has not been undermined by contemporary medical knowledge, and 
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the jury.216 Thus, the presumption eliminates the power of a trial 
judge to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence of criminal 
responsibility. 
In rejecting a defendant's due process challenge to the constitu­
tionality of this presumption, the court gave three "fundamentally 
sound reasons" justifying the practice: First, the presumption pro­
tects the jury's factfinding discretion to decide the credibility of ex­
pert testimony on the subject and to determine the weight, if any, to 
give such testimony; second, because the facts underlying the pre­
sumption are within the jury's common sense and knowledge, it 
would be inappropriate and artificial to forbid the jurors to rely, at 
least in part, upon their common experience; and third, the require­
ment that the prosecution prove criminal responsibility beyond a 
reasonable doubt provides an adequate safeguard against erroneous 
convictions.217 It is evident that one consequence of this practice is 
to render the Rule 25 sufficiency evaluation superfluous on all sanity 
fact issues; correspondingly, any judicial concern regarding the per-
justifies the continuance of the presumption after introduction of evidence of 
insanity. 
Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965). 
216. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 536, 350 N.E.2d 444, 457-58 (1976); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 179,258 N.E.2d 13,20 (1970); Commonwealth 
v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E. 641, 645 (1935). 
217. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 535-36, 350 N.E.2d 444, 457-58 
(1976). 
Although an in-depth critique of this practice is not within the scope of this article, it 
is pertinent to note that the first and third of these reasons run directly counter to the 
Winsh¥,-based constitutional policies of Jackson and the second, as expressed, is based 
on a non sequitur. 
The first is faulty because it is inconsistent with the due process requirement that a 
jury decide Winship fact issues exclusively on evidence presented to them. The jurors' 
common knowledge and experience, which they can properly rely on in judging credibil­
ity, making weight determinations and drawing inferences, are not evidence and cannot 
constitutionally be given evidentiary force. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. The third reason is 
directly repudiated in Jackson, in which the Court offered as a justification for its higher 
standard of sufficiency the danger that juries, even when properly instructed on the Win­
ship burden of proof, may nevertheless convict on insufficient evidence. Id at 317. 
Finally, the second reason is faulty in two respects. First, it simply does not logically 
follow that abandonment of the evidential impact of the presumption would prevent 
jurors from drawing on their common knowledge and experience. It would confine use 
of these resources to their proper sphere, to be used as decisional tools rather than evi­
dence. It is the office of the sufficiency of evidence evaluation to enforce such limitations 
on the jury's fact-finding discretion. Id at 319. The propositions on which the presump­
tion is based could be made the subject of proof through evidence, e.g., by expert testi­
mony. In fact, the need to rely on the presumption arises in cases in which the 
prosecution, inexplicably, has not produced expert testimony on the criminal responsibil­
ity issue. See Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1983); Com­
monwealth V. Robinson, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 441 N.E.2d 553 (1982). 
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suasive force of the prosecution's actual evidence of criminal respon­
sibility must be treated as a weight of the evidence issue under the 
provisions of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence).218 
The current Massachusetts practice for litigating the issue of 
sanity, then, is to impose a beyond a reasonable doubt burden of 
persuasion on the prosecution while relieving that party of any re­
sponsibility to present evidence on the issue. With this arrangement, 
the burden of persuasion is reduced to a form of words conveyed to 
the jury in instructions. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has grappled with but not yet accu­
rately perceived this problem in reviewing several first degree mur­
der convictions in which the presumption of sanity apparently 
carried the day for the prosecution.219 In these cases the prosecution 
presented neither expert evidence nor circumstantial evidence such 
as apparently rational, discriminating conduct by the defendant at or 
near the time of the crime. Juries nevertheless found the defendants 
criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. Such clear evi­
dence of extra-legal decision making by the jury has troubled the 
Court sufficiently to persuade it of the necessity of a new trial in each 
such case, but has not shaken the Court's commitment to the pre­
sumption of sanity. Indeed, the Court has not discussed the problem 
in terms of whether enforcing a burden of production is indispen­
sible to enforcing a burden of persuasion. In fact, the Massachusetts 
presumption of sanity not only dispenses with the prosecution's bur­
den to produce evidence, it virtually invites a conviction based on no 
evidence at all. If the beyond a reasonable doubt standard can be 
met without evidence its effect on jury decisions will depend entirely 
on the jury's inclination and ability to honor it. 
Thus, regardless of whether the initial burden of producing evi­
dence is imposed, the prosecution must be held to a standard of evi­
dentiary sufficiency if the burden of persuasion is expected to playa 
realistic part in assuring jury verdicts are rationally supported by ev­
idence. While the problem may be particularly acute in the sanity 
issue because jurors may resist the idea of such a defense and be­
cause of the unusual features of the presumption of sanity, the prin­
ciple holds true for all instances where the prosecution is permitted 
to rely upon one or more proof-facilitating devices to satisfy its bur­
den of disproving an affirmative defense. Any failure to insure that 
218. See infra text accompanying notes 484-97. 
219. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 350 N.E.2d 444 (1976); Common­
wealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1983). 
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the prosecution produce evidence sufficient to satisfy its burden of 
persuasion will work to increase the risk of irrationality in the 
verdict. 
In sum, it is both practical and a wise policy to require that the 
prosecution be required to produce, in its case-in-chief, evidence suf­
ficient to satisfy its burden of persuasion on each issue in litigation, 
whether or not the issue is "elemental." The prosecution's interest in 
not being required to prove irrelevant negatives is satisfied by requir­
ing the defendant to plead the claim sufficiently in advance of trial to 
permit the prosecution to meet it. This practice further secures the 
defendant's important interest in having the sufficiency of the prose: 
cution's case evaluated exclusively on the prosecution's evidence, 
and simultaneously assists the trial judge by simplifying the tasks of 
applying the rational fact-finder and prosecution's best case rules. 
Similarly, the defendant's fundamental interest in not being required 
to defend inadequately founded charges is better secured by this 
practice and the policy of fixing the defendant's double jeopardy po­
sition at the close of the prosecution's case is facilitated. This prac­
tice is equally felicitous when applied to non-elemental issues that 
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.220 The logi­
cal contradiction of severing the burden of production from the bur­
den of persuasion is avoided and the defendant's interests, secured 
by this practice, are functionally, if not constitutionally, indistin­
guishable from those associated with elemental issues. The cost of 
this practice would be negligible. 
F. Evaluating the Evidence: the Trial Judge's J)ilemma 
Having resolved preliminary issues affecting the scope of the 
charge and the evidence, defined critical statutory terms and identi­
fied the issues-both elemental and affirmative-upon which the 
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence must be assessed, the trial 
judge then must evaluate the potential persuasive force of the body 
of evidence under consideration. The question is whether the evi­
dence and the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom (provided 
they are not too remote according to the usual course. of events) are 
of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and sagac­
ity to the persuasion ofguilt beyond a reasonable doubt.221 The con­
220. This is illustrated by the trial court's practice in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 
Mass. 672,405 N.E.2d 927 (1980). 
221. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-77, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374 
(1979) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928); 
and Commonwealth v. Clark, 378 Mass. 392,403-04,393 N.E.2d 296, 303 (1979». 
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stitutional duty to assess the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence 
may press the conscientious trial judge against certain pre- Winship 
limitations imposed upon judges for the purpose of preventing them 
from infringing upon the jury's fact-finding prerogatives.222 The 
traditional approach has been to distinguish between the activity of 
assessing the sufficiency of evidence on the one hand and weighing 
evidence on the other. On this view, the task of assessing the suffi­
ciency of the evidence requires nothing more than an evaluation of 
the potential persuasive force of the evidence, while weighing the evi­
dence involves judging credibility, drawing justifiable inferences and 
comparing the relative force of conflicting evidence.223 The judge 
may assess sufficiency but may not weigh evidence in deciding a mo­
tion for a required finding of not guilty. The rationale of Jackson, 
however, is that it is the trial judge's constitutional function in as­
sessing evidentiary sufficiency to insure that a case is not submitted 
to a jury unless the evidence presents facts upon which a jury might 
reasonably find guilt, even if the jury's factfinding prerogatives are 
limited in the process.224 Implicitly, on a motion for a required find­
ing of not guilty, the judge must insure that the evidence presents 
some reasonable basis for making the credibility and weight judg­
ments and drawing the inferences necessary to a finding of guilt. 
Such a motion invokes fundamental constitutional rights which 
it is the trial judge's duty to assiduously protect: the right to not be 
required to defend unfounded charges225 and the right not to be ar­
bitrarily convicted.226 To discharge this duty the judge must under­
take the difficult task of reviewing the prosecution's evidence and 
testing its logical strength in the mind of the hypothetical reasonable 
juror without assuming, to an unwarranted degree, the jury's fact­
finding role of deciding what evidence to accept as true, what rela­
tive weight to give to conflicting sources of information or what in­
ferences to draw from the evidence presented. 
222. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368,373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928) 
(" 'we cannot consider any question of the weight of the evidence' ") (quoting Common­
wealth v. Asherowski, 196 Mass. 342, 348, 82 N.E. 13, 15 (1907»; see also Curley v. 
United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
223. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-77, 
393 N.E.2d 370, 374 (1979). 
224. 443 U.S. at 319. The Court acknowledged that every sufficiency assessment 
will limit the jury's fact-finding discretion to some degree. Id at 319 n.13; see also Curley 
v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (It is the function of the judge to 
deny the jury any opportunity to operate beyond its province.). 
225. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n.12 (1978); United States v. Mar­
tin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977). 
226. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313-14. 
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To assist the judge in restraining his or her critical judgment at 
this stage the law instructs the judge to interpret the evidence in 
terms most favorable to the prosecution's case; the "prosecution's 
best case" rule. While the interest nominally protected by this form 
ofjudicial restraint is the jury's fact-finding discretion, the actual in­
terest affected, in adversarial terms, is the prosecution's opportunity 
to have the case submitted to the jury and to persuade the jury to 
convict.227 The structural rules to be applied by the trial judge in 
this setting, then, reflect a resolution of two conflicting interests. To 
protect the defendant's right to terminate unwarranted proceedings 
at the earliest point possible, the judge must determine whether the 
prosecution's evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable fact­
finder that every element of the offense has been established beyond 
a reasonable doubt. To protect the prosecution's interest in having 
an opportunity to persuade the jury, the judge is required to view the 
evidence in terms most favorable to the prosecution. It is clear that 
these two rules-each supposedly describing the same boundary 
(distribution of fact-finding responsibility between judge and jury) 
from opposing perspectives-will not always be congruent. More­
over, because of the nature of the directed verdict inquiry, the suffi­
ciency issue frequently raises other difficult issues of fact and law, 
many of which add to the difficulty of adhering to these role-defining 
rules. 
Another set of problems which the trial judge must face in eval­
uating a motion for a required finding of not guilty during trial is 
that both the standard of decision and the structure of the inquiry 
have been fashioned by appellate courts and generally, are not sensi­
tive to important differences in the trial judge's position and perspec­
tive. Appellate courts enjoy the benefits of knowing what the jury's 
decision was, having the assistance of transcripts of testimony and 
written arguments by counsel and having ample time to reflect and 
make a carefully-reasoned decision. The trial judge, in contrast, 
must rule at the close of the prosecution's case if the defendant 
moves at that time. Acquittal by the jury is still a possibility, in most 
cases a transcript of testimony has not been prepared, and because 
the decision cannot be postponed and the need for continuity and 
dispatch in the trial process are fairly pressing, the trial judge gener­
ally feels pressured to act upon the motion quickly. These consider­
ations suggest the need for appellate court development of a 
227. This interest is entitled to no independent protection; the prosecution'S case 
must stand or fall on its merits. 
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standards of decision and mode of procedure designed to serve the 
needs of the trial judge. 
The standard of decision should allow the trial judge fo be less 
circumspect with regard to the jury's fact-finding discretion. The 
appellate standard of review incorporates the principle of deference 
to the jury's verdict in two ways. The evidence is viewed in its light 
most favorable to the government and in addition, the "rational fact 
finder" standard instructs the court to determine whether a hypothet­
ical fact-finder, acting reasonably, could have found each element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Each of these requirements, 
in effect, creates a presumption that the jury's guilty verdict is 
valid.228 A trial judge, determining whether to submit a case to the 
jury, need not be so deferential. The task is not the relatively simple 
one of determining whether the jury has acted outside the proper 
scope of its authority. The trial judge must determine instead 
whether a properly-instructed jury might reasonably conclude that 
the evidence, permissibly interpreted, establishes each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The task of forecasting how a 
jury might permissibly reason, without the benefit of being able to 
reconstruct the line of reasoning probably followed in light of the 
verdict, cannot be accomplished without giving some consideration 
to the weight of the evidence. 229 
Moreover, the justification for deference before the case is sub­
mitted to the jury is less compelling than it is in the case in which the 
jury has found the defendant guilty. Courts have found the govern­
ment's interest in protecting a conviction sufficiently strong to allow 
the prosecution to seek appellate review of a later decision that sets 
aside or reduces the verdict.230 The prosecution's interest in having 
its case submitted to a jury, however, is not comparable. The gov­
ernment's interest, for example, is not considered sufficiently strong 
to permit appeal of a directed verdict improperly granted in the de­
fendant's favor, even if founded upon an erroneous legal ruling.231 
228. See Comment, The Jackson v. Virginia Standardfor Sufficiency of the Evi­
dence, 65 IOWA L. REV. 799, 807 (1979). This standard is virtually identical, both in 
substance and in effect, to the standard employed by Massachusetts appellate courts in 
reviewing the exercise of discretionary authority by trial judges. 
229. Id Even reviewing courts applying the pre-Jackson "no evidence" standard 
occasionally acknowledged the necessity of weighing evidence. See, e.g., Speigner v. 
Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1210-12 (6th Cir. 1979). Compare Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d 894, 
898 (8th Cir. 1975). The same necessity persists under the Jackson standard. 
230. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 344, 353 (1975); see Common­
wealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 315 n.l, 431 N.E.2d 915,916 n.1 (1982). 
231. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 78 (1978); United States v. Martin 
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To the extent the rule of deference protects the jury's verdict from a 
judge's inclination to second-guess the fact-finder, it is inapplicable 
to the trial judge's pre-submission sufficiency determination. In 
other words, the prosecution is not entitled to an opportunity to per­
suade the jury unless it produces sufficient evidence to reasonably 
support a conviction. 
The trial judge, having heard and observed the demeanor of the 
witnesses, is in a better position than an appellate judge to judge 
credibility and weight issues.232 The judge will have had considera­
ble experience in exercising this critical judgment in bench trials and 
in addition will have made preliminary findings of fact on issues 
such as witness competency, admissibility of evidence and the per­
missibility of relying on some types of inferences. Additionally, the 
judge will have expertise in interacting with the jury on fact-finding 
issues by means of instructions, particularly those describing permit­
ted methods of reasoning, which frequently constitute indirect com­
ments on credibility and weight of the evidence.233 
Finally, the general nature of most jury verdicts lends a genuine 
air of mystery and potential irrationality which further inhibits ap­
pellate judges by lending strength to the suggestion that any disa­
greement the appellate court might have with the jury's verdict must 
necessarily be the product of second-guessing. This is strengthened 
by the common failure of appellate courts to draw an explicit dis­
tinction, in practice, between the trial judge's initial judgment (which 
is reviewed only if adverse to the defendant), the trial judge'S review 
of sufficiency after a guilty verdict, appellate review of the correct­
ness of either of these rulings by the trial judge and appellate review 
of the reasonableness of the jury's verdict. 
These considerations, it is submitted, suggest the need for and 
usefulness of such distinctions, and for development of a standard of 
decision applicable to sufficiency determinations by trial judges 
before submitting a case to a jury. Such a standard must acknowl­
edge the necessity and desirability of allowing the judge greater lee-
Linen Supply Co., 436 U.S. 564, 576 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 
(1962). 
232. This superiority in the trial judge'S position compared to the appellate court's 
is acknowledged and forms part of the basis for extending the section 33E powers found 
in Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) to trial judges. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keough, 
385 Mass. 314, 317-18,431 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1982). Consideration of whether to permit 
the trial judge to act on these observations in determining sufficiency questions should 
tum solely on notions of the proper allocation of responsibility between trial judge and 
JUry. 
233. Allen, supra note 7, at 332-39. 
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way to critically evaluate the quality of the prosecution's case than is 
permitted in reviewing the reasonableness of a jury's verdict.234 
Trial judges must and do consider issues of credibility, weigh 
conflicting testimony and evaluate the reasonableness of inferences 
in assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. To the ex­
tent the legal rules regulating the sufficiency assessment process in­
struct judges to refrain from making these types of critical 
judgments, they should be modified. The principle of Jackson v. Vir­
gini0235 requires that the judge restrict the jury's fact-finding discre­
tion to the realm of reasonable judgments by insuring that the jury is 
presented with sufficient evidence to provide them with a basis for 
exercising their discretion reasonably.236 This protection can be af­
forded simply by recognizing that judges routinely assess evidence in 
this fashion when making sufficiency assessments and in other con­
texts, as will be demonstrated below. To formalize these practices as 
a required part of the sufficiency assessment process, courts need 
simply to modify the "prosecution's best case" rule as follows: 
In assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence the court 
shall view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu­
tion where it appears that the inferences, weight of the evidence 
and credibility judgments needed to reach a finding of guilt are 
reasonably supported by evidence. 
This modification would not significantly alter the present divi­
sion of fact-finding responsibility between judge and jury except as 
to credibility judgments: Numerous judicial duties presently require 
judges to screen evidence which restricts the jury's discretion to draw 
inferences and weigh evidence. Consider the role of the trial judge 
m the pre-indictment bind over hearing. The judge's task is to 
234. The Honorable Mel Greenberg, a Massachusetts trial judge, has suggested in 
a recent article that the distinction between weight and sufficiency has little impact in 
practice: 
Some judges assigned to the jury session will always have a different prescrip­
tive vision of whether the bench trial judge acted properly on the weight and 
sufficiency ofthe evidence presented at the bench trial. These matters are rarely 
capable of exact quantification. Sufficiency of evidence review then will always 
depend, to some extent, on who is assigned to the jury session. . . . In cases 
where specific elements of the offenses will be lacking in proof, the task is rela­
tively simple. In reviewing matters where the decision hinges on credibility, 
circumstantial evidence, and inferences as factors which enter into the judg­
mental process, it is more difficult to attain uniformity. 
Greenberg, Double Jeopardy and Trial DeNovo: The Dilemma in Ihe Slale's Dislriel 
Courls, 68 MASS. L. REV. 50, 59 (1983). 
235. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
236. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. 
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screen out unwarranted prosecutions by determining whether the 
Commonwealth has presented sufficient admissible evidence to es­
tablish probable cause to believe that the offense was committed by 
the defendant. In some cases, it is appropriate for the judge to assess 
the credibility of the prosecution's evidence and to weigh the defend­
ant's evidence against the prosecution's. The probable cause stan­
dard to be employed is whether the evidence is sufficient to support a 
verdict.237 
Later, in the course of a trial, the judge will make a variety of 
rulings based on an assessment of the weight of particular evidence. 
It is common for judges, in instructing a jury, to suggest possible 
inferences, identify commonly-accepted considerations in making 
credibility judgments, and comment on the evidence, thus influenc­
ing the jury's exercise of its exclusive fact-finding discretion.238 
Moreover, to determine whether such instructions are consistent 
with Winshp-based principles, the judge must weigh the predicate 
evidence.239 In determining whether a proposed proof-facilitating 
device can be allowed to assist the prosecution in satisfying its bur­
den of production, the judge, to observe due process limitations, 
must assess the weight of the predicate evidence.240 
In carrying out their responsibility of determining the admissi­
bility of evidence, trial judges routinely assess the potential or actual 
weight of evidence.241 The judge routinely determines the relevancy 
of proffered evidence. Relevant evidence is generally admissible; to 
be relevant, evidence must be both probative and material. The evi­
dence must have some tendency in logic, common sense or experi­
237. Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843,298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). 
238. Sometimes the judge's decision whether to give such instructions requires a 
preliminary assessment of the evidence of guilt. For example, in Commonwealth v. Nizi­
olek, 380 Mass. 513, 404 N .E.2d 643 (1980) the court ruled that a trial judge may instruct 
the jury that it may consider the defendant's failure to present an available witness and 
infer that the witness, if presented, would have testified adversely to the defense. Id at 
523, 404 N.E.2d at 649. The judge must first determine whether "the evidence against 
[the defendant) is so strong that, if innocent, he would be expected to call [the missing 
witness)." Id at 519-20, 404 N.E.2d at 647. Thus the judge must detennine the probable 
guilt of the defendant in determining whether to give the instruction. Clearly this deter­
mination will include credibility and weight judgments; in Niziolek the defendant and 
the prosecution's key witness had directly contradicted each other's testimony regarding 
an agreement the defendant allegedly made with the missing witness. Id at 516-17, 404 
N.E.2d at 645-46. 
239. "Predicate evidence" is the evidence offered as the foundation for triggering a 
presumption, an inference or establishing a "prima facie case." 
240. See generally Allen, supra note 7, at 348-54. 
241. See generally P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK ON MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE 407-11 
(5th Ed. 1981). 
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ence, to make the existence some fact of consequence to the case 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.242 That 
is, evidence is probative if, taken alone or in connection with other 
evidence, it tends to help establish or refute the proposition for 
which it is offered as proof. If this relationship cannot be estab­
lished, the evidence is too "remote" to be considered relevant,243 It is 
necessary, but not sufficient, that evidence be probative to be rele­
vant; it must also be material. Evidence is material when it tends to 
establish or refute any fact that is of consequence to the determina­
tion of the case.244 Determinations of materiality may involve com­
parative judgments balancing the degree to which evidence is 
probative against the likelihood that the evidence will cause confu­
sion, unfair surprise or lead to the creation of collateral disputes.245 
These judgments involve assessing the weight of the particular 
evidence in that its logical impact on an issue in the case must be 
evaluated, either with or without reference to its relation to other 
evidence. The trial judge's responsibility of assessing the weight of 
evidence is clearer when the danger appears that relevant evidence 
might affect the jury's judgment in an improper manner. In this cir­
cumstance, the inquiry is whether the evidence is more prejudicial 
than probative. The decision turns upon whether, in the trial judge's 
discretion, the jury is so likely to be improperly influenced by the 
evidence that its probative value is outweighed by this danger.246 
Thus, a trial judge's relevancy determinations involve a blend of as­
sessments of probative worth, materiality and the discretionary ap­
plication of safeguards based upon a weighing of the evidence in the 
context in which it is offered. These judgments are no different in 
242. FED. R. EVID. 401; PROPOSED MASS R. EVID. 401. Similar statements to this 
effect are found in Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 59, 337 N.E.2d 691, 699 (1975); and 
Commonwealth v. Fillippini, I Mass. App. Ct. 606, 611, 304 N.E.2d 581, 584-85 (1973). 
243. Commonwealth v. Haley, 363 Mass. 513, 523, 296 N.E.2d 207, 213 (1973); 
Commonwealth v. Machado, 339 Mass. 713, 715, 162 N.E.2d 71, 73 (1959); Common­
wealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521,533-34, 159 N.E.2d 856, 864 (1959). 
244. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
434 (2d ed. 1972). 
245. Id. at 438-39. 
246. E.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 Mass. 676, 692, 369 N.E.2d 996, 1006 
(1977); Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 344 Mass. 276, 279, 182 N.E.2d 133, 135, cerro 
denied, 371 U.S. 852 (1962). This concern also arises when the pseudo-scientific nature of 
the prosecution's proffered evidence creates a risk that the jury might give it undeserved 
weight. A similar concern underlies the constitutional requirement that identification 
evidence developed by unnecessarily suggestive means must be excluded if it creates a 
substantial likelihood of misidentification. See Neil V. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
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kind from those that must be made as a practical matter in the 
course of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. 
l. 	 The Judge Must Determine the Permissibility of 

Suggested Inferences 

The trial judge's decision whether to give a particular instruc­
tion is based upon an assessment of the evidence. This assessment is 
indistinguishable from a sufficiency determination.247 In making a 
sufficiency determination, the judge is required to survey possible 
inferences and determine whether they are sufficiently supported by 
the prosecution's evidence so as to permit the jury to rely upon them 
in deciding the issue of guilt. The question is whether a possible 
inference is "forbidden by some special rule of law, or is declared 
unwarranted because too remote according to the ordinary course of 
events."248 The nature of the trial judge's assessment of the evidence 
for this purpose is worth consideration. On one hand, examination 
of the terminology used to describe the nature of the inquiry demon­
strates the discretionary and necessarily ad hoc quality of it. On the 
other hand, examination of the assessment process will demonstrate 
the extent to which this responsibility casts the trial judge in the role 
of preliminary fact-finder. 
A variety of terms have been used to describe the threshold 
quality that an inference must have if it is to aid the prosecution in 
satisfying its burden of production. In addition to Justice Holmes' 
description of an appropriate inference as one that is not "too re­
mote,"249 the following are common and appear to be regarded as 
synonymous: "possible and reasonable,"250 "probable but not neces­
247. Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 499-501, 436 N.E.2d~, 405-06 
(1982). 
248. Commonwealth v. Ashemowski, 196 Mass. 342, 347, 82 N.E. 13, 14 (1907) 
(quoting Holmes, J. in Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 137 Mass. 245, 247 (1884»; see a/so 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676,393 N.E.2d 370, 373-74 (1979). Unwar­
ranted inferences to be guarded against include those which might be drawn from 
prosecutorial reference to, or use of, material or facts not actually offered in evidence. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass. 179, 187 n.8, 439 N.E.2d 257, 262 n.8 
(1982) (repeated use of document never offered in evidence to "refresh" recollection of 
witness); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 487, 265 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1970) (un­
substantiated claim made in opening statement); see a/so Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
415,416-17 (1965) (facts similar to Amado). . 
249. Commonwealth v. Ashemowski, 196 Mass. 342, 347, 82 N.E. 13, 14 (1907). 
250. Commonwealth v. Earltop, 372 Mass. 199, 201, 361 N.E.2d 220, 221 (1977); 
see Commonwealth v. Wilbome, 382 Mass. 241, 244-45, 415 N.E.2d 192, 195-96 (1981). 
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sary or compelling,"251 reasonable, warranted,252 and "relevant."253 
"Remoteness" commonly is used as a criterion of admissibility to 
describe an element of relevance. It is used to assess the need to 
exclude relevant evidence because of a danger of unwarranted em­
phasis by the jury.254 It is not necessary to distinguish between the 
relevancy of an inference and its sufficiency unless the inference is 
being used as the sole evidence available to establish the prosecu­
tion's case on an essential element of the crime. In such circum­
stances, the need to assess the extent to which the evidence supports 
conflicting inferences may force the judge to weigh the relative per­
suasive force of the possible inferences in view of the available 
evidence. 
Consider the dispute in Commonwealth v. Howard255 over 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the 
251. E.g., Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 463, 416 N.E.2d 944, 953 
(1981). 
252. E.g., Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 500, 350 N.E.2d 436, 443 
(1976). 
253. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 244-45, 415 N.E.2d 192, 
195-96 (1981). 
254. In Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959), evidence 
had been admitted that the defendant had been engaged in an extramarital affair which 
had been discovered and thwarted by the defendant's wife (the murder victim) seven 
months before the killing. Id at 533-34, 159 N.E.2d at 864. Conceding that the evidence 
supported an inference of hostility on the defendant's part toward his wife, the court 
noted that it also tended to prove other crimes (presumably adultery and/or fornication) 
and ruled that it was inadmissible as being too remote in time. Id at 534, 159 N.E.2d at 
864. 
The danger of overemphasis is more acute where the reasonableness of single-factor 
inferences are involved. The commonly used inference permitting the jury to find that 
one who possesses recently stolen goods knew the goods were stolen, presents an espe­
cially acute problem of remoteness because of its great potential for distortion. This 
potential is found in its implied suggestion that knowledge of the stolen character of the 
goods can be inferred from a single fact rather than from an assessment of all of the 
circumstances under which the property was received. It is exacerbated by the tenuous 
relevance of the single predicate fact: the length of the interval between the theft and the 
time of receipt. Although it articulated extremely loose standards, the supreme judicial 
court in Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 335 N.E.2d 903 (1975), ruled that the 
remoteness of this inference was, at the extremes, an issue for the trial judge to decide 
and, between those extremes, an issue for the jury to decide. Id at 744, 335 N.E.2d at 
913. As to property stolen 13 months before the defendant received it, the trial judge had 
directed the jury that it was not recently stolen and could not be considered as a basis for 
the inference of knowledge. Id at 742,335 N.E.2d at 912. The court's suggestion that, as 
to very short intervals, the trial judge might permissibly have directed the jury that it 
must consider the property to have been recently stolen, id at 742, 744, 335 N.E.2d at 
913, obviously raises due process issues which were not carefully considered. See United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); .Commonwealth v. 
Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185,302-03 (1855). 
255. 386 Mass. 607,436 N.E.2d 1211 (1982). 
976 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:917 
defendant was armed when he robbed the victim.256. The only evi­
dence available on this elemental issue was presented by the prose­
cution. The defendant approached the victim with his hand in his 
pocket, saying: "Walk straight, look down and don't try anything 
foolish or I'll pull the trigger."257 The police arrived while the rob­
bery was in progress; the defendant was unarmed when arrested and 
no gun was found in the vicinity. The victim did not see a 
weapon.258 
The defendant's statement to the victim implying that he was 
armed might support an inference that he was actually armed, but 
the fact that he was not armed when arrested in the course of the 
robbery suggests an inference to the contrary. During the robbery, 
the defendant had taken the victim into an apartment building 
(where he took her purse) and then into an alley, where he required 
her to empty her pockets (he was arrested in or near the alley; the 
victim was still with him).259 There had been some opportunity for 
the defendant to dispose of a weapon, if he had one.260 Thus the 
following chain of "possible" inferences might be constructed: the 
defendant implied that he was armed, acted as if he was armed and 
may have had some opportunity to dispose of a weapon.261 The rea­
sonableness of inferring beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend­
ant was armed without considering and weighing the other possible 
inferences is questionable. The defendant's statement to the victim 
could have been a bluff and the inference that it was a bluff is rein­
forced by the facts that (1) the victim did not see a weapon; (2) the 
defendant was unarmed when arrested at the scene; and (3) an im­
mediate search of the vicinity for a weapon was fruitless. 262 The 
"prosecution's best case"263 rule might lead a trial judge to conclude 
that he is required to consider the prosecution's proposed inference 
in isolation, and determine whether the inference is not too remote 
256. The court in Howard suggested that because the statutory range of potential 
sentences for unarmed robbery is the same as for armed robbery, the defendant's interest 
in this issue was "largely academic." fd. at 608-09 n.2, 436 N.E.2d at 1212 n.2. Sentenc­
ing guidelines indicate, however, that the sentence for unarmed robbery is likely to be 
substantially less harsh than for armed robbery. See Massachusetts Superior Court De­
partment Sentencing Guidelines, (May 15, I 980-Nov. 15, 1980) (unpublished). Simi­
larly, the parole board views the offenses differently. 
257. 386 Mass. at 607,436 N.E.2d at 1211. 
258. fd. at 609, 436 N.E.2d at 1212. 
259. fd. 
260. fd. at 619, 436 N.E.2d at 1217 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
261. fd. 
262. fd. at 612-13, 436 N.E.2d at 1214 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
263. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
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in the ordinary course of events. The actual reasonableness of the 
prosecution's suggested inference cannot be judged fairly out of con­
text, that is, without considering each step in the suggested reasoning 
process.264 The defendant's statement and conduct during the rob­
bery without more, would not support beyond a reasonable doubt a 
conclusion that he was actually armed because he was not armed 
when arrested. The strongest inference based on this evidence is that 
the defendant was not armed at any time during the robbery. The 
additional evidence of an opportunity to dispose of the weapon 
could be construed as further support for the "armed" inference but 
this is equally consistent with the "unarmed" inference.265 The evi­
dence that the victim did not see a weapon is, at best, neutral. The 
final state of the evidence, assessed in this step-by-step manner, does 
not reasonably support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the inference 
that the defendant was armed. 
The process of assessing the permissibility of the prosecution's 
suggested infrences, then, necessarily requires the judge to weigh 
ambiguous evidence-evidence which supports conflicting, incrimi­
nating and exculpatory inferences. The inquiry is whether the evi­
dence provides a reasonable basis upon which the jury could prefer 
the incriminating inference. This approach provides a basis for 
resolving the conflict recently aired in Commonwealth v. Nelson,266 a 
conflict between two apparently irreconcilable sets of evaluative 
principles to be applied in evaluating ambiguous evidence.267 The 
Nelson majority applied principles which allowed the evidence to be 
sufficient if it permits a guilty inference even if it does not require 
that inference.268 In dissent, Chief Justice Hennessey argued that 
two additional principles should be applied: First, if the evidence 
leaves the question of guilt to "conjecture or surmise" and does not 
provide a "solid foundation in established fact" for the guilty infer­
ence, it is insufficient; and second, if the evidence "tends equally to 
sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can 
264. The process followed in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in Common­
wealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 491-500, 350 N.E.2d 436, 438-43 (1976), illustrates this 
step-by-step approach. 
265. From this Justice O'Connor argues that the evidence of opportunity was not 
relevant to the prosecution's proposed inference. 386 Mass. at 613, 436 N.E.2d at 1214 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
266. 370 Mass. 192,346 N.E.2d 839 (1976). 
267. See id at 201-03, 346 N.E.2d at 845-46; id at 206-08, 346 N.E.2d at 847-49 
(Hennessey, c.J., dissenting). 
268. Id at 203, 436 N.E.2d at 845. 
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be said to have been established by legitimate proof."269 
A quick reconsideration of the Howard facts demonstrates that 
Justice Hennessey's principles are applicable when the evidence of­
fers no reasonable basis for selecting the incriminating inference 
over the exculpatory one. In Howard, the inference that the defend­
ant had actually had and disposed of a weapon only could be based 
on conjecture and surmise; nothing in the evidence supported that 
conclusion as a probability. There was no "solid foundation in es­
tablished fact" for that conclusion. Because the prosecution's evi­
dence (at best) tended to sustain either inference equally neither was 
established by legitimate proof. Thus the practice of weighing con­
flicting inferences based upon ambiguous evidence to determine 
whether the prosecution's suggested inference is permissible, and its 
evidence accordingly sufficient, is one firmly established in Massa­
chusetts practice. 
2. 	 The Judge Must Determine Whether Necessary 
Credibility Judgments are Reasonably Supported 
by Evidence 
Credibility judgments are the aspect of fact-finding most un­
equivocally reserved as the jury's exclusive province.270 Yet the 
principle of Jackson v. Virginkj271-that it is the trial judge's consti­
tutional duty to insure that a case is not submitted to the jury unless 
the prosecution has presented reasonable evidentiary basis to sup­
port each essential element of the crime272-logically applies to cred­
ibility issues. The case in which the prosecution's evidence does not 
provide a reasonable basis for making a credibility judgment needed 
to support a finding of guilt will be rare. In most cases, the reason­
able basis for discrimination will appear simply from the fact that 
the evidence to be evaluated has been presented through witness tes­
timony. The jury's opportunity to observe and listen to the witness 
will furnish a reasonable basis for its credibility judgments. 
The exceptional case will be similar to Commonwealth v. John­
son273 in which the key evidence of guilt presented by the prosecu­
tion was the defendant's written confession and the needed 
269. Id. at 206, 436 N.E.2d at 847 (Hennessey, C.]., dissenting). 
270. See Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 Mass. 136, 145-47, 365 N.E.2d 815, 
821 (1977) ("the jury have the sole power to believe or disbelieve any or all such 
evidence"). 
271. 443 U.S. 307 (1977). 
272. Id. at 315-16. 
273. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 326 N.E.2d 355 (1975). 
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incriminating inferences could be drawn only if the jury chose to 
believe the incriminating portions of the statement and disbelieve 
the exculpatory portions.274 The prosecution presented no evidence 
which the jury could use as a basis for reasonably discriminating 
between the defendant's admission that he had killed the victim with 
a knife and his assertion that the victim had first attacked him with 
the knife.275 If no reasonable evidentiary basis for the jury's credi­
bility judgments is discernible from the prosecution's evidence, then 
the defendant is exposed to the risk of either being arbitrarily con­
victed or of being required to provide the essential credibility evi­
dence in his or her own case.276 
A more difficult case is presented when the defendant's evidence 
casts such serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's testi­
monial evidence on an essential element of the crime that the prose­
cution's evidence cannot reasonably be believed. Ordinarily, no 
sufficiency issue is presented because the operation of prosecution's 
best case rule and the exclusive fact-finding prerogative of the jury 
combine to shield the problem from the judge's scrutiny in the suffi­
ciency process. Nevertheless, the supreme judicial court has indi­
cated that such a situation may present a sufficiency of the evidence 
issue. 
When a defense includes an alibi, the prosecution's best case 
rule presents difficult obstacles to an effective assessment of the suffi­
ciency of the prosecution's identification evidence, particularly when 
the evidence consists principally of solely or eyewitness identifica­
tion. The chief difficulties are illustrated by the recent case of Com­
274. Id. at 232, 326 N.E.2d at 359. 
275. Id. at 232-33, 326 N.E.2d at 360. The appeals court ruled that there was no 
basis, even internal inconsistency or implausibility, on which the jury might have relied 
to reasonably believe one part of the transcribed statement and disbelieve the remainder. 
Id. at 233, 326 N.E.2d at 360. 
In Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 Mass. 136, 365 N.E.2d 815 (1977), the 
supreme judicial court explicitly repudiated the appeals court's reasoning on this point, 
asserting in effect that a jury's credibility judgments need not be reasonable, or, to the 
same effect, cannot be regulated to assure reasonableness. Id. at 142,365 N.E.2d at 819; 
see supra notes 184-206 and accompanying text. . 
276. In Johnson the defendant testified at trial that he had not made the statements 
attributed to him and asserted that he had not killed the decedent. He claimed he had 
been cut breaking up a fight between the decedent and two other men. He had, however, 
developed such severe psychiatric problems shortly after his arrest that he was hospital­
ized for a competency evaluation. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 227-28, 365 N.E.2d at 356-57. 
While his bizarre testimony may account for the jury's verdict, it is irrelevant to the issue 
of the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's case. See Common­
wealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 408, 348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976). 
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monwealth v. Woods,277 in which the supreme judicial court 
intimated that it might relax or modify the usual restrictions imposed 
upon the trial judge's view of the evidence in such cases.278 The 
Woods case is worth discussing in some detail because it demon­
strates a number of points regarding the influence of preliminary 
proceedings on the sufficiency assessment in addition to demonstrat­
ing why the trial judge must have the discretion to consider weight 
and credibility in assessing sufficiency. 
The defendant was charged with a rape which had occurred, 
according to the indictment, in Boston near a MBTA station at 7:00 
A.M. on September 23, 1975.279 The first effort to try the case ended 
in a mistrial on the prosecutor's opening statement; the trial resulting 
in defendant Woods' conviction occurred in October, 1978. In re­
sponse to the prosecution's pretrial demand for disclosure of alibi,280 
the defense gave notice of its intent to show, through the record 
keeper of the Suffolk County House of Correction at Deer Island, 
that the defendant had been imprisoned continuously there between 
December 19, 1974, and October 9, 1975, serving a sentence.281 In­
stitutional records indicated that Woods had been furloughed sev­
eral times for short periods in September 1975 but had been 
continuously confined from 10:30 A.M. on September 19 through 
3:30 P.M. on September 26, 1975. He had been in Boston on a fur­
lough from noon on September 18 until 10:30 A.M. September 19 
and had returned to Deer Island on the latter date via the MBTA 
277. 382 Mass. 1,413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980). 
278. See id. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103. But see Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass. 
179,181 n.l, 439 N.E.2d 257, 258 n.l (1983), where the court stated that alibi evidence is 
not to be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence either at the close of the 
prosecution's case or at the close of all the evidence. 
279. 382 Mass. at 2, 413 N.E.2d at 1100. The indictments were returned in June, 
1977. The victim had been unable to identify her assailant until she saw the defendant's 
photograph in a two-page spread she was examining after having reported a burglary of 
her apartment in March, 1977. Id. at 6 n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 n.7. 
The time of 7 A.M. is from the victim's trial testimony rather than the indictment, 
which specified the date only. The early morniiJ.g hour of the rape was never in doubt. 
Considerable circumstantial evidence supported the grand jury's specification of Septem­
ber 23 as the correct date. See id. at 2-3, 413 N.E.2d at 1100-01. In addition, the victim's 
contemporaneous reports to her roommates and parents and testimony at her probable 
cause hearing and before the grand jury all pointed to that date. Finally, her belated 
reports to a hospital on October I, 1975 and to the police on November 8, 1975 identified 
September 23 as the date of the rape. Id. at 4,413 N.E.2d at 1101. 
280. The trial occurred before July I, 1979, the effective date of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 14(b)(I) would have required disclosure of the alibi 
and its evidentiary basis had the trial occurred after the rules took effect. See MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 14(b)(I). 
281. Woods, 382 Mass. at 5, 413 N.E.2d at 1102. 
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train system.282 
At the outset of the first trial, the prosecution was permitted, 
over objection, to amend the indictment to allege that the rape oc­
curred "on or about" rather than "on" September 23, 1975.283 In the 
second trial, the victim identified Woods in the courtroom as her 
assailant and testified that the rape had occurred "in the latter part 
of September."284 In short, the prosecution's case-in-chief consisted 
of a dubious identification bolstered by the inferences it could mus­
ter by exploiting the ambiguity of the amended accusatlon and the 
uncertainties in its own witnesses' recollections.285 As the supreme 
judicial court noted, the prosecution's case created the distinct im­
pression that it had been fashioned to fit the only possible opening in 
the defendant's otherwise unimpeachable alibi evidence.286 
Although the supreme judicial court treated Woods as a special 
case justifying remedial action to "avoid the reproach that justice 
may have miscarried," the lower courts had treated the case as rou­
tine.287 The trial judge denied the defendant's motions for required 
findings of not guilty at the close of all the evidence and for a new 
trial, commenting that the case was tried to a jury on fact issues upon 
which the trial judge could not substitute his own judgment-the 
trial was fair and justice was done.288 The appeals court summarily 
affirmed the conviction in a rescrip opinion.289 The supreme judicial 
court hinted that it would have found the evidence insufficient and 
reversed the trial judge's decision to submit the case to the jury, had 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 10, 413 N.E.2d at 1104-05. 
284. Id. at 2, 413 N.E.2d at 1100. The victim had initially described the rapist to 
the police (November 8, 1975) "as black, young, under six feet tali, of medium build, 
wearing short Afro-style hair." Id. at 3, 413 N.E.2d at 1101. In June 1977, having made 
an initial photographic identification that March, she chanced to see Woods alone be­
hind an enclosure in the court room as she waited to testify at the probable cause hear­
ing. No lineup or other comparative identification procedure was conducted. Id. at 4,7, 
413 N.E.2d at 1101, 1103. 
285. The victim had identified the date as September 23, a Tuesday (as September 
23 was; September 19 was a Friday) and as the day after a holiday. Neither September 
18 nor 22 was a holiday. The only Monday holidays in September 1975 were the 1st 
(Labor Day) and the 15th (Yom Kippur). Id. at 4, 413 N.E.2d at 1102. Jail records 
showed that Woods was released on a furlough at 10:10 A.M. on September 2 and incar­
cerated on September 16. Id. at 5, 413 N.E.2d at 1102. 
286. Id. at 6 n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 n.7. 
287. Id. at 8-10, 413 N.E.2d at 1103-04. 
288. Commonwealth v. Woods, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 816, 397 N.E.2d 1302, 1302 
(1980). 
289. Commonwealth v. Woods, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 406 N.E.2d 1054 (1980). 
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the defendant pressed this claim on appeal.290 
The trial judge had grounded his sufficiency ruling on the vic­
tim's testimony.291 Acknowledging this, the court intimated that the 
sufficiency of the prosecution's identification evidence presented a 
close question.292 But the prosecution's evidence in its case-in-chief, 
interpreted in its most favorable light, was clearly sufficient to sup­
port a finding that Woods was the rapist, with the only doubts at this 
point arising from the victim's credibility, an issue reserved for the 
jury.293 Whether the evidence tending to show that the rape oc­
curred September 19 was sufficient to prove that the crime was com­
mitted "on or about September 23" addresses the weight of the 
evidence, and is similarly shielded from judicial scrutiny.294 Because 
the precise date and time of the offense become material only in light 
of the defendant's alibi evidence, a judge has no occasion to consider 
the feebleness of the evidence on this point at the close of the prose­
cution's case. At the close of the defense evidence, all doubts about 
the evidence fall under the rubric of credibility and weight and must 
290. See 382 Mass. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103. 
291. Id. This testimony was not uncorroborated except on the point of identifica­
tion. She had made contemporaneous reports of the rape to her roommates and parents. 
Id. at 3, 413 N.E.2d at 1101. Her in-court identification of the defendant was unequivo­
cal. Id. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103. Ifbelieved, her testimony offered sufficient support for 
the conviction. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 38 (1982). 
292. See 382 Mass. at 10-11, 413 N.E.2d at 1105. 
The judge denied directed verdicts at the close of all the evidence, resting the 
denial on the testimony of the victim. On this appeal, the defendant has pre­
ferred not to press his exception to the ruling. However, "to sustain the denial 
of a directed verdict, it is not enough for the appellate court to find that there 
was some record evidence, however slight, to support each essential element of 
the offense; it must find that there was enough evidence that could have satisfied 
a rational trier of fact of each such element beyond a reasonable doubt" . . . 
including here the proposition that it was this defendant who was the assailant. 
In this aspect the denial of the direct verdict motions could not be accounted an 
easy decision. 
Id. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103. 
293. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-74 
(1979). 
294. Ordinarily, an indictment must be proved as charged. But variations are per­
mitted between indictment and proof so long as the variation is neither material (e.g., 
changes the offense charged or otherwise alters the work of the grand jury) nor prejudi­
cial to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Ohanian, 373 Mass. 839, 843, 370 N.E.2d 695, 
697 (1977). In an alibi case, a variation in date and time might be considered prejudicial 
to the defense. The court did not address this issue in Woods. The permissibility of an 
amendment is governed by essentially the same considerations as govern the permissibil­
ity of a variation. See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 869-70, 434 N.E.2d 633, 
639 (1982). 
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be left to the jury.295 
The need to permit the trial judge to assess the credibility and 
weight of the prosecution's identification evidence in determining its 
sufficiency appears clearly in the Woods case. The supreme judicial 
court's comments regarding sufficiency intimate that there is room 
for such an assessment in the requirement that the trial judge" 'find 
that there is enough evidence that could have satisfied a reasonable 
trier of fact ... beyond a reasonable doubt.' "296 The suggestion 
that the victim's identification was not sufficiently firm or positive to 
satisfy that standard is based on an assessment of the weight-and 
perhaps credibility-of that witness' testimony. The strength of 
Woods' alibi and the direct quote from People v. McGee297 indicate 
that the assessment includes weighing the identification evidence 
against the alibi evidence. Such a judgment is clearly inconsistent 
with the pre-Jackson restrictions but is consistent with the proposal 
advanced here that it is the trial judge's responsibility to insure that 
the evidence presents a reasonable basis for the weight and credibil­
ity judgments needed to infer guilt.298 
The Woods procedural facts also highlight the manner in which 
pretrial proceedings will often directly affect the trial judge's ability 
to effectively assess sufficiency at a factual level. Clearly the practice 
of requiring the defense to plead defensive claims before trial creates 
a need for judges to be alert to the possibility that the prosecution's 
evidence will be manipulated to meet the contours of the defendant's 
295. The rule of Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147,346 N.E.2d 368 (1976), 
requires reconsideration of the prosecution's case on the defendant's motion at the close 
of all the evidence to determine whether the prosecution's case has deteriorated. Id at 
150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 370 n.!. While it might be interpreted as applying to elemental 
defensive issues on which the defense has met its burden of production, the defendant's 
evidence cannot cause the prosecution's position to deteriorate simply by contradicting 
the prosecution's evidence. 
To the author's knowledge, this rule has not been applied in a reported Massachu­
setts case. Unless it abrogates the "prosecution's best case" rules after the defendant's 
evidence is presented, however, any "deterioration" must be internal to the prosecution's 
case. For example, key evidence might have been stricken in the interim. C;: Common­
wealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 294-97, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1102-04 (1979) (testimony of 
prosecution witness who invoked privilege against self-incrimination, preventing effec­
tive cross-examination, should have been stricken; without that witness' testimony, di­
rected verdict appropriate). 
296. 382 Mass. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103 (quoting People v. McGee, 21 Ill. 2d 440, 
445, 173 N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (1961». 
297. 21 Ill. 2d 440, 445, 173 N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (1961). 
298. The supreme judicial court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass. 
179, 439 N.E.2d 257 (1982), makes it clear that its discussion of the sufficiency of the 
Woods identification has not yet been translated into active principle. 
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position.299 The case also demonstrates that judges ought to con­
sider, in ruling on motions for bills of particulars and amendments 
to indictments, whether the proposed action will assist or undermine 
their task of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. In general, the 
more narrowly focused and directly contested the factual issues are, 
the simpler the sufficiency assessment will be. 
The essential teaching of Jackson is that an effective assessment 
of the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence is a step of funda­
mental importance in insuring the fairness and established balance 
of the adversary trial.3oo The judge'S basic responsibility is to insure 
that a case is not submitted to a jury unless the evidence presents a 
reasonable basis for finding guilt. 30 I The foregoing survey of the 
sufficiency assessment process, as it is administered in Massachu­
setts, demonstrates the need for and feasibility of several basic modi­
fications in this process. The pre-Jackson requirements that the trial 
judge invariably view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution is inimical to the Jackson requirements of reasonable­
ness, particularly when applied to elemental defensive issues. Simi­
larly, the practice of prohibiting the trial judge from making 1) those 
weight and credibility judgments necessary to insure that the evi­
dence reasonably supports guilty inferences and 2) other weight and 
credibility judgments needed reserved to the jury in order to convict 
thwarts the Jackson principle by leaving the jury free to make un­
supported judgments in those areas. 
The proposed modifications would bring the Massachusetts' 
sufficiency assessment process in line with constitutional principle 
without significantly altering the actual division of fact-finding re­
sponsibility between judge and jury. The constitutional policy of 
making the jury the primary fact-finders in a criminal case is 
designed to protect the accused from the danger of arbitrary or op­
pressive prosecution and conviction.302 The trial judge cannot direct 
a verdict of guilty or unilaterally enter a judgment of conviction in a 
jury trial, even when the evidence is overwhelming.303 But while the 
trial judge cannot infringe upon the jury's fact-finding discretion to 
299. Indications of this kind of prosecutorial misconduct can legitimately be con­
sidered relevant to the credibility of the witness and the weight of the witness' testimony. 
300. See 443 U.S. at 307. 
301. Id. at 317-24. 
302. Eg., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373-74 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(1972); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185,207-10 (1855). 
303. Eg., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977). 
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the defendant's disadvantage,304 that limitation does not extend to 
actions favorable to the defendant, even if erroneous.305 The policy 
of making the jury the primary fact finders, then, should not be used 
to justify submitting to it cases which might result in unjust 
convictions. 
Present Massachusetts practice regularly involves trial judges in 
determining the permissibility of possible inferences and assessing 
the possible or likely impact of evidence on a jury. Through jury 
instructions, judges commonly influence jurors' views of credibility, 
weight and likely inferential relationships between evidence and 
legal conclusions. The proposed modification of the judge's view of 
the evidence, then, would alter the sufficiency process slightly but 
would have little impact on the actual division of fact-finding re­
sponsibility between judge and jury in Massachusetts. 
III. WEIGHING EVIDENCE IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 
When the new Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure went 
into effect on July 1, 1979, the trial judges of the district and superior 
court departments were granted an extraordinary and somewhat 
mysterious authority to correct jury verdicts of guilty in criminal 
cases. The power is extraordinary-both because its scope is unprec­
edented and because it authorizes a specialized kind of decisionmak­
ing that is not easily confined to the usual systemic restraints of 
standard and procedure. It is a power which can be applied to any 
criminal case tried to a jury and is so flexible that it lends itself to 
ameliorate any element of unwarranted harshness in the application 
of the criminal law to a case. 
This remarkable power is contained in a single sentence of Rule 
25(b)(2); everything else to be known about it must be derived from 
the study of related or analogous provisions. Its place in the system's 
repertoire of post-conviction remedies has not yet been clearly estab­
lished, but it is possible to begin to characterize this power and locate 
it within this context. Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) provides: 
If a verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on motion set aside 
304. This limitation often receives less than full attention where jury instructions 
regarding inferences and presumptions are involved. Allen, supra note 7, at 326-39. BUI 
see Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (instruction as to credibility of defense 
witness unfairly reduced the prosecution's burden of proof). 
305. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-78 (1978); United States v. Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568-76 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 
142-43 (1962). The application of the Winship standard is not exclusively the province of 
the jury. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317 n.lO; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25. 
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the verdict and order a new trial, or order the entry of a finding of 
not guilty, or order the entry of a finding of guilty of any offense 
included in the offense charged in the indictment or complaint.306 
There are no accompanying provisions that state the grounds upon 
which relief may be granted, set out the criteria by which it can be 
determined that acceptable grounds have been adequately estab­
lished, or define standards by which the appropriate form of relief 
can be determined. 
A. The Purposes and History of the Power to Revise Jury Verdicts 
Evidence of the function and purpose of this grant of authority 
in Rule 25 can be discerned from its context-it is found in the rule 
of procedure governing the trial court's duty to regulate the jury's 
fact-finding discretion and it constitutes a form of post-conviction 
remedy additional to that provided for in Rule 30.307 Additionally, 
it is similar to the supreme judicial court's section 33E powers.30B 
1. Purposes 
The Reporter's Notes to Rule 25 state that the purpose of the 
second sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) is to extend to trial courts the duty 
and power to reduce verdicts vested in the supreme judicial court by 
section 33E.309 Section 33E in its present form requires the court, in 
all homicide cases resulting in a first degree murder conviction, to 
review the law and the facts broadly to determine whether the jury's 
verdict represents a miscarriage of justice. If the court finds that 
there has been a miscarriage of justice, the provision empowers it to 
grant a new trial or reduce the jury's verdict by ordering entry of a 
finding of guilty of any lesser included offense.310 Although trial 
courts may look to the supreme judicial court's exercise of its section 
306. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2). 
307. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § II (West 1981) 
provides: 
If a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty is denied and the case is 
submitted to the jury and a verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on a 
renewed motion for a directed verdict of not guilty pursuant to the Massachu­
setts Rules of Criminal Procedure set aside the verdict and order a new trial, or 
order the entry of a finding of guilty of any offense included in the offense 
charged in the indictment or complaint. 
308. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981); see infra text accom­
panying notes 309-10. 
309. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a) reporter's note at 502. 
310. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). By virtue of the supreme 
judicial court's interpretation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, § 6 (West 1970), in 
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 371 Mass. 605, 607, 358 N.E.2d 786, 787 (1976), all first de­
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33E powers for guidance, section 33E and Rule 25(b)(2) are far from 
congruent and the guidance provided by th~ supreme judicial court 
is not always clearly expressed. The supreme judicial court itself has 
not been guided by any but the most general standards; it has viewed 
its section 33E powers as discretionary. An observation the court 
recently made about its power to review unpreserved errors of law 
could just as easily be made regarding its power to review jury con­
victions of first degree murder: 
Discretionary decisions by individual judges inevitably produce 
variations in result in substantially similar factual situations. 
Statements explanatory of such decisions may serve "no sharp an­
alytical purpose." At least one Justice of this court has found it 
difficult to rationalize our decisions. . " Although we have 
sometimes engaged in the dangerous practice of comparing discre­
tionary decisions, we have recognized that "§ 33£ review is not 
simply a process of "color matching.' "311 
Thus, despite the availability of a body of murder cases in 
which analogous powers have been exercised, a number of funda­
mental questions remain regarding the nature and extent of the trial 
court's new Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) powers: 
a. On what basis may the power be exercised? 
The supreme judicial court's section 33E power to reduce a ver­
dict has been exercised based upon the supreme judicial court's view 
in a particular case of the "weight of the evidence."312 Its power to 
gree murder indictments must be tried by a jury. Accordingly, section 33E, like Rule 
25(b)(2) (second sentence), applies only to jury verdicts. 
This function was first codified in 1939. Before that the power to grant a new trial 
was considered to be within the court's inherent powers. Commonwealth v. Greene, 17 
Mass. (I Pick.) 417, 429 (1822). In 1939 it was enlarged to permit review of the facts as 
well as the law. This expansion was attributable at least in part to dissatisfaction gener­
ated by the nature of the appellate review given the cases of Sacco and Vanzetti. Com­
monwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 168, 380 N.E.2d 113, 120 (1978); see 
Commonwealth v. Sacco, 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167 (1927) (convictions in 1921, review 
completed 1927, executions carried out 1927). . 
Until 1962 the only remedy authorized by section 33E was a new trial. In that year 
the court was further authorized to reduce the jury's verdict. See Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109, 190 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1963). Between 1962 and 1979 the court 
reviewed 230 cases, presumably all of the first and second degree verdicts returned in the 
Commonwealth during that period. It reduced the verdict in thirteen of those cases. See 
Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d 905, 912 n.9 (1981). It 
granted new trials in an undetermined number of others. Id. 
311. Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 759, 412 N.E.2d 354, 357-58 (1980) 
(citations omitted). 
312. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E.2d 241 (1944). 
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grant a new trial has been exercised on both "weight of the evi­
dence" grounds and on the ground that an irremediable trial error 
created a "substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice" oc­
curred.313 The court has never had the authority to order entry of a 
finding of not guilty in the face of a jury verdict, as trial judges now 
do. The trial judges' power is unprecedented and there are no au­
thoritative standards or guidelines to govern its exercise. 
b. What function or functions is the power intended to serve? 
In all cases the trial judge is required to screen the evidence 
before requiring the defendant to defend by evaluating the legal suf­
ficiency of the prosecution's evidence before submitting a case to the 
jury for a decision.314 The effectiveness of this "quality control" 
function is limited by the requirement referred to in this discussion 
as the "prosecution's best case" rule: The judge must interpret the 
evidence in every respect in the light most favorable to the prosecu­
tion. The effectiveness is further limited, and in some cases elimi­
nated, by the operation of a number of procedural and evidentiary 
devices that result in shifting the burden of producing evidence on a 
given issue to the defendant (affirmative defenses) or that facilitate 
proof of the prosecution's case through the use of inferences and pre­
sumptions. The use of imprecisely defined terms to express essential 
elements of an offense, or the vagueness in the indictment on such 
issues as the time, place and manner in which the offense occurred, 
also impair the effectiveness of sufficiency evaluations designed to 
protect defendants from the mischief of having to defend unfounded 
charges. 
The location of this power within the structure of Rule 25 and 
the uses to which the supreme judicial court has put its section 33E 
verdict reduction powers, suggest that this is a primary function of 
the trial court's newly acquired "quality control" authority. Unlike 
the Rule 30 power to grant a new trial, Rule 25 is to be invoked and 
exercised before an appeal, by addressing largely nonappealable 
problems and, secondarily, to eliminate the need or impetus for an 
appeal. The power is intended to be used or at least should be used 
principally to complete the trial court's ability to discharge its duty 
in regulating the scope of the jury's fact-finding discretion. Rule 25 
313. See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975). 
314. Because the Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) power is limited in its application 
to jury cases, the factfinder, for purposes of most of this paper, will be a jury. Where it is 
not, the general term will be used. 
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embodies a recognition that, as properly instructed juries may never­
theless convict on insufficient evidence, such juries may also-be­
cause of the influence of the devices mentioned above-return 
verdicts that are so against the weight of the evidence as to suggest 
that either the judgment of guilt or the assessment of the degree of 
guilt may have been based upon or has been decisively influenced by 
nonevidentiary considerations. The strongest indication of such a 
problem is, of course, a case in which the legal sufficiency of the 
prosecution's case has not been thoroughly evaluated, is marginal, or 
has been artificially enhanced by the effect of one or more of the 
aforementioned procedural devices. 
c. On what basis should the appropriate remedy be selected? 
The example of the supreme judicial court's exercise of section 
33E power is not fully instructive on how an appropriate remedy 
may be selected in an exercise of Rule 25 power. The court has 
never exercised the full range of remedial powers under section 33E 
that is now available to trial judges under Rule 25(b)(2) (second sen­
tence). A narrow interpretation of the grounds upon which a trial 
judge may exercise these powers would eliminate unpreserved, re­
versible trial error as a basis, and further limit the trial courts to 
grant relief based upon an assessment of the weight of the evidence. 
Although it is not central to the inquiry of this paper, it is suggested 
that the latter remedy is appropriate only when, in the court's view, 
the weight of the evidence leads it to conclude that important, avail­
able, relevant evidence favorable to the defendant, has not been 
presented to the jury.3lS 
The supreme judicial court's discretionary authority to reduce 
verdicts based upon its view that the weight of the evidence has pro­
duced ample basis for establishing standards, but several characteris­
tics of cases in which the court has exercised its power suggest that 
care should be exercised not to demand of these cases more than 
they can provide.316 While their homogeneity-all of the section 
33E reduced verdict cases are homicide cases-makes them an ideal 
reference for degree of guilt issues, most of the cases shed little light 
315. Under MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30, such evidence would warrant granting a new 
trial only if it were "newly discovered." See Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 
25, 140 N.E. 470, 475 (1923). Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) is not limited by such 
qualifications. Cf. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 607, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827 
(1975). 
316. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 412 N.E.2d 354 (1980). 
990 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:917 
on how a judge should deal with cases in which guilt is the only issue 
and the weight of the evidence is inadequate to support the verdict. 
The section 33E cases involving reduction of verdicts will be 
analyzed first to discover the method used by the court to assess the 
weight of the evidence. Second, the cases will be analyzed to dis­
cover patterns in the methods used and the elements of the offense in 
question. 
The section 33E cases fit roughly into three categories. In the 
first, the court's view of the weight of the evidence does not involve 
any significant revision of the factual findings implied by the jury's 
verdict, but the verdict is found by the court to be disproportionate 
to those verdicts rendered in similar factual cases.317 In the second, 
the court's view of the weight of the evidence involves substantial 
revisions of the factual findings implied by the jury's verdict, and 
while the evidence is still legally sufficient to support the verdict, the 
verdict is considered to be disproportionate to the facts; it is too 
harsh on the revised facts, for example.318 Each of these two catego­
ries account for roughly forty percent of the verdict reduction cases. 
In the third category, the court's view of the weight of the evidence 
involves a revision of the jury's implied findings and leads the court 
to the conclusion that the weight of the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict. 319 
In most cases, the court's primary conclusion that the verdict is 
not supported by the weight of the evidence is accompanied by a 
secondary conclusion that the court's view of the evidence supports a 
verdict of guilty of some lesser included offense.32o That is, the inad­
equacy found is limited to that evidence addressed to a particular 
element that defines the distinction, for example, between murder 
and manslaughter (malice aforethought). In such a case, the murder 
verdict would be revised to a manslaughter verdict. In some cases, 
however, the court's view of the weight of the evidence has-led it to 
grant a new trial rather than to reduce the verdict.321 For example, 
in insanity cases in which the prosecution relies solely on the "pre­
sumption of sanity" to get its case to the jury, the court has found the 
jury's guilty verdict to be against the weight of the evidence and or­
317. The evidence is, by hypothesis, legally sufficient in this class of cases. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 190 N.E.2d 555 (1963). 
318. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833 
(1975). 
319. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975). 
320. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams 364 Mass. 145,301 N.E.2d 683 (1973). 
321. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1969). 
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dered a new trial.322 Another example is a second degree murder 
case which involved a defense of accident where the court found no 
basis in the evidence for a verdict greater than involuntary man­
slaughter (recklessness) and ordered a new trial on that charge only. 
In effect the court ordered findings of not guilty on the greater 
charges.323 The proposition will be developed that these types of 
cases may provide a basis for developing at least rudimentary guide­
lines for the exercise of the trial court's unique Rule 25 power to 
order a finding of not guilty based upon its view of the weight of the 
evidence. 
The second sentence of Rule 25(b )(2) grants the trial court the 
authority to provide relief from a jury's guilty verdict by setting the 
verdict aside and granting a new trial, ordering a finding of not 
guilty, or ordering a finding of guilty on any lesser offense included 
in the charge.324 The rule does not provide guidance for the court in 
determining when it is appropriate to exercise this authority or in 
determining an appropriate form ofrelief.325 With regard to the trial 
judge's relationship to the jury, Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) ex­
tends the authority and duty of the judge to review the jury's verdict 
in view of the weight of the evidence and to determine whether the 
jury's verdict was based on a careful consideration of the evidence 
and not the product of bias, misapprehension or prejudice.326 In 
addition, the trial judge has a broader power to consider whether a 
verdict otherwise may represent a miscarriage ofjustice and whether 
a lesser degree of guilt would be more consonant with justice than 
322. Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975). 
323. Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1969). 
324. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b}(2}. 
325. The rule is not entirely inscrutable, however, because it is similar to that of 
two familiar remedial powers found elsewhere in the system: the trial court's statutory 
power to grant a new trial under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 29 (West 1981), 
which is now codified in MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b); and the supreme judicial court's au­
thority to conduct a plenary review of the law and facts in capital cases to insure that 
injustice has not been done, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). 
In Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 414-15, 378 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1978), 
the court noted the limited remedial powers of the trial court under section 29. In Com­
monwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 554, 420 N.E.2d 905, 911 (1981), and Common­
wealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 316,431 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1982) the court ruled that the 
Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) powers of the trial court to reduce a verdict are the 
equivalent of the court's section 33E power to reduce a verdict and are to be exercised 
similarly. 
326. See Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243-44 
(1944) (describing the nature of the supreme judicial court's review of the facts under 
section 33E, which in turn is derived from the section 29 powers of the trial judge). 
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that rendered by the jury.327 This assessment of the jury's verdict, 
however, is not confined to the narrower limits imposed upon the 
trial court when it evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence under the 
preceding provisions of Rule 25. Although the power to reduce the 
verdict is to be used sparingly, a determination that the verdict was 
supported by sufficient evidence is not decisive.328 
It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate that the provi­
sions of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) that authorize the trial court 
to reduce the jury's verdict or acquit the defendant are designed and 
suited to provide a mechanism for determining the adequacy of the 
evidence in two types of cases: those in which the evidence is suffi­
cient to require submission to the jury but the verdict returned ap­
pears to the judge to be disproportionate to the weight of the 
evidence or the result otherwise works an injustice, and those in 
which the "prosecution's best case" rule or other procedural or evi­
dentiary device prevents any meaningful assessment of evidentiary 
sufficiency. The provisions of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) may 
also provide a mechanism for review of trial errors and fundamental 
defects in the trial process, a proposition which will be addressed 
only briefly. 
The rule does not on its own terms identify the grounds upon 
327. See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662,700-01,335 N.E.2d 660, 683 
(1975), for a description of this additional, broader discretionary authority. The supreme 
judicial court held in Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543,420 N.E.2d 905 (1981); 
Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314,431 N.E.2d 915 (1982), that the trial judge 
had authority to reduce the second degree murder convictions to manslaughter convic­
tions in each case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence to support the murder verdicts. 
Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 554-55, 420 N.E.2d at 912; Keough 385 Mass. at 319, 320, 431 
N.E.2d at 918-20. 
Insufficiency, however, appears at times to be an important factor in the court's deci­
sion. See Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 316-18, 372 N.E.2d 246, 251-52 
(1978); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 485-88, 265 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (1970). 
In a number of recent cases the court, in enumerating its reasons for not revising the 
verdict, has pointed out that the evidence supporting it was legally sufficient. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 79, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (1983); Common­
wealth v. Parker, 389 Mass. 27, 33, 449 N.E.2d 316, 319 (1983); Commonwealth v. Nick­
erson, 388 Mass. 246, 251-54, 446 N.E.2d 68, 72-73 (1983); Commonwealth v. 
Prendergast, 385 Mass. 625, 635-38, 433 N.E.2d 438, 444-46 (1982). In general the suffi­
ciency of the evidence will have been established and the court's attention will be ad­
dressed instead to the weight of the evidence, a broader subject of inquiry. But this 
distinction is not rigidly maintained and a suggestion of marginal sufficiency or even 
insufficiency appear to underlie the court's decision in some section 33E cases. See Com­
monwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308,372 N.E.2d 246 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 
358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970); see also Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 
437 N.E.2d 224 (1982) (Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) ruling). 
328. Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314,431 N.E.2d 915 (1982). 
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which the trial court may base its remedial action. The Reporter's 
Notes are ambiguous on this point.329 That is, the notes address only 
the power to reduce the verdict but state that the effect of the rule is 
to extend to the trial courts a post-verdict power-"a power in all 
cases much like that which had previously been reserved to the 
Supreme Judicial Court in capital cases under ... [section] 33E (as 
amended)."330 
The court's authority under section 33E is not limited to the 
power to reduce verdicts.33l Section 33E empowers the court to re­
view claims that errors of law were committed but were not 
presented to the trial court or otherwise preserved or presented for 
appellate review according to the usual course of procedure.332 The 
court has reviewed a variety of claims under the aegis of this provi­
sion, most prominently those claims addressed to jury instructions 
dealing with the essential elements of the offense, issues of defense or 
mitigation, or a central aspect of the fact-finding process such as the 
allocation or definition of the burden of proof, or serious misconduct 
by the prosecution during the trial.333 
There are strong reasons to support the view that the trial court 
has a similar authority under Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence). Much 
the same authority is available under Rule 30(b), but Rule 30(b) is 
designed for post-appellate use.334 One of the purposes of Rule 
25(b )(2) however, is to allow trial judges to eliminate the need for an 
329. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2) reporter's note. The supreme judicial court has 
treated the reporter's notes on this rule as a persuasive but not decisive expression of its 
purpose and scope. See Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 554-55, 420 N.E.2d 
905,912 (1981); Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314,316-18,431 N.E.2d 915, 917­
18 (1982). 
330. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2) reporter's note at 435. 
331. 	 Section 33E provides in pertinent part: 
In a capital case as hereinafter defined the entry in the supreme judicial 
court shall transfer to that court the whole case for its consideration of the law 
and the evidence. Upon such consideration the court may, if satisfied that the 
verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of newly 
discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may require (a) order a 
new trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt, and 
remand the case to the superior court for the imposition of sentence. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981): 
332. Id. 
333. Commonwealth v. Collins, 386 Mass. I, 11-13,434 N.E.2d 964, 971-72 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 386 Mass. 35, 37-38, 434 N.E.2d 983, 984-85 (1982); Com­
monwealth v. Smith, 381 Mass. 141, 143-46,407 N.E.2d 1291, 1292-94 (1980); Common­
wealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 756-58, 412 N.E.2d 354, 358-59 (1980). 
334. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b) reporter's notes at 328; Commonwealth v. Pres­
ton, 393 Mass. 318, 321 n.2, - N.E.2d - n.2 (1984). 
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appeal. 335 It would be both efficient and consistent with general 
practice in Massachusetts to afford trial courts the opportunity to ad­
dress and, if appropriate, to correct fundamental defects in the trial 
process which would otherwise be addressed only on appeal.336 The 
cases indicate that the supreme judicial court tends, at times, to exer­
cise its various forms of authority under section 33E collectively, or 
at least without taking care to specify the precise basis upon which it 
was acting.337 These considerations suggest that the trial court is au­
335. Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543,554 n.8, 420 N.E.2d 905, 912 n.8 
(1981). 
336. Such issues can be raised in a post-conviction collateral attack by means of a 
motion for new trial. Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 320-21, 403 N.E.2d 363, 
367-68 (1980) ("If the original trial was 'infected with prejudicial constitutional error,' 
the trial judge has no discretion to deny the motion" for new trial under Rule 30(b).); 
Earl v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 181, 184,248 N.E.2d 498, 500 (1969). 
The court's comment in Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 758, 412 N.E.2d 
354,357 (1980), that the 1939 amendment to section 33E gave it "a discretionary author­
ity broader than that of the trial judge" could not have been addressed to the power to 
consider errors of law, which was not affected by that amendment. Also, in light of 
Gaulden and Keough it could not have been addressed to the power to reduce a verdict. 
At most, it can be interpreted as a suggestion that the trial court cannot act under Rule 
25(b)(2) (second sentence) "for any other reason that justice may require" as the supreme 
judicial court can. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). It may have 
been nothing more than a poorly considered remark. 
337. This is not surprising in view of the equitable and broadly discretionary na­
ture of the authority the court exercises, and in view of the fact that, until the advent of 
Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence), there was little reason for the court to focus on the 
precedental impact of a particular decision. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 282 N.E.2d 409 (1972) (reducing 
second degree murder verdict to manslaughter where judge failed to give manslaughter 
instructions); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967) (reducing 
first degree murder verdict to second degree where trial judge failed to give instructions 
clearly distinguishing basis of finding one rather than the other), cerl. denied, 391 U.S. 
968 (1968). 
In Kinney the trial judge had not instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter 
although the issue was raised by the evidence. 361 Mass. at 712, 282 N.E.2d at 411. The 
court considered manslaughter to be the appropriate verdict but evidently believed it 
unlikely that a jury would reach that result in a second trial because of the inflammatory 
nature of the circumstances: the defendant, an adult male, had been confronted and 
attacked by a group of some twenty angry women and children; he claimed to be in fear 
for his life and to have fired five warning shots, supposedly into the air. Two persons 
were struck and killed by four of the bullets fired. Id at 710, 282 N.E.2d at 410. 
In While the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder, evidently on a 
felony murder theory, for a killing resulting from his efforts either to burglarize a restau­
rant or rob its owner. The burglary-murder would have been second degree; the rob­
bery-murder first, but the trial judge'S instructions did not correctly define either 
underlying felony. The weight of the evidence suggested the defendant's purpose had 
been burglary and the court ordered entry of a verdict of second degree murder "to 
prevent a possible miscarriage of justice." 353 Mass. at 426, 232 N.E.2d at 346. 
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thorized by Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) to act on grounds as 
broad as those more specifically enumerated in section 33E. 
2. History 
The history of the development and use of the supreme judicial 
court's section 33E powers and the trial court's section 29 powers to 
grant a new trial cast some light on the extraordinarily broad and 
equitable nature of the trial court's Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) 
power. The trial judge's authority and duty to grant relief from un­
just convictions precedes any explicit legislative grant of authority 
and, in some respects, may be derived from the due process guaran­
tees ofArticle 12 of the Declaration of Rights.338 The judge's role in 
the exercise of this authority is, like the role assumed in evaluating 
evidentiary sufficiency, supervisory vis-a-vis the jury. In contrast to 
the court's authority to determine sufficiency of the evidence, how­
ever, it is guided by discretion rather than by an articulated legal 
standard.339 Before the enactment of Rule 25, the only remedy the 
trial judge could give was to grant a new trial,340 The authority to 
grant a new trial could be exercised either on the basis of trial errors 
"when a decisive or pertinent point affecting substantive rights has 
not been raised by exception at the trial (in order to prevent a mis­
carriage of justice)"341 or when, in the trial judge's judgment, the 
verdict was" 'so greatly against the weight of the evidence as to in­
duce in his mind the strong belief that it was not due to a careful 
consideration of the evidence, but that it was the product of bias, 
misapprehension or prejudice.' "342 Such a verdict, if allowed to 
338. The trial court's responsibility and authority in this respect were acknowl­
edged in Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 229-31 (1855); and Common­
wealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 514, 550 (1822), where the court suggested that the judge's 
supervisory relationship to the jury is concommitant to the Article 12 guarantee of a jury 
trial. 
339. See Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 545, 420 N.E.2d at 913 (citing Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 414-15, 378 N.E.2d 429,432-33 (1978». 
340. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 414 n.5, 378 N.E.2d 429, 
432 n.5 (1978). This was also true of the supreme judicial court's remedial powers under 
section 33E and its predecessors until 1962, when the statute was amended to permit the 
court to revise the verdict as well. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. \07, \08-09, 
190 N .E.2d 555, 557 (1963). The court has never had the power to enter a finding of not 
guilty under section 33E, however. 
341. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12,25, 140 N.E. 470, 476 (1923); if. 
Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. (1 Pick.) 515, 549-50 (1822) (claim of newly discov­
ered evidence reviewed with view toward protection of the innocent). 
342. Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1944) 
(quoting Scannel v. Boston Elevated Ry., 208 Mass. 513, 514, 94 N.E. 696, 696 (1911) 
(standard for grant of new trial on weight of evidence grounds in civil cases». 
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stand, would result in a miscarriage of justice. It is not enough that 
the trial judge had a reasonable doubt examining the case as a juror, 
because the issue is not whether the judge agrees with the verdict but 
whether the judge believes that the jury actually confined itself to 
deciding the case on the evidence.343 Until 1939 the supreme judi­
cial court was not clearly empowered to act on grounds other than 
errors of law in the exercise of its section 33E authority, but the stat­
ute was explicitly broadened by amendment that year to open the 
facts of a case to the court's consideration.344 Five years later the 
court ruled that, as to the weight of the evidence, the statute con­
ferred "the power and the duty exercised by a trial judge upon a 
motion for a new trial,"345 and "that the question of whether a ver­
dict is contrary to the weight of the evidence is, upon analysis, one of 
fact, although commonly spoken of as one of discretion."346 
In sum, after 1939, section 33E authorized the supreme judicial 
court (in capital cases) to grant a new trial on anyone of four 
grounds: (1) that the verdict was against the law; (2) that the verdict 
was against the weight of the evidence; (3) that there existed newly 
discovered evidence; or (4) for any other reason that justice may re­
quire. The trial judge had comparable authority in all cases, at least 
as to the first three grounds. The supreme judicial court's remedial 
343. See Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406-07, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243 
(1944). 
344. 1939 Mass. Acts 341 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, 
§ 33E (West 1981». The amended statute provided that the appeal of a capital case to 
the supreme judicial court "shall transfer to that Court the whole case for its considera­
tion of the law and the evidence" and authorized the court to "order a new trial if satis­
fied that the verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of 
newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may require." Common­
wealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241,243 (1944). 
Until 1939 only the trial court could grant a new trial. The revision transferring this 
authority to the supreme judicial court was an effort to streamline the appeals and post­
conviction review process. The court had been confined to reviewing questions of law on 
direct appeal and reviewing denials of motions for a new trial for abuse of discretion. 
Commonewalth v. Sacco, 259 Mass. 128, 134-42, 156 N.E. 57, 58-61, cerl. denied, 275 
U.S. 574 (1927); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASS., THIRD REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 37-43 
(1927), reprinted in 13 MASS. L.Q. I, 37-43 (Nov. 1927); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASS., 
THIRTEENTH REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 28-30 (1937), reprinted in 23 MASS. L.Q. 1,28­
30 (Nov. 1937); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASS., FOURTEENTH REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 
14-167 (1938), reprinted in 24 MASS. L.Q. I, 14-167 (Nov. 1938); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 
MASS., FIFTEENTH REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 8-9 (1939), reprinted in 25 MASS. L.Q. I, 
8-9 (Dec. 1939); see Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 166-69, 390 N.E.2d 113, 
119-20 (1978); Rosenthal, Reversible Error in Homicide Cases in Massachusetts 1927-1949, 
34 MASS. L.Q. 45 (Oct. 1949). 
345. Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1944). 
346. Id. at 405, 58 N.E.2d at 243. 
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authority was enlarged in 1962 by legislative amendment to permit it 
to direct the entry of a lesser degree of guilt and remand the case to 
the trial court for resentencing.347 After 1962, then, section 33E 
functioned as a "safety valve" by conferring upon the supreme judi­
cial court the extraordinary power in capital cases to review all as­
pects of a case regardless of whether a proper claim of error had 
been made.348 The trial court's remedial powers on a motion for 
new trial were not correspondingly enlarged at that time.349 Those 
remedial powers were enlarged in new Rule 25 to include the power 
to reduce the jury's verdict and further to authorize a finding of not 
guilty.350 
B. 	 Considerations Developed by the Supreme Judicial Court under 
Section 33£ 
Whether Rule 25 transfers the full set of "safety valve" powers 
found in section 33E to the trial court in all non-capital criminal 
cases is not clear. It clearly does confer upon the trial judge the duty 
and authority to review the weight of the evidence.351 The proper 
exercise of this extended supervisory responsibility over the jury's 
fact-finding function requires the trial judge to consider two ques­
tions: first, under what circumstances should it be concluded that 
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and second, in such 
circumstances according to what criteria should the trial judge select 
the appropriate form of relief? 
It is suggested that in at least two sets of circumstances the trial 
judge should grant relief on consideration of the weight of the evi­
dence. These two situations overlap substantially, if not completely, 
347. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). 
348. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 168, 380 N.E.2d 113, 120 
(1978). 
349. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 701, .335 N.E.2d 660, 683 (1975), 
cerro denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 809-10, 323 
N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975); Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109, 190 N.E.2d 555, 
557 (1963). 
350. The trial judge's remedial options are thus broadc;r than those available to the 
supreme judicial court under section 33E. The scope of the trial judge's discretionary 
authority is comparable to that of the court. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 554-55, 420 N.E.2d at 
912. The suggestion to the contrary in Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 758,412 
N.E.2d 354, 357 (1980), apparently refers to the state of affairs as it was before Rule 25 
was promulgated. 
351. The "evidence" includes all information available concerning the case and is 
not limited to evidence presented to the jury. It may be appropriate to hold an eviden­
tiary hearing on a motion for relief from a verdict where the claim depends to any extent 
on information outside the trial record. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 
501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1979). 
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with regard to whether relief should be granted. The distinction be­
tween them, however, is relevant and should be observed in deter­
mining what form of relief is appropriate. As has been demonstrated 
earlier in this paper, the limiting effect of the "prosecution's best 
case" rule on the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, and of the use 
of long-standing procedural/evidentiary devices-("prima facie evi­
dence" rules, presumptions, inferences and "affirmative defenses") 
drastically impairs or eliminates the protective function of the provi­
sions of Rule 25(a), (b)(l) and (b)(2)(first sentence) in some cases, 
especially if more than one of these devices is employed. The alibi 
case of Commonwealth v. Woodj352 and the homicide case of Com­
monwealth v. JohnsOlz353 were discussed as examples,354 and it was 
demonstrated that the presumption of sanity severely impaired the 
protective functions of Rule 25(a) in all cases which involved the 
issue of criminal responsibility.355 These cases must receive careful 
attention under Rule 25(b)(2)(second sentence). They are included 
in the larger, more general class of cases in which the evidence has 
been determined to be legally sufficient but inadequate to satisfy the 
court's sense ofjustice. The best sample of this general class of cases 
consists of fourteen cases in which the supreme judicial court has 
reduced verdicts based upon weight of the evidence grounds356 and 
three reported cases in which the supreme judicial court has affirmed 
trial court decisions granting relief on this basis.357 
The question becomes in what kinds of cases a trial court, fol­
lowing the supreme judicial court's example, will grant some form of 
relief on the basis of the weight of the evidence.358 While the court 
has not developed a definable standard to be applied in determining 
352. 382 Mass. 1,413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980). 
353. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 326 N.E.2d 355 (1973). The supreme judicial court 
expressed disapproval of Johnson in Commonwealth v. Mcinerny, 373 Mass. 136, 145-46, 
365 N.E.2d 815, 820-21 (1977). 
354. See supra notes 179-206, 277-305 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra notes 207-220 and accompanying text. 
356. See supra note 317. 
357. See supra notes 337-38. 
358. The court in Gaulden reports that its survey of the 230 cases in which it con­
sidered the weight of the evidence "explicitly or by necessary implication", it granted 
relief in thirteen. 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d at 912 n.9. These figures do not 
provide much guidance to trial courts for several reasons. First, the court was required 
by section 33E to consider the weight of the evidence in all 230 cases, whether the issue 
was raised by the defendant or not. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 380 Mass. I, 401 
N.E.2d 811 (1980) (appellate counsel for both parties failed to address section 33E issues 
in briefs, not an isolated occurrence; court reviewed law and facts nonetheless). Trial 
judges do not have this obligation; a defense motion is the predicate to Rule 25(b)(2) 
(second sentence) review and, presumably, such motions will be made selectively. See 
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whether to reduce a verdict, the court did, in Gaulden, mention some 
of the considerations it found to be pertinent in particular cases.359 
The considerations discussed in Gaulden included both the 
kinds of information that the court has relied upon as well as some 
of the circumstances in which the court has found it appropriate to 
act.360 The court's discussion in Gaulden suggests, and an examina­
. tion of the section 33E and Rule 25(b)(2)(second sentence) cases con­
firms, that the power is discretionary. The task of deriving guidance 
from these cases, then, is not a quest for a set of rules that can be 
applied depending upon the defendant's ability to satisfy one or 
more clearly defined standards. Rather, the quest is to survey the 
cases in an effort to identify the patterns in defendants' conduct, in 
mitigating circumstances and in shortcomings in proof of culpability 
that has prompted the court to conclude that justice may not have 
been done. Toward this end, it is necessary to examine the underly­
ing facts and, frequently, the proof presented at trial in considerable 
detail. The trial court is required to state reasons for its exercise of 
its Rule 25(b )(2) authority in terms of the considerations that 
prompted the supreme judicial court to exercise its section 33E pow­
ers; trial counsel must be prepared to approach the court in these 
terms as well.361 
l. Information Relied Upon by the Court 
It is necessary to be aware of the kind of information upon 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2). A higher incidence of granting relief by trial judges would 
not necessarily reflect more lenient standards. 
Second, the qualifier "or by necessary implication" suggests that the review was 
more or less cursory in some cases. See 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d at 912 n.9. In 
many homicide cases, no doubt the justice of the result seems apparent on the face of 
things. Trial judges, being faced with a wider range of offenses, can expect to face a 
greater concentration of difficult factual claims such as that presented in Woods, and 
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1085, 435 N.E.2d 1053 (1982)(positive 
victim identification pitted against convincing alibi defenses, accompanied by apparent 
manipulation of evidence by prosecutor or police). 
359. 383 Mass. at 554-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13. 
360. Id. at 554-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912. 
361. "Where we have reduced a verdict, we have stated the reasons for our ac­
tions." Id. at 556, 420 N.E.2d at 912. Presumably, the trial court's statement of reasons 
will serve to facilitate appellate review, whereas the supreme judicial court's statements 
of reasons will serve a guidance function. 
The court's own statements of its reason for granting relief have not always been 
enlightening. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 597-98, 363 N.E.2d 245, 
249 (1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 396, 
274 N.E.2d 795, 800 (1971); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 425, 232 N.E.2d 
335,345 (1967), cerl. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968). 
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which the court has permitted itself to rely. First, the court has not 
limited itself to consideration of the evidence presented to the jury. 
In Commonwealth v. Mahnke,362 for example, the court relied heavily 
upon a coerced statement made by the defendant and properly sup­
pressed at trial, noting that section 33E "requires us to consider the 
whole case broadly to determine whether there was any miscarriage 
ofjustice" . 363 The court has considered a variety of "character" fac­
tors, including the defendant's age, lack of serious criminal record, 
military service, marital status, number of children and relationship 
to the victim.364 Additionally, the court has also considered back­
ground information in the form of published studies not presented 
by either party.365 Further, in considering "character" factors, the 
court has occasionally inferred, from the absence of evidence in the 
record, that the defendant had no earlier criminal convictions.366 
The court has also considered the outcome of co-defendant's cases 
and the possibly inflammatory impact of the characteristics of the 
victim and/or the circumstances in which the killing occurred.367 In 
a few cases, the court mentioned the sentencing consequences of a 
362. 368 Mass. 662,335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). 
363. Id. at 702 n.47, 335 N.E.2d at 684 n.47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cox, 327 
Mass. 609, 614, 100 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1951»; see also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 
601, 607-09, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827-29 (1975)(evidence presented to judge at hearing on 
pretrial motion should have been presented to jury). 
364. See Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 95, 364 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (1977) 
(court noted that defendant was "not a hoodlum or gangster"). 
365. Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 316, 372 N.E.2d 246, 251 (1978). 
366. Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 750-51, 328 N.E.2d 833, 837­
38 (1975); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 808,323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975); see 
also Commonwealth v. Keough. 385 Mass. 314, 321, 431 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982). 
367. See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 159, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1209­
10, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 311, 
372 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1978); Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743,749-51,328 
N.E.2d 833, 837-38 (1975); Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 151-52, 301 
N.E.2d 683, 688 (1973). While an inconsistency in verdicts by juries in separate trials is 
not sufficient to justify relief, the fact that a co-participant is allowed to plead guilty to a 
lower offense in exchange for testimony has some impact. See Cadwell, 374 Mass. at 311, 
372 N.E.2d at 249 (woman friend, mother of four-year-old victim of child abuse); Van­
derpool, 367 Mass. at 750, 328 N.E.2d at 837 (gang member who shot victim, ostensibly at 
defendant's command, pleaded guilty to second degree murder). 
The inflammatory impact of the circumstances of the killing were discussed in Cad­
well, 374 Mass. at 315-16, 372 N.E.2d at 251-52 (defendant delivered fatal blows to child 
abused by defendant and child's mother); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 
335 N.E.2d 660 (1975) (defendant killed and hid body of pregnant girlfriend; was har­
rassed, kidnapped and gave confession to vigilante group consisting of victim's family 
and friends), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 
282 N.E.2d 409 (1972) (defendant, shooting in panic, killed woman and child); Common­
wealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970) ("deadbeat" defendant shot and 
killed 16-year-old son under questionable circumstances). 
1001 1984] MASSACHUSElTS EVIDENCE 
reduction of the verdict. 368 The victim's character and reputation 
are also taken into account when the defendant has claimed self­
defense or provocation.369 Most importantly, however, the court has 
taken the liberty of relying upon the defendant's account of the facts 
in a variety of circumstances: where the defendant's account was 
basically consistent with the accounts of the prosecution's witnesses, 
but more detailed or complete;370 where the defendant's facts were 
inconsistent with the inferences apparently drawn by the jury but not 
contradicted by direct evidence presented by the prosecution;37I and 
where the defendant's account was only partially rebutted by the 
prosecution's evidence and the unrebutted portion supported a the­
ory of excessive force in self-defense or other imperfect claim of 
exculpation.372 
2. Three Methods of Assessing the Weight of the Evidence 
The supreme judicial court has developed three distinct meth­
ods of developing the version of facts it is willing to rely upon in 
assessing the weight of the evidence. In one set of cases, the court 
has accepted the prosecution's version of the events and found it to 
368. Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 159,430 N.E.2d 1198, 1210, cerl. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 508, 373 N.E.2d 
208,212 (1978); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660, 685 (1975), 
cerl. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 151,301 
N.E.2d 683, 688 (1973). In every homicide case, of course, a reduction in the jury's ver­
dict creates at least an opportunity for the superior court to impose a more lenient sen­
tence. The reduction of a first degree murder verdict to second degree makes the 
defendant eligible for parole after 15 years, the reduction of a murder conviction to man­
slaughter eliminates the mandatory life sentence and in addition makes probation and a 
suspended sentence a possible disposition. 
369. Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 95, 364 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (1977); Com­
monwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 804, 808, 323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975). 
370. Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 112-15, 190 N.E.2d 555, 558-60 
(1963). 
371. Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 701, 335 N.E.2d at 683-84; if. Commonwealth v. 
Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 320, 431 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982). (Rule 25 relief upheld, reliance 
upon defendant's account approved). 
372. Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83,94-95,364 N.E.2d 1243, 1250-51 (1977) 
(no third-party witness to defendant's having shot victim in front and back of head, claim 
of self-defense "deserves consideration" where government did not rebut defendant's 
theory that impact of first shot caused victim to tum, causing second shot to strike back 
of head, defendant could be held to have used excessive force in self-defense or to have 
acted from a "transport of passion upon provocation," or upon "sudden combat"-all 
manslaughter verdicts); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 808-09, 323 N.E.2d 726, 
729 (1975) (use of knife in defense of attack by victim armed with straight razor, razor 
found in victim's pocket; defendant "reasonably apprehensive that victim might use the 
razor which defendant knew the victim possessed"). 
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be sufficient but unsatisfactory, given the crime charged.373 In a sec­
ond set of cases, the court has established a paradigm of the offense 
which is less exact than its formal definition and, utilizing either the 
prosecution's version or a mixed version of the events, found the evi­
dence to be sufficient but unsatisfactory.374 In the third set the court 
has, using the paradigm approach, found the evidence to be insuffi­
cient. Under each of these approaches it has concluded that relief 
should be granted.37s 
a. Sufficient But Unsatisfactory Evidence 
Taking a broad view of the case, the court has focused upon the 
adequacy of the prosecution's proof of the elements which distin­
guish degrees of culpability in homicides. Except for two cases, the 
court has gone no further than reducing the jury's verdict by more 
than one "degree" of culpability. In Commonwealth v. Baker,376 the 
court conceded that sufficient evidence of malice aforethought and 
deliberate premeditation had been presented to support the jury's 
first degree murder verdict, but found the evidence too weak on both 
points in the face of the uncontradicted evidence that the unarmed 
victim and, perhaps one or all of his companions, had been advanc­
ing on the defendant, who shot the victim twice.377 The court or­
dered entry of a manslaughter verdict in the belief that 'justice will 
be more nearly achieved."378 In Commonwealth v. Bearse,379 the 
court found no evidence to support any theory of murder liability in 
the prosecution's evidence and ordered a retrial, to be limited to the 
lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.380 Between 
these extremes of uncontradicted evidence and no evidence lie the 
majority of cases in which the evidence, while conflicting, is legally 
sufficient to support the verdict. In some, such as Commonwealth v. 
IJalton,381 sparse evidence was rendered unsatisfactory by the ab­
sence of bolstering evidence, such as that which would establish a 
motive for the killing.382 The evidence demonstrated that an appar­
373. See infra notes 376-96 and accompanying text. 
374. See infra notes 397-462 and accompanying text. 
375. See infra notes 463-77 and accompanying text. 
376. 346 Mass. 107, 190 N.E.2d 555 (1963). 
377. Id. at 118, 190 N.E.2d at 562. 
378. Id. at 119, 190 N.E.2d at 562. 
379. 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970). 
380. Id. at 487-88, 265 N.E.2d at 500. 
381. 385 Mass. 190,431 N.E.2d 203 (1982). 
382. Id. at 197,431 N.E.2d at 209. One disquieting feature of the Da/loncase is the 
possibility that the verdict was reduced in part in lieu of ordering further proceedings 
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ently intentional killing was committed by the defendant but did not 
lend itself to any explanation of the reason.383 In other cases, the 
court acknowledged that the conflicting evidence made the issue of 
malice a close question.384 The decision to grant relief in these cir­
cumstances may depend upon one of several factors. The following 
cases illustrate the interplay of these factors. 
In Commonwealth v. Jones,385 the defendant was the smaller of 
two intoxicated men involved in a "violent quarrel. . . undoubtedly 
the result of too much drinking."386 The defendant's claim that he 
stabbed the victim while defending himself from the latter's attack 
with a straight razor was evidently rejected by the jury based, in all 
likelihood, on the evidence that the victim died with his razor in his 
pocket.387 Despite the fact that the jury was fully instructed on man­
slaughter,388 the court concluded that the defendant reasonably be­
lieved that the victim might use the razor.389 Significantly, the court 
dealt directly with the inference of malice which may arise from the 
use of a deadly weapon in a killing: "We believe, however, that jus­
tice will be more nearly achieved by concluding that the intention 
... [to attack with a knife] was formed in the heat of sudden affray 
which might have resolved some of the doubts in the case. The defendant had moved for 
a new trial and unsuccessfully requested, inler alia, appointment of a medical expert to 
investigate whether he acted in the throes of an epileptic seizure. The court affirmed this 
discretionary trial court ruling, noting the absence of any evidence in the record that 
Dalton suffered an epileptic seizure during the shooting. Id at 195,431 N.E.2d at 207­
08. In reducing the verdict, however, the court noted in partial explanation that Dalton 
"was on medication for the treatment of epilepsy ... [n)o motive for this killing has 
surfaced." Id at 197,431 N.E.2d at 209. The first objection to this implied accommoda­
tion, if that is what occurred, is that in some jurisdictions the fact that a person acted in 
the throes of a seizure is considered to be either completely or partially exculpatory. See 
People v. Grant, 46 Ill. App. 3d 125, 130, 360 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1977), rev'd, People v. 
Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551, 377 N.E.2d 4 (1978). The court in Dallon seemed to concede that 
such a circumstance would at least negate the element of malice. See 385 Mass. at 193, 
431 N£2d at 207. The second objection is that the development of substantive rules 
through case law is impaired when such issues are resolved "equitably." Compare Com­
monwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 712-13, 282 N.E.2d 409, 411-12 (1972); Common­
wealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 395, 397, 274 N.E.2d 795, 802 (1971); Commonwealth v. 
Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 584, 266 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1970); Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 
Mass. 107, 119, 190 N.E.2d 555, 563 (1963) (assignments of error regarding motion for 
partial directed verdict, complaints about jury instructions not considered in light of re­
duction of verdict). 
383. See Dallon, 385 Mass. at 197,431 N.E.2d at 209. 
384. See infra notes 465-77 and accompanying text. 
385. 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975). 
386. Id at 808, 323 N.E.2d at 729. 
387. See id at 806, 807, 323 N.E.2d at 727, 728. 
388. Id at 808 n.l, 323 N.E.2d at 728 n.!. 
389. Id at 808-09, 323 N.E.2d at 728. 
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or combat . thus negating the necessary element of malice 
...."390 This was a case, then, in which the evidence was sharply 
contested and fairly evenly balanced as between manslaughter and 
murder; the impact of the "presumption of malice"391 might have 
had a decisive impact on the jury's judgment. 
The evidence in Commonwealth v. King392 was, in contrast, con­
tested only with regard to interpretation: the question of what mens 
rea inferences might be drawn from the evidence. The killing re­
sulted from a brawl in which both participants were grossly intoxi­
cated.393 The fact that the defendant was unquestionably the 
aggressor apparently explains why the court's discussion did not ex­
plore the possibility that the killing was manslaughter;394 as in Jones, 
the presumption of malice permitted from the intentional use of a 
deadly weapon satisfied the sufficiency standard as to that element. 
The court justified its reduction of the verdict to second degree mur­
der by reference to three factors-the weakness of the prosecution's 
evidence, the strong evidence of gross intoxication, and the absence 
of jury instructions on a potentially key mitigating factor. 395 The 
evidence as a whole was uncontradicted and sufficient but unsatis­
390. Id. at 809, 323 N.E.2d at 729 (citations omitted); see also, Commonwealth v. 
Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 583, 266 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1970) (conflicting evidence precluded 
identification of aggressor in scuffle between parties intoxicated by drugs and alcohol; 
court found that defendant acted in heat of sudden affray and killing done in heat of 
passion; second degree murder verdict reduced to manslaughter). 
391. This presumption has been renamed and its mandatory thrust has been elimi­
nated in light of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
392. 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1978). 
393. Id. at 505,373 N.E.2d at 210. The victim's post-mortem blood alcohol level 
was measured at 0.33%. The defendant and the Commonwealth's adult witnesses were 
also visibly intoxicated at the scene. Id. at 504-05, 373 N.E.2d at 210. 
394. In its only reference to the element of malice necessary to a murder verdict, 
the court stated somewhat cryptically: 
The knife wounds themselves look like the consequences of an untoward, 
foolish introduction of a dangerous weapon in a fight not otherwise at a lethal 
pitch. . . but if malice is suggested, it is not the deliberated or purposeful mal­
ice of an assassin. The defendant's unsworn statement at trial seems a layman's 
assertion that despite the knife he did not intend to inflict mortal injury. 
Id. at 507, 373 N.E.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted). 
395. Id. at 506-08, 373 N.E.2d at 211-12. The prosecution's evidence (the defend­
ant presented none) was presented through witnesses who were so inarticulate that the 
court noted the difficulty of constructing a "connected story" from it: "The facts emerge 
spottily, with some gaps and inconsistencies." Id. at 502, 373 N.E.2d at 209. From the 
facts presented the court found that "[dJeliberate premeditation is ... a dubious conclu­
sion ... even if the element of drunkenness is ignored." Id. at 507, 373 N.E.2d at 212. 
That element was abundantly present, but was ignored in the jury instructions, which did 
not inform the jury of the possible relevance of intoxication to the capacity to deliber­
ately premeditate. Id. at 507-08, 373 N.E.2d at 212. 
1005 1984) MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 
factory because of the paucity of credibile witnesses and the prosecu­
tion's failure to present a complete, connected account of the 
killing.396 
b. The Paradigm Approach: Relaxed Legal Standards 
Another type of case involving legally sufficient but unsatisfac­
tory evidence appears when the fact pattern does not fit the court's 
paradigm of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Of 
the fourteen reported cases, those in this group fit most clearly the 
"disproportionate verdict" ground identified in Gaulden as the pri­
mary basis for granting the section 33E remedy of a reduced ver­
dict.397 Three of the court's decisions reviewing first degree murder 
convictions illustrate the different aspects of disproportionality 
which have prompted the court to act. 
The earliest case was Commonwealth v. Williams,398 the case of a 
young prostitute who, with another, robbed and killed a ha~di­
capped customer. The evidence supported a first degree murder ver­
dict on anyone of the three separate grounds found in 
Massachusetts law: felony-murder involving the capital felony of 
robbery, participation in a deliberately premeditated killing, and 
participation in a killing accomplished with extreme atrocity and 
cruelty. The court, noting that the defendant's accomplice had been 
convicted of manslaughter in a separate trial, concluded that the 
weight of the evidence demonstrated second degree murder. 399 In 
the court's view, the robbery and killings occurred spontaneously in 
the wake of the struggle which ensued when the larceny attempt 
went awry.400 
396. Compare the treatment of an even sketchier account by the appeals court, 
which was limited to considering the sufficiency of the evidence, in Commonwealth v. 
Johnson,3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 231-33, 326 N.E.2d 355, 359-60 (1975). 
397. 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13 n.9. 
398. 364 Mass. 145, 301 N.E.2d 683 (1973). The victim, who had hired a motel 
room for the three, evidently caught the women trying to steal from him and responded 
violently. They bound, gagged, and strangled him "and there was some evidence that 
other extreme violence had been inflicted on him." Id at 146-47,301 N.E.2d at 685. A 
gold ring was taken from him and sold later that day by Williams for $30. Id 
399. Id at 151, 301 N.E.2d at 687-88. 
400. Id at 152, 301 N.E.2d at 688. 

Inferences are warranted that at some instant in the rapid happenings the de­

fendant's intent veered from larceny to robbery, and that for a fleeting period of 
time she intended to kill the victim. Nevertheless, in our view, her criminal 
involvement was not of the nature that judges and juries, in weighing evidence, 
ordinarily equate with murder in the first degree. 
Id 
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A similar conclusion was drawn in Commonwealth v. Cadwel1,401 
but through a slightly different analysis. One morning a child died 
after the defendant punished him for his difficulties in eating a 
doughnut. The pathologist's opinion was that the child was killed by 
"multiple blunt force injuries to the head."402 The court found that 
the first degree murder verdict rested on sufficient evidence to show 
either deliberate premeditation or killing by extreme atrocity and 
cruelty.403 It regarded the case, however, as one involving the "bat­
tered-child syndrome" in which the typical abuser "tends to suffer 
from emotional pressures which are not directly related to the child 
himself, [and therefore] focuses his general feelings of frustration 
and anger on the one child [the victim here had a sister with Down's 
Syndrome, who was evidently not abused] and expresses his emo­
tions through an immature and uncontrolled display of physical 
abuse of the child. "404 Viewing the case from this perspective, the 
court found evidence of deliberate premeditation unsatisfactory.405 
The alternative basis for the first degree verdict--extreme atroc­
ity and cruelty-was dealt with similarly. The factual basis was 
surely present and less easily disposed of because it did not depend 
upon any proof of the defendant's mental state, provided the killing 
was intentional.406 The court, noting the pathologist's opinion that 
40\. 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978). 
402. Id. at 310,372 N.E.2d at 248. There was evidence that the child's mother also 
beat him at least occasionally. Id. at 310& n.l, 372 N.E.2d at 248 & n.\. The victim was 
four years old, a slow leamer, and undernourished, weighing only twenty-five pounds. 
The defendant lived with the victim's mother and was apparently responsible for disci­
plining the victim. His method of punishment was to beat the child, and at the time of 
his death the child was bruised over much of his body. Id. 
403. Id. at 316, 372 N.E.2d at 251-52. 
404. Id. at 317, 372 N.E.2d at 252 (emphasis in original) (quoting, People v. Steger, 
16 Ca1.3d 539, 549 n.4, 546 P.2d 665, 671 n.4, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 n.4 (1976) (quoting 
Note, The Ballered Child.' Logic in Search of Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364, 375 
(1971»). 
405. 374 Mass. at 316-17, 372 N.E.2d at 252. 
Deliberate premeditation in the sense of the statute can perhaps be pieced out 
of the evidence, but that conclusion is much harder to reach on the proofs here 
than in the run of convictions involving that element. On the whole record, the 
surest surmise is that the lethal blows were struck by the defendant in an acCess 
(sic) of anger and frustration. There is an irreducible doubt in all the circum­
stances whether the defendant consciously formed a purpose that morning to do 
the child mortal injury; but if the defendant did, it is still probable that the 
resolve lasted for only "a fteeting period of time," as we said of the interval of 
premeditation in . . . Williams where we applied § 33E to reduce a murder 
verdict to the second degree. 
Id. The court then noted parenthetically: "In the present case we need not go so far as to 
negate all premeditation in order to apply § 33E." Id. 
406. "Our cases have usually looked to the consciousness and degree of suffering 
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earlier beatings had not contributed to the child's death, found that 
the case was "much less persuasive of extreme cruelty than is com­
monly found in convictions on that basis."407 
The degree of flexibility the court has permitted itself in arriving 
at a new version of the facts in order to act under section 33E is 
illustrated by its decision in Commonwealth v. Vanderpool 408 The 
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove a pattern of 
activity: There was an altercation in a bar between the victim and 
the defendant and other members of a "club," the Outlaw Rene­
gades; some time later, the defendant and a man named Torres, who 
was armed and by his own account "high on acid," found the victim 
in another bar and confronted him; the defendant and victim ex­
changed blows and Torres shot the victim at the urging of the de­
fendant.409 The defendant's testimony was that at the time of the 
killing he was no longer a member of the club, but was in disfavor 
with its present members and had interceded in the first altercation 
between the victim and other members of the club. The second en­
counter with the victim had occurred by chance. The defendant had 
approached the victim, who argued with him, and Torres had ap­
proached and shot the victim without any urging and to the defend­
ant's surprise.410 
of the victim, the disproportion between the means actually needed to inflict death and 
those employed, the instrumentalities employed and the extent of physical injury." 
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 362 Mass. 78, 81-82, 284 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1972); Com­
monwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 628, 255 N.E.2d 191, 198, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
843 (1970). 
407. 374 Mass. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252. "[A] jury might piece a guilty verdict [on 
that basis] out of the testimony." Id. 
The implication was that the victim's suffering on the day of his death did not pro­
vide satisfactory evidence of extreme atrocity and cruelty but that evidence of a slow 
death caused by accumulated injuries over a period of days or weeks would have over­
come the court's reservations. See id. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252-53. 
408. 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833 (1975). 
409. The evidence was undisputed that all involved were intoxicated by alcohol 
and possibly other drugs. Id. at 749, 328 N.E.2d at 837. 
Similar fact patterns occurred in Commonwealth v. Nordstrom, 364 Mass. 310, 303 
N.E.2d 711 (1973); and Commonwealth v. Pratt, 360 Mass. 708, 277 N.E.2d 517 (1972) 
(both first degree verdicts, not reduced); and in Commonwealth v. Rooney, 365 Mass. 
484,313 N.E.2d 105 (1974); and Commonwealth v. Deeran, 364 Mass. 193,302 N.E.2d 
912 (1973) (both second degree murder verdicts); see a/so Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 
Mass. 805, 808, 323 N .E.2d 726, 729 (1975) and cases cited therein. Relief was denied in 
Pratt, Nordstrom, Deeran and Rooney because the evidence was that there had been an 
initial encounter, followed by a "cooling-off" period during which the defendant left the 
scene and armed himself, and then returned and killed the victim. See Jones, 366 Mass. 
at 808, 323 N.E.2d at 727. 
410. 367 Mass. at 744-45, 328 N.E.2d at 834-35. 
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The court reduced the verdict on appeal.411 Relying upon the 
defendant's version of his purpose in approaching the victim, it 
found no period of reflection and premeditation.412 The court also, 
apparently accepted Torres' testimony that he shot the victim on the 
defendant's instructions. The court noted that Torres-obviously 
the central witness against the defendant-had not been tried, at the 
time he testified, for his role in the killing and later had been permit­
ted to plead guilty to second degree murder.413 The prosecution's 
evidence of premeditation was quite strong, if believed, but the court 
acted upon a version of the facts which comprised selected portions 
of each party's evidence, and acted much as a jury might act.414 The 
account as constructed apparently accepted the defendant's claim 
that his second approach to the victim was to reconcile their dispute, 
but also apparently accepted the prosecution's claim that the defend­
ant instigated the shooting: an intentional killing is a necessary in­
gredient of second degree murder. On this version, the court found 
that "the defendant's criminal involvement was not of the nature 
that judges and juries, in weighing evidence ordinarily equate with 
murder in the first degree."415 The court's reconstruction established 
411. Id. at 751, 328 N.E.2d at 838. 
412. Id. at 750, 328 N.E.2d at 837-38. 
413. Id. at 750, 328 N.E.2d at 838. The court also noted that Vanderpool was 22, 
married with two children, and suffering from Vietnam war disabilities. Id. 
414. The jury could have found that Torres had armed himself on the defendant's 
instructions and accompanied the defendant to the second bar, where the defendant ac­
costed the victim, determined that the victim intended to press criminal charges based on 
the earlier altercation, stated: "We'll get you." He then punched the victim, and yelled: 
"Shoot him, Tony, shoot him, Tony," whereupon Torres shot and killed the victim. 
Torres' testimony to this effect was, except for the final statement attributed to the de­
fendant, essentially corroborated by the testimony of eyewitnesses to the shooting. Id. at 
744-45,328 N.E.2d at 834-35. Torres' explanation of his role was that he was drunk and 
"high on acid." Id. 
415. Id. at 751,328 N.E.2d at 838 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 
at 152,301 N.E.2d at 688). Compare Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 159,430 
N.E.2d 1198, 1210 (defendant admitted killing, contested persuasiveness of evidence of 
extreme atrocity and cruelty), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). 
In one other case section 33E relief was granted on the Williams rationale. The 
defendant, in Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 363 N.E.2d 245, cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 869 (1977), had been convicted of first-degree murder. His codefendant's subse­
quent second degree murder conviction by a different jury had been affirmed in 1973. Id. 
at 592 n.l, 363 N.E.2d at 247 n.l; see Commonwealth v. White, 363 Mass. 682, 296 
N.E.2d 822 (1973). The court based its reduction in Pisaon the ground that the evidence 
of first degree murder was "much less persuasive" than that of second degree murder. 
372 Mass. at 598, 363 N.E.2d at 251. It is not possible to discern from either opinion 
what the basis of Pisa's defense was, what the basis for his section 33E request was or, for 
that matter, where the weakness in the prosecution's first-degree murder, either by delib­
erate premeditation or capital felony-murder, lay. 
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a clear case of second degree murder: an intentional, malicious kill­
ing without deliberate premeditation. 
This paradigm approach is reflected in the supreme judicial 
court's approving review in the first two cases in which it considered 
the propriety of trial court orders reducing murder verdicts to man­
slaughter under Rule 25. The court in Gaulden and Keough indi­
cated that, where the trial court concludes that the verdict is against 
the weight of the evidence (even if sufficient to support it), the appro­
priate form of relief is an order for entry of a verdict reduced to a 
level of culpability that has clearly been established.416 This situa­
tion will arise most commonly in section 33E decisions where an 
evaluation of the pertinent considerations (the relative strength, con­
sistency and credibility of the prosecution and defense evidence, the 
treatment of the co-participants, the presence of mitigating factors 
such as the prior relationship of defendant and victim, the tenor of 
their earlier contacts, the role played by intoxicants or other respon­
sibility-impairing influences, and the defendant's character4 17) leads 
to the conclusion that the case in question does not fit the court's 
generally undefined paradigm of the offense for which the defendant 
was convicted.418 The court's paradigm of an offense is usually 
closely related to, but less inclusive than, that literally described by 
the statutory elements. That is, the court's paradigm of first degree 
murder by extreme atrocity and cruelty does not include all cases in 
which a rational fact-finder, properly instructed and presented with 
legally sufficient evidence, might find that circumstance established 
416. See Keough, 385 Mass. at 319-21, 431 N.E.2d at 918-20; Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 
554-55,420 N.E.2d at 912-13. It is clear from the terms of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sen­
tence) and from analysis of the supreme judicial court's rulings that this form of relief is 
available only in cases in which the offense charged includes a lesser offense. In a case in 
which no lesser offense is included in the charge, the weight of the evidence analysis will 
leave the trial court to choose between ordering either a finding of not guilty or a new 
trial. 
417. These ordinarily deserve consideration only if not properly presented through 
instructions for the jury's assessment. Compare Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 
508,373 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1978); and Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 745­
46,328 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1975); with Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 389 Mass. 626, 633, 
451 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (1983); and Commonwealth V. Podlaski, 377 Mass. 339, 350, 385 
N.E.2d 1379, 1387 (1979). 
Character evidence is most readily available in cases in which the defendant has 
testified, but it may be added to the record on appeal as in King, 374 Mass. at 508 n.6, 373 
N.E.2d at 212 n.6. In the trial court, such information can be presented in documents or 
testimony in support of the motion for relief. Arguably, this is not a factor in the para­
digm of the offense, but is a factor in a paradigm of the offender. 
418. See Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.419 The paradigm in general will consist 
of the type of "criminal involvement. . . that judges and juries, in 
weighing evidence, ordinarily equate with [the offense in ques­
tion),"420 based on the trial judge's experience and judgment. The 
court has declined to use this paradigm approach to modify the law, 
for example, by recognizing defensive claims that are not otherwise 
available.421 Accordingly, the paradigm will not include factors that 
are not relevant in Massachusetts law. 
Application of the paradigm to a particular case frequently in­
volves some revision of the jury's implied findings as was the case in 
Commonwealth v. Vanderpool422 In Cadwell, for instance, the court 
noted that only the blows administered to the victim on the date of 
his death should have been considered in deciding whether the kill­
ing in that case was done with extreme atrocity and cruelty, based on 
the pathologist's testimony.423 The jury may have considered (and 
properly could have considered, exercising its prerogative to ignore 
even the uncontradicted opinion of an expert) the suffering inflicted 
in the course of earlier beatings in making its extreme atrocity and 
cruelty finding.424 It was necessary for the court first to establish a 
419. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 
1203, cerro denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), Commonwealth v. Cadwell; 374 Mass. 308, 318, 
372 N .E.2d 246, 253 (1978). The court's action in Tavares might be interpreted as being 
based on the judgment that the effect of the joint venture doctrine attributing the atro­
cious and cruel conduct of Tavares' co-participants to him was undesirably harsh. In 
Cadwell, the effect, if not the purpose, of the court's action was to ameliorate the imputa­
tion of a mens rea element easily satisfied by formal legal standards, strictly applied 
(deliberate premeditation). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 
308 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805,323 N.E.2d 726 (1975). 
420. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555, 420 N.E.2d at 913; Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 
367 Mass. 743, 751, 328 N.E.2d 833, 838 (1975); Williams, 364 Mass. at 151-52, 301 
N.E.2d at 688. 
421. In Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 390 Mass. 722, 726. 459 N.E.2d 98, 101 
(1983), the court rejected the argument that the facts supported a finding of manslaughter 
because the killing was committed under the influence of an extreme mental or emo­
tional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. Such a killing is 
manslaughter under MODEL PENAL CODE § 21O.3(1)(b) (Official Draft 1980), and in, for 
example, New York. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 199 (1977). It is not recog­
nized in Massachusetts law. 
422. 367 Mass. 743, 749-51, 328 N.E.2d 883,837-38 (1975). In Commonwealth v. 
Therrien, 383 Mass. 537 n.6, 420 N.E.2d 897, 901 n.6 (1981), the court suggested that in 
some cases the submission of special verdict interrogatories to the jury as provided for by 
Rule 27 might clarify whether an appropriate basis for a reduced verdict is present. De­
fense counsel might be wary of the tendency of such structuring devices to encourage 
findings of guilt. See United States v. Spock. 416 F.2d 165, 181-83 (1st Cir. 1969). 
423. 374 Mass. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252. 
424. It seems noteworthy that the definitional vagueness of this element gives the 
jury a great deal of fact-finding latitude in such cases. Similarly, the doctrine permitting 
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narrower factual basis than the jury evidently acted upon before ap­
plying its paradigm. This was, of course, an appropriate step in the 
exercise of its section 33E powers on its view of the weight of the 
evidence. 
Even without revising the jury's implicit findings, the court has 
found legally sufficient evidence to be of inadequate weight so as to 
fit the court's paradigm of an offense, for a variety of reasons. The 
prosecution's evidence may fail to satisfy the court because of its lack 
of coherence as in King.425 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Dalton,426 
there was little factual dispute; the evidence established the possibil­
ity that the defendant had "reflected on his resolution to kill" but 
was "by no means overwhelming."427 In these cases, the reference to 
a paradigm is less . direct but the nature of the knife wounds in King 
and the absence of evidence of motive in Dalton receive prominent 
mention in the court's statement of its reasons for granting relief.428 
Where the prosecution's case does not measure up to the court's 
paradigm, based on the court's revised findings the verdict is, then, 
disproportionate: i.e., it is "markedly inconsistent with verdicts re­
turned in similar cases."429 Such a finding has served to justify a 
reduced verdict in those cases in which defective jury instructions 
have either incorrectly presented the possibility of a lesser verdict to 
the jury or have removed that possibility altogether. Ordinarily, the 
proper form of section 33E relief in defective-instructions cases is a 
new tria1.430 The rationale for the distinction between a new trial 
and a reduced verdict as the appropriate form of relief is well 
founded and the distinction is clearly drawn in Commonwealth v. 
Kendrick431 : "[O]ur concern has not been with the propriety of the 
the jury to find deliberate premeditation to have occurred during the most minute time 
period creates broad fact-finding latitude. See Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 Mass. 
136, 148, 365 N.E.2d 815, 822 (1977). 
425. 374 Mass. at 506-07,373 N.E.2d at 211-12; see supra notes 392-96 and accom­
panying text. 
426. 385 Mass. 190,431 N.E.2d 203 (1982); see supra notes 381-83 and accompany­
ing text. 
427. Id at 196,431 N.E.2d at 208. 
428. As in all cases in which Section 33E relief has been granted, additional factors 
were considered, particularly the role of intoxication: the failure to fully instruct the jury 
and favorable character evidence. King, 374 Mass. at 507-08 & n.6, 373 N.E.2d 212 & 
n.6. 
429. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 556, 420 N.E.2d at 913. The following cases most 
clearly fall into this category: Keough, Gaulden, and Cadwell. The court has consistently 
placed Vanderpool in this category, but that classification is questionable. 
430. Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 218 N.E.2d 408 (1966). 
431. 351 Mass. 203, 218 N.E.2d 408 (1966). 
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verdict returned by the jury but with the impropriety of withdrawing 
from their consideration another verdict which, although they might 
not have reached it, was nevertheless open to them on the evi­
dence."432 Where, however, the evidence of the greater offense is 
inadequate to satisfy the court's paradigm, there is no need for a new 
trial unless some other shortcoming prevented consideration of a le­
gitimate theory that might have led to an acquittal or reduced the 
verdict even further.433 
This was the approach taken in Commonwealth v. King434 and 
Commonwealth v. Kinney.435 In King, the verdict was first degree 
murder. There was pervasive evidence that all adults involved in the 
incident, including the witnesses to the killing, had been drinking 
heavily. The jury was not instructed to consider the possible impact 
of intoxication on the defendant's capacity to deliberately premedi­
tate.436 The court reduced the verdict rather than granting a new 
trial because the evidence was inadequate to satisfy its paradigm of 
deliberately premeditated murder.437 Similarly, in Kinne, the trial 
court failed to instruct the jury on the possible verdict of involuntary 
manslaughter. The court found that, on the weight of the evidence, 
the defendant had not been the aggressor and had acted out of con­
fusion and fear rather than anger when he killed the victims.438 On 
these facts, a finding of malice could not be made and the court con­
cluded that justice would be more nearly achieved by not giving the 
prosecution an opportunity to submit its second degree murder case 
to another jury.439 Thus, even where trial errors are found that 
would ordinarily justify granting a new trial under section 33E, the 
proper course is to consider the weight of the evidence and reduce 
432. Id at 213, 218 N.E.2d at 415; accord Commonwealth v. McCauley, 355 Mass. 
554, 561-62, 246 N.E.2d 425, 429 (1969). 
433. q: Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970). 
434. 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1978). 
435. 361 Mass. 709, 282 N.E.2d 409 (1972). 
436. 374 Mass. at 502-05, 373 N.E.2d at 209-11. 
437. Id at 507-08, 373 N.E.2d at 212. 
438. 361 Mass. at 712-13, 282 N.E.2d at 411-12. 
439. Id at 712-13, 282 N.E.2d at 412. The issue was put explicitly in these terms. 
See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 366 Mass. 703, 713, 322 N.E.2d 407, 412 (1975). The 
suggestion that, on the weight of the evidence, the prosecution's evidence was insufficient 
to support a second degree murder verdict distinguishes this case from the paradigmatic 
disproportionality cases discussed above. This third class of cases is discussed in the 
preceding section. See supra notes 376-96 and accompanying text. Had the case been 
remanded for a trial on proper instructions and the same evidence been presented, a 
verdict of second degree murder could have been supported by sufficient evidence. 
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the verdict where the only just result of a second trial on the same 
evidence would be a finding of guilty on the lesser offense. 
In two felony-murder cases, the court has reduced verdicts in 
response to defects in jury instructions that would justify no more 
than a new trial.440 Each involved first degree murder convictions 
probably reached on felony-murder grounds, although in each case 
the court recognized that sufficient evidence of deliberate premedita­
tion had been presented,441 and legally sufficient evidence of extreme 
atrocity and cruelty was present in one.442 The first, Commonwealth 
v. White,443 involved a defendant who, while attempting either a 
breaking and entering of a restaurant or a robbery of its proprietor, 
killed the proprietor in a shoot-out.444 According to Massachusetts 
felony-murder doctrine, if the killing occurred during a robbery, it 
was first degree murder; if it occurred in the course of a breaking and 
entering, it was second degree murder.445 The jury instructions did 
not define either offense, leaving the jury to distinguish between the 
two according to their own understanding. During their delibera­
tions the jury requested clarifying instructions on second degree 
murder.446 
According to Kendrick, decided the previous year, a new trial 
was the proper remedy for this trial defect.447 The White court, how­
ever, reduced the verdict to second degree murder "to prevent a pos­
sible miscarriage of justice," noting both the "very real possibility" 
that the jury had been misled and notice the sentencing conse­
quences of one verdict as opposed to the other.448 
440. Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 274 N.E.2d 795 (1971); Common­
wealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967). 
441. Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 391, 274 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1971); 
Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 421, 232 N.E.2d 335, 343 (1967). 
442. Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385,394,274 N.E.2d 795, 801 (1971). 
443. 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967). 
444. The evidence of White's purpose came in the testimony of two acquaintances 
to whom he had described the crime when they visited him together in jail before trial. 
According to one, White's purpose was robbery, according to the other it was larceny. 
There was evidence of a deliberate premeditation which the court described as "slight": 
he went armed, intending to steal. Id. at 425, 232 N.E.2d at 346. The suggestion that 
these facts evidence deliberate premeditation is at best questionable. 
445. Robbery is a capital felony (punishable by life imprisonment or, at the time, 
by death). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 17 (West 1970). Breaking and entering a 
business establishment (as opposed to a dwelling) is not a capital felony. Id. ch. 266, 
§ 16. 
446. 353 Mass. at 425, 232 N.E.2d at 345-46. 
447. 351 Mass. at 213, 218 N.E.2d at 415. 
448. 353 Mass. at 425-26, 232 N.E.2d at 346. 
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The decision four years later in Commonwealth v. Regif49 in­
volved strikingly similar circumstances.45o The evidence of first de­
gree murder by deliberate premeditation was stronger and there was 
also evidence of extreme atrocity and cruelty in the manner of the 
killing.451 The same ambiguity in the evidence of the basis for a 
felony murder conviction, however, was present and the jury instruc­
tions were similarly defective. Citing White, the court reduced the 
verdict to second degree murder, again noting the sentencing conse­
quences of its action, and stating that the only issue in a new trial 
would be whether the defendant committed first or second degree 
murder: "We conclude that justice will best be served if guilty ver­
dicts of second degree murder are now entered."452 
Arguably, Rego can be reconciled with Williams, decided two 
years later. There the court reduced the felony murder conviction to 
second degree murder because the court viewed the defendant's ac­
tions as spontaneous.453 In Rego the thrust of the evidence was that 
the defendants were stealing surreptitiously, were taken by surprise 
and responded spontaneously and violently. The intent to kill prob­
ably arose spontaneously, immediately before it was acted out, and 
the robbery may have followed the killing rather than being the pur­
pose behind it.454 The defendant in White, however, went armed to 
the scene of the crime and engaged in a shoot-out with the owner.455 
It would be an unusual paradigm of felony murder which did not 
embrace this conduct. The basis for the court's choice of relief in 
these cases could be efficiency-a judgment that the matter in dis­
pute did not warrant expending the resources necessary to conduct a 
retrial. 
449. 360 Mass. 385,274 N.E.2d 795 (1971). 
450. The case for first degree murder on deliberate premeditation or extreme atroc­
ity and cruelty grounds was substantially stronger in this case. The victim was a night 
watchman who surprised the defendant and his two accomplices as they stole coins from 
coin operated machines in a warehouse they had broken into. The watchman was se­
verely beaten and died from blows to the head, and there was evidence that money was 
taken from his person. Id. at 387-88, 274 N.E.2d at 797-98. 
451. Id. at 388, 274 N.E.2d at 797. 
452. Id. at 396-97, 274 N.E.2d at 802. The defendant was a young man but no 
other evidence of mitigating circumstances was discussed. Although neither defendant 
was charged with robbery and each was convicted of breaking and entering, the court 
explicitly disavowed this fact as warranting relief in Rego. Id. at 396, 274 N.E.2d at 802. 
453. 364 Mass. at 152,301 N.E.2d at 688; see supra notes 398-400 and accompany­
ing text. 
454. 360 Mass. at 387-88, 274 N.E.2d at 797-98. Compare Williams, 364 Mass. at 
152, 301 N.E.2d at 688; see supra notes 398-400 and accompanying text. 
455. See 353 Mass. at 425, 232 N.E.2d at 346. 
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The court's most recent verdict revision under section 33E both 
confirms the foregoing analysis and cautions against the temptation 
to view the categories proposed here as being clearly defined or hav­
ing firm boundaries. In Commonwealth v. Bellamy,456 the court re­
duced a first degree felony-murder conviction to second degree to 
hedge against the possibility that the jury might have been misled by 
joint venture instructions which were apparently correct when 
given.457 Bellamy was tried for felony-murder for his involvement in 
the killing of a variety store proprietor which occurred, by all ac­
counts, during the course of an unarmed robbery.458 The jury had 
been told it could convict Bellamy of first degree murder if Bellamy 
killed the victim in the course of either an armed or unarmed rob­
bery, or if his accomplice had killed the victim and Bellamy had not 
dissociated himself from the robbery before the killing.459 
Any theory upon which the first degree felony murder verdict 
could be sustained required a jury finding that Bellamy either acted 
with conscious disregard for the risk to human life created by his and 
his accomplice's conduct or that Bellamy knew Bimbo was armed 
456. 391 Mass. 511,461 N.E.2d 1215 (1984). 
457. In the 1975 trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict Bellamy on a 
joint venture (common enterprise) theory if it found that his cohort in the robbery had 
killed the victim unless it found "Bellamy dissociated himself from the robbery prior to 
the killing." Id. at 513-15, 461 N.E.2d at 1217-18. 
458. The prosecution's account relied heavily on Bellamy's purported confession to 
the mother of his daughter. According to the mother's account, Bellamy picked up a 
knife from the counter and stabbed the clerk when the latter tried to hit him with a 
crowbar during an unarmed robbery Bellamy and his cohort "Bimbo" were attempting. 
Id. at 512-13, 461 N.E.2d at 1216-17. 
Bellamy testified that he went to the store with Bimbo, who unexpectedly reached 
into the open cash drawer. The victim swung the crowbar at Bimbo, whereupon Bellamy 
left the store and went to Bimbo's car nearby. Bimbo came running out shortly, presum­
able after stabbing the victim. Id. at 513, 461 N.E.2d at 1217. 
459. Id. Defense counsel objected to the joint venture instruction but not to the 
felony murder instruction. 
In the interim between Bellamy's conviction and the ruling on his appeal, the 
supreme judicial court had refined the felony murder rules to require a finding that the 
defendant acted with conscious disregard of the risk to human life created by his conduct 
where the underlying felony was not inherently dangerous as with unarmed robbery. 
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492,508,436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982) (extortion); 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 651, 442 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1982) (unarmed 
robbery). It had also refined the rules of joint venture responsibility in such circum­
stances to require a finding that an unarmed accomplice knew that the armed accomplice 
had a weapon and was going to or was likely to use it. Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 
Mass. 536, 544, 447 N.E.2d 1182, 1187-88 (1983). The court found that Bellamy was 
entitled to the retroactive benefit of these new legal principles. 391 Mass. at 515, 461 
N.E.2d at 1218. Recall that a Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) motion can be filed at 
anytime, and there is no procedural prequisite other than a jury verdict. See supra note 
16. 
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and likely to use his weapon, or both.460 The evidence presented by 
both parties indicated that neither proposition was likely; rather, it 
indicated that the killing was an unplanned, spontaneous reaction to 
an unanticipated situation and that the killer armed himself by sim­
ply grabbing an available weapon. The instructions permitted the 
jury to convict Bellamy without making either of the presently re­
quired findings. 
On these facts the court could have concluded, as it had in Wil­
liams, King and Vanderpool, that the killing was not of the type that 
judges and juries, in weighing evidence, ordinarily equate with first 
degree felony murder. There was little evidence that the felony was 
armed robbery, that the robbers acted with conscious disregard of a 
risk to human life created by their conduct or that, if Bimbo was 
armed, Bellamy knew it. Rather than act on this basis, however, the 
court ruled that the jury might have been misled into thinking that it 
could convict Bellamy of first degree felony murder if Bimbo killed 
the victim, whether or not Bellamy knew he was armed.461 As in 
White, this is a case in which the court's articulated rationale would 
ordinarily call for a new trial. As in Rego, the additional deficiency 
in the weight of the evidence justified revising the verdict instead to 
the highest degree clearly supported by the evidence.462 
C. Insufficient Evidence on Revised Findings 
The foregoing survey of the court's section 33E reduced verdict 
cases reveals one additional ground for relief, akin to, but distinct 
from the Williams form of disproportionality. This ground appears 
in cases in which the court's findings, based on its weighing of the 
evidence, render the prosecution's case inadequate.463 These cases 
460. The jury might have found that Bellamy used the knife to commit armed 
robbery and killed the victim while doing so but the evidence as presented in the court's 
discussion was not sufficient to support such a finding. The knife was used in the store's 
operation and was kept near the cash register. The armed robbery indictment was not 
tried. 391 Mass. at 512, 416 N.E.2d at 1216 & n.2. 
46I. Id. at 515, 461 N.E.2d at 1218. 
462. A second degree felony murder verdict, on the theory that the robbery was 
unarmed and the killing was spontaneous, intentional and malicious, was clearly sup­
ported by sufficient evidence. 
463. Of course, the evidence in these cases has been found to be legally sufficient to 
support the verdict. The court's view of the case after weighing the evidence is, essen­
tially, that, as revised, the evidence is not sufficient. The term "inadequate" is applied to 
such findings to clarify this distinction in the nature of the judgment which leads to the 
finding. Where a court's assessment of the evidence is limited to considering the range of 
possible judgments which the evidence might reasonably support, its conclusion that the 
evidence is inadequate is a finding of legal insufficiency. This finding constitutes an ac­
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differ from the paradigmatic "disproportionality" cases in which the 
evidentiary basis for the greater verdict is sufficient but not satisfac­
tory to the court's sense of justice.464 Commonwealth v. Mahnke465 
and Commonwealth v. Jonest66 are examples of this category of cases. 
In Jones, the court began with the view that the legal sufficiency 
of the prosecution's evidence to support the second degree murder 
verdict presented a "very close" question.467 Noting that the jury 
had been fully and accurately instructed upon the possibility of a 
manslaughter verdict based upon the use of unreasonable defensive 
force, acts committed in the heat of passion, provocation or sudden 
affray, the court found that the jury could reasonably have con­
cluded that the defendant, aware that the victim was very intoxicated 
and did not have razor in hand, killed in retaliation for the blow 
infiicted.468 The court's conclusion, based upon an assessment of the 
"great weight of the evidence" was that the defendant was reason­
ably apprehensive that the victim might use the razor which Jones 
knew he had; on this view, the killing was not carried out with mal­
ice aforethought.469 On the facts established by the court's assess­
ment of the weight of the evidence, a finding of malice was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. The second degree verdict was re­
duced to manslaughter.47o 
quittal which is, by operation of federal double jeopardy principles, final. A similar 
conclusion based on a court's assessment of the weight of the evidence is not an acquittal 
in federal constitutional terms. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). To honor 
this distinction the latter judgment is treated in this paper as a finding of inadequacy. Of 
course, whether such a finding should be treated under state law as an acquittal barring 
retrial is not controlled by the holding in Tibbs. 
464. See supra notes 376-96 and accompanying text. 
465. 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975). 
466. 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975). 
467. Id at 807-08, 323 N.E.2d at 728. In fact, the court implied that it considered 
the alternative conclusions of "whether there was malice in the defendant's attack on the 
victim so as rationally to support a verdict of murder or, in the alternative, whether 
justice requires the entry of a verdict of manslaughter pursuant to section 33E" as 
equivalent. Id At the time, the difference in terms of relief was probably between a new 
trial and a reduced verdict. After Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981), and Greene 
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), of course, a finding of insufficient evidence by an appellate 
court or a trial court requires entry of a finding of not guilty on the charge. See Hudson, 
450 U.S. at 43; Greene, 437 U.S. at 24. 
The undisputed evidence showed that Jones had been assaulted and knocked down 
by the deceased, who had a "reputation for his knife and his fight" and was much larger 
than the defendant. Jones stabbed him with a fishing knife he routinely carried, claiming 
that the deceased had attacked him with a razor. The razor, however, was found in the 
deceased's pocket. 366 Mass. at 806, 323 N.E.2d at 727. 
468. 366 Mass. at 808, 323 N.E.2d at 728. 
469. Id at 808-09, 323 N.E.2d at 729. 
470. Id at 810, 323 N.E.2d at 730. 
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The basis for reducing the verdict in Mahnke was reached by a 
similar process. The defendant was convicted of second degree mur­
der, having admitted killing his fiancee, who he believed was preg­
nant by another man. There was little direct evidence other than the 
defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of the killing.471 
The court acted by using the account given by the defendant under 
questioning by a vigilante group which had kidnapped him and held 
him in seclusion until he admitted the killing. By this account, the 
victim had slapped him during an argument and he had responded 
by striking her, causing her to fall and strike her head on a curb, 
which killed her.472 The court reduced the verdict to manslaughter, 
finding that "this version of the events will not support a finding of 
malice aforethought. The defendant never formed a specific inten­
tion to kill the victim .... Nor could death reasonably be expected 
to follow the defendant's blow."473 In such a case the verdict is dis­
proportionate, not in comparison to the usual judgment of judges 
and juries in similar cases, but in terms of the relation of the facts 
found by the court on weighing the evidence to the formal require­
ments of the elements of the offense. That is, on the weight of the 
evidence, the defendant's guilt of the greater offense has not been 
established. The court has reduced verdicts in both types of cases, 
even those in which fundamental trial errors have occurred which 
would otherwise require a new tria1.474 
The supreme judicial court has also been called upon to exercise 
its section 33E powers in cases in which the weight of the evidence 
justified a finding of not guilty.475 In such cases, the court was con­
strained to devise other forms of relief because it lacked the author­
ity to order an acquitta1.476 The trial courts do have such 
authority477 but, because this power is sui generis, have little prece­
dent to guide them in exercising it. 
471. 368 Mass. at 701, 335 N.E.2d at 683. This and similar problems are a com­
mon feature in the section 33E reduction of verdict cases. The paucity, spottiness or 
largely circumstantial nature of the prosecution's evidence-either on specific issues or 
overall-is mentioned in a number of cases. See e.g., Dallon, 385 Mass. at 196, 431 
N.E.2d at 208; King, 374 Mass. at 506, 373 N.E.2d at 211; Cadwell, 374 Mass. at 315, 372 
N.E.2d at 251; Vanderpool, 367 Mass. at 749,328 N.E.2d at 837; Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 
700, 335 N.E.2d at 683; Williams, 364 Mass. at 150, 301 N.E.2d at 687. 
472. 368 Mass. at 702, 335 N.E.2d at 684. 
473. ld. 
474. See King, 374 Mass. at 508, 373 N.E.2d at 212. 
475. See, e.g., Mutina, 366 Mass. 810,323 N.E.2d 294 (1975). 
476. See, e.g., Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1969). 
477. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2). 
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C. 	 Weighing the Evidence To Resolve Unaddressed Su.f!icieny 
Issues 
It has been demonstrated earlier that in some cases, the suffi­
ciency determination conducted pursuant to Rule 25(a) and 25(b)(1) 
will result in cases being submitted to the jury on marginal evidence, 
on artificially enhanced evidence or on evidence which has not been 
assessed for sufficiency.478 Where conviction results, the trial court's 
assessment of the case in terms of the weight of the evidence should 
provide an essential protection against the injustice of an unwar­
ranted conviction or the imposition of an unduly harsh penalty.479 
In some cases, however, a reduced verdict is simply not an appropri­
ate remedy, and the court should order either a new trial or enter a 
finding of not guilty. The purposes of this section are to demonstrate 
how the court, freed from the constraints of the sufficiency assess­
ment rules, has acted where the shortcomings in the sufficiency as­
sessment process appear to have failed to prevent execution of 
irrational jury judgments and to suggest some criteria by which the 
appropriate remedy can be selected on a principled basis. 
The supreme judicial court's section 33E verdict-revision deci­
sions indicate that it has been most sensitive to weight of the evi­
dence problems where the prosecution's case is legally sufficient but 
marginal, and there is evidence indicating that the jury's decision 
may not be a "true verdict";480 that is, it may have been influenced 
by or based on non-evidentiary considerations. It is a primary func­
tion of the sufficiency assessment process to insure that a jury not be 
allowed to decide any case in which there is no rational evidentiary 
support for a guilty verdict. As we have seen, a court considering the 
weight of the evidence is authorized to and must go further to con­
sider whether the balance of the evidence of guilt (particularly de­
gree of guilt) is proportional to the verdict. The following discussion 
478. In addition to the cases discussed in Part II, supra, Commonwealth v. Sherry, 
386 Mass. 682, 699-700, 437 N.E.2d 224, 234 (1982) demonstrates that sufficiency issues 
may arise at a point in the process at which no established procedure affords an opportu­
nity to raise the issue. The supreme judicial court treated this as a weight of the evidence 
problem. The only problem with this treatment is that it might impose a higher burden 
of persuasion on the defendant to obtain relief. 
479. The supreme judicial court's section 33E decisions reducing verdicts in homi­
cide cases clearly illustrate the usefulness of this power to avoid the imposition of 
mandatory sentences of imprisonment where such a penalty would be undesirably harsh 
and a lesser offense which does not carry a mandatory penalty is included in the offense 
charged. Such cases might arise, for example, in cases involving the charge of unlawfully 
carrying a firearm or of trafficking in a controlled substance. 
480. 	 Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822, 323 N.E.2d 294, 301 (1975). 
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will consider how the court has dealt with cases in which it appears 
that the sufficiency assessment process has not effectively served its 
purpose, and what indications of improper external influence have 
prompted the court to take remedial action. 
The weight of the evidence problems created by the presump­
tion of sanity demonstrate to what extent that device (and to a lesser 
extent, other such proof-facilitating devices) creates the possibility of 
irrationality in the decision making process; why the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is ineffectual as a protective device when 
it is not backed by a duty to produce legally sufficient evidence; and 
how the verdict revising authority of section 33E has been used to 
supplant the sufficiency assessment mechanism. The court's section 
33E treatment of the "accidental homicide" issue in Commonwealth 
v. Bearse481 demonstrates how the verdict-revising authority should 
be used to deal with sufficiency problems which may be masked by 
the use of narrowly based common law inferences to satisfy the pros­
ecution's burden of production. The court's treatment of the identifi­
cation-alibi issue in Commonwealth v. Woods482 demonstrates how a 
weight of the evidence assessment should be used to protect against 
apparently irrational credibility and weight judgments by a jury.483 
In each case, apparent shortcomings in the sufficiency process, to­
gether with indications that. the jury was influenced by something 
other than evidence in reaching its verdict, led the court to order new 
trials. 
The evidentiary effect given the presumption of sanity in Massa­
chusetts works in every case to require the trial judge to submit the 
case to the jury even if the prosecution offers no evidence on that 
issue.484 This practice has been characterized by the court as an inte­
gral part of its general policy of granting broad fact-finding discre­
tion to the jury on the issue.485 The policy includes encouraging 
481. 358 Mass 481,265 N.E.2d 496 (1969). 
482. 382 Mass. I, 413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980). 
483. See supra notes 262-84 and accompanying text. 
484. Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 468 n.7, 457 N.E.2d 275, 278 n.7 
(1984); Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 532-33, 350 N.E.2d 444,455-56 (1976); 
Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975); Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178-81,258 N.E.2d 13, 19-21 (1970). 
485. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28,35,453 N.E.2d 437,442-43 (1983). 
The other primary components of this policy are (I) broad standards ofre\evancy; (2) use 
of the Model Penal Code's definition of criminal responsibility, see id at 34, 37 n.II, 453 
N.E.2d at 442, 444 n.II; and (3) imposing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
on the prosecution once the issue is injected into the case. See Kostka, 370 Mass. at 527, 
350 N.E.2d at 452. 
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each party to present a broad array of evidence.486 Neither side need 
present expert opinion testimony, but the prosecution in particular 
has been urged to do so when its evidence is otherwise margina1.487 
Because the presumption of innocence permits the jury to infer san­
ity from its own knowledge and experience, not in the particular case 
but in human conduct in general, the prosecution can satisfy its bur­
den of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt without producing a 
scintilla of evidence of sanity.488 In Commonwealth v. Mutina,489 the 
court, faced with just such a conviction, treated it as a weight of the 
evidence problem; however, the case presented a serious problem of 
evidentiary sufficiency if sanity is regarded as an essential element of 
the conviction.490 The court exercised its section 33E "safety valve" 
powers to reverse the conviction, without clearly indicating whether 
it was employing a sufficiency or weight of the evidence standard.491 
486. The defendant's demeanor in the courtroom, for example, is recognized as 
providing such an important source of information as to entitle him or her to appear 
before the jury without medication, even if (s)he does not testify. Commonwealth v. 
Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983). 
487. Id. at 36-37 & n.9, 437 N.E.2d at 443 & n.9. 
488. Arguably, neither the presumption of innocence nor the Winship principle im­
poses a burden of producing evidence of sanity on the prosecution because it is not an 
elemental issue. But the integrity of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is left ex­
clusively to the stewardship of the jury when the prosecution is allowed to satisfy its 
burden of persuasion without producing any evidence. In addition, the right to have the 
trial judge assess the sufficiency of the evidence may be inherent in the right to a jury 
trial. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 73 (1965). 
489. 366 Mass. 810,323 N.E.2d 294 (1975). 
490. The defendant had shot and killed a woman who had tried to end their ro­
mantic relationship. The killing was carried out in an apparently irrational manner. Id. 
at 812-13, 323 N.E.2d at 296. 
The defendant's evidence at trial included proof of a long history of mental illness 
manifested in bizarre speech and behavior, physical ailments and periods of hospitaliza­
tion. Two psychiatrists gave their opinions that he lacked criminal responsibility. Id. at 
813-14, 323 N .E.2d at 296. The prosecution presented no evidence of criminal responsi­
bility other than the circumstances of the killing. It relied on its cross-examination of the 
psychiatrists and the "presumption of sanity." Id. at 815, 323 N.E.2d at 297. 
An increasing tendency to exploit the presumption of sanity was noted in Common­
wealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35-36, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442-43 (1983). This prose­
cutorial practice may eventually lead the courts to conclude that the device imposes 
intolerable costs on the system. 
491. 366 Mass. at 812-17, 323 N.E.2d at 295-98. The court did not discuss in its 
opinion whether the defendant had challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution's evi­
dence. Had the issue been raised, however, the ruling required by Massachusetts law had 
been clearly stated as recently as 1970: a trial judge is not permitted to direct a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity in any criminal case tried by a jury. This rule is traceable 
to Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1935), and was 
reaffirmed before Mutinain Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178-81,258 N.E.2d 
13, 19-21 (1970). The court did recognize the questionable validity of allowing the pre­
sumption alone to carry the prosecution's burden. 366 Mass. at 815 n.2, 323 N.E.2d at 
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The court's statement of its reasons for granting the defendant relief 
under its section 33E authority, however, makes it clear that the 
prosecution's evidence of sanity was not legally sufficient to justify 
submitting the case to the jury. Although it characterized its deci­
sion at one point as being based on the "weight of the evidence," the 
court's statements of its view of the case are much stronger. It recog­
nized that the case had been submitted to the jury despite "the ab­
sence of any affirmative evidence of the defendant's sanity"492 and in 
the face of "overwhelming persuasive evidence that the defendant 
was insane at the time of the killing."493 The imbalance in the evi­
dence on the issue of criminal responsibility was so overwhelming 
that the court concluded that the verdict "was not a true verdict."494 
The court, therefore, set aside the verdict and ordered that the de­
fendant be retried. Recognizing that the jury had been placed in an 
untenable position, the court held that in future trials involving the 
issue of criminal responsibility, the jury may be told-at the defend­
ant's request or at the jury's-that the consequence of a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity does not result in the automatic re­
lease of the defendant.495 
In dissent, Justice Quirico argued that this effort to encourage 
the jury to render a "true verdict" itself compromised another aspect 
of the fundamental division of responsibility between judge and jury 
according to which the judge alone exercises the court's sentencing 
297 n.2. Apparently because it granted section 33E relief, the court found it unnecessary 
to address the constitutional validity of denying the trial judge the power to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. . 
492. MUlina, 366 Mass. at 816, 323 N.E.2d at 298. 
493. Id. at 822, 323 N.E.2d at 301. Perhaps it is this type of development that the 
court referred to in Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 346 N.E.2d 368 (1976), 
when it said: "It is possible, also, that the Commonwealth's position as to proof might 
deteriorate between the time that [it] rested and the close of all the evidel!ce. In that 
event, the defendant's rights would, of course, on renewal of his motions, be reappraised 
in consideration of all the evidence." Id. at 150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 370 n.1. Application 
of this rule to criminal responsibility, however, is foreclosed by the current working of 
the "presumption of sanity." 
494. 	 366 Mass. at 822, 323 N.E.2d at 301. 
Implicit in the jury's verdict was a determination that the Commonwealth 
had proven the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. On the record 
before us, we have found no rational justification or basis for such a finding, 
except the jury's understandable concern for the need to confine an insane and 
still dangerous killer for the protection of society.... The evidence heard by 
them and the law given to them clearly played little part in their final 
verdict.... 
Id. at 822-23, 323 N.E.2d at 301-02. 
495. Id. at 823 n.12, 323 N.E.2d at 302 n.12. 
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powers.496 Neither majority nor dissent acknowledged the fact that 
the source of this mischief was the "presumption of sanity," which 
may (and did in this case) function to allow the jury to act outside its 
province. The improper influence perceived to be at work in Mutina 
was the jury's ignorance of the sentencing consequences of a finding 
of not guilty by reason of insanity and its (presumed) fear that such a 
verdict would not incapacitate the defendant.497 
Another recognized potential improper influence is the specter 
of voluntary abuse of consciousness-altering drugs.498 A third 
closely-related source is improper prosecutorial argument designed 
to take advantage of the drug specter.499 The likelihood that such 
external influences will sway the jury is greatest when the prosecu­
tion's evidence of sanity is weakest. 
The court has responded by employing a weight of the evidence 
standard which evokes the spirit of Jackson v. Virginia without the 
customary sufficiency of the evidence restrictions. The weight of the 
evidence inquiry is whether the issue of sanity was presented "fully 
and fairly" to the jury; that is, whether the prosecution's evidence 
"adequately rebutted" the defendant's evidence of insanity.5°O 
Although in Commonwealth v. Lunde,501 the court discussed the legal 
sufficiency and weight of the evidence very much as if they raised 
identical issues of assessment,502 its ruling in Commonwealth v. 
496. Id. at 824-25, 323 N.E.2d at 302-03 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
497. 366 Mass. at 822, 323 N.E.2d at 301. 
498. The difficulty of distinguishing drug-induced behavior, psychotic behavior at­
tributable to mental illness but triggered by drug (including alcohol) consumption and 
psychotic behavior unrelated to drugs is mentioned in the medical evidence in several 
recent cases and has been noted by the court. See Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 
464,469-71,457 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (1984); Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 
39-40,453 N.E.2d 437, 445 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 381 Mass. 340, 345, 350 
n.6, 409 N.E.2d 732, 736, 738 n.6 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 770, 
383 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (1978). 
499. In Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1984), for 
example, the prosecution argued that the killing was solely the result of the voluntary use 
of drugs. It presented no evidence that the defendant had taken drugs shortly before the 
killing and no expert opinion testimony to support its theory. The medical records pro­
vided some basis for such a theory. The court commented that "that conclusion is diffi­
cult to reach in view ofthe Bridgewater report as a whole and the testimony at trial." Id. 
at 469-70, 457 N.E.2d at 278-79. 
500. Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 49, 453 N.E.2d 446,450-51 (1983). 
Typically, the defense will present expert opinion testimony of lack of criminal responsi­
bility, but need not do so to meet its burden of production, particularly where evidence of 
a history of mental illness and treatment is presented, e.g., through hospital records. See 
Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983). 
501. 390 Mass. 42, 453 N.E.2d 446 (1983). 
502. Id. at 47-48, 453 N.E.2d at 449-50. The court rejected the defendant's suffi­
\024 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:917 
Guiliana503 makes it clear that the adequacy of the prosecution's san­
ity evidence is an issue ofweight.504 Where the defendant's evidence 
includes expert opinion testimony, the prosecution may satisfy the 
court's weight of the evidence standards by relying upon circumstan­
tial evidence of rational, controlled conduct. But where the defense 
evidence is strong, and the prosecution fails to present medical ex­
pert testimony to support its theory of sanity, the court can infer that 
none was available and consider that factor in assessing the weight 
of the evidence.505 Unless a strong circumstantial case for an infer­
ence of sanity has been made, the prosecution's evidence is 
inadequate.506 
These cases confirm that it is necessary and appropriate to as­
sess the weight of the prosecution's evidence of sanity as a substitute 
for the sufficiency assessment, which is never undertaken on this is­
sue. The focus should be upon whether the prosecution's evidence 
"adequately rebuts" the defendant's evidence; that is, whether a rea­
sonable evidentiary basis for conviction has been presented to the 
jury. At this point, the presumption of sanity should not be given 
any evidentiary weight. The purpose of this assessment is to insure 
that some alternative to an irrational (Mulino) conviction is available 
to the jury; a major effect of the presumption is to create the possibil­
ity that the jury will convict without evidence and defeat the purpose 
mockery of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of persuasion.507 
ciency claim based on the argument that the prosecution's position had "deteriorated" in 
the course of the defense case. The prosecution had offered no expert testimony in its 
rebuttal case, choosing to concede the mental illness issue and argue that the defendant 
could nevertheless substantially conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The 
defendant argued that, in face of the evidence of his 20 year history of mental illness and 
the unrebutted opinion testimony of three experts, the prosecution's evidence was insuffi­
cient. The court responded that the prosecution's evidence that Lunde was oriented as to 
time, place and persons and that he behaved calmly and rationally before and after the 
killing "adequately rebutted" the defense evidence. 390 Mass. at 49, 453 N.E.2d at 450 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 37-38, 402 N.E.2d 55, 60 (1980». 
The court referred to the same state of the evidence in rejecting Lunde's weight of 
the evidence claim. Id 
503. 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1984). 
504. See id at 469-71, 457 N.E.2d at 278-79. 
505. Id at 470-71, 457 N.E.2d at 279 (quoting Kostka, 370 Mass. at 540, 350 
N.E.2d at 460 (Hennessey, c.J., dissenting in part». 
506. In Giuliano a circumstantial case "might have been pieced together" by selec­
tively reading "internally inconsistent, conflicting medical records which were contra­
dicted by the testimony at trial." 390 Mass. at 470 & n.9, 457 N.E.2d at 279 & n.9. The 
sufficiency of such evidence in the face of the defense case would present a problem 
similar to that presented in Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. I, 413 N.E.2d 1099 
(1980). 
507. The court's ruling in Giuliano makes it clear that evidence of improper outside 
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Commonly utilized inferences or similar proof-facilitating de­
vices may also create a risk that the jury will be improperly influ­
enced by non-evidentiary considerations. As with the presumption 
of sanity, an inference drawn from an artificially limited factual ba­
sis may permit a jury to reach a verdict on less than adequate evi­
dence. The common law "presumption of malice"508 had that 
impact in Commonwealth v. Bearse,509 prompting the court to exer­
cise its verdict revising powers in the interest of justice. 
The defendant in Bearse had shot his sixteen year-old son Ricky 
at close range with a rifle he owned. In a pretrial statement to police, 
he said the rifle "discharged accidentally. His wife, who had been in 
a room above that in which the shooting occurred, reported that she 
heard her son say "Don't do it, Dad" a second or two before she 
heard the shot. The prosecution's theory was that this statement sup­
ported inferences that the shooting was intentional and malicious 
(the verdict was second degree murder).510 
Bearse's assignments of error on appeal included the denial of 
his motions for directed verdicts on so much of the indictment as 
charged first and second degree murder.5lI The court found "no re­
versible error" in anyone of his claims, but did not discuss them in 
detail "[i]n view of [its] ultimate conclusion."512 It granted section 
33E relief because it could not fairly conclude that the jury, "unaf­
fected by considerations other than the evidence, were satisfied be­
yond a reasonable doubt that Ricky made the statement" and "could 
infer beyond a reasonable doubt from the fact of the statement that 
Ricky was prompted to make it because he saw that his father was 
intent upon shooting him."513 The court set the verdict aside and 
remanded the case "to stand for trial on so much of the indictment as 
charges involuntary manslaughter."514 
The formal inference of malice from the intentional use of a 
deadly weapon, together with the trial judge's disability on the credi­
influence is not a prerequisite to relief where the verdict is otherwise against the weight of 
the evidence. See 390 Mass. at 471, 457 N.E.2d at 279. 
508. After Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the term "presumption" is 
no longer favored and has been replaced by the term "inference." While inferences must 
be "permissive" when presented to the jury via instructions, in either form the device has 
the effect of diluting the prosecution's burden of production. 
509. 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970). 
510. Id. at 486, 265 N.E.2d at 499. 
511. Appellant's Brief at 8-9, Bearse. 
512. 358 Mass. at 485, 265 N.E.2d at 498. 
513. Id. at 487, 265 N.E.2d at 499. 
514. Id. at 488,265 N.E.2d at 500. 
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bility and weight issues, worked to ease the prosecution's evidence 
past, rather than through, the sufficiency assessment. To prove 
either voluntary manslaughter or murder, the prosecution had to es­
tablish an intentional shooting; to prove murder, it would also have 
to prove malice. If the killing were shown to have been intentional, 
sufficient evidence of malice could be inferred solely from the use of 
a deadly weapon to bring it about.515 The key issue, then, was 
whether the evidence that Ricky said, seconds before he was shot, 
"Don't do it, Dad," would support an inference beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the killing was intentional and malicious. 
Whether Ricky uttered those words was a question of Mrs. 
Bearse's credibility which for sufficiency purposes must be taken for 
granted.516 Assuming the statement was made and was subject to 
conflicting interpretations, the question of whether it would be taken 
as evidence that Ricky perceived that the defendant intended to 
shoot him is likewise an issue falling exclusively within the jury's 
fact-finding discretion.517 If it is conceded that the inference is a 
possible one, it stands as sufficient evidence unless considered to be 
"too remote according to the usual course of events."518 The most 
logical interpretation of the court's action in Bearse, particularly in 
light of its explicit ruling that it found no reversible error among the 
defendant's assignments of error for appeal, is that it viewed the in­
ference as being sufficient, if barely SO.519 Its later rejection of that 
inference is couched in terms suggestive of a weight of the evidence 
evaluation; the court further concluded that the jury's verdict was 
probably influenced by the prosecutor when he told the jury that he 
would prove the defendant remarked, shortly before the shooting 
(no such evidence was offered): "I'm going to kill that kid."520 
In Part Two it was argued that a trial judge may not constitu­
tionally give conclusive effect to such an inference in assessing the 
sufficiency of the evidence. If that is done, however, and the infer­
515. See Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 209-10, 218 N.E.2d 408, 413 
(1966). 
516. Cj; Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928). 
517. Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 81, 375 N.E.2d 693, 699 (1978); 
Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 355-56, 140 N.E.2d 140, 160 (1957). 
518. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928). 
519. This was a pre-Jackson v. Virginia ruling. It seems unlikely that, given the 
ambiguity of the declaration and lack of evidence to provide a basis for choosing what 
inference to draw from it, this evidence would be considered sufficient under present 
standards. 
520. 358 Mass. at 487, 265 N.E.2d at 499. The possibility that the jury's verdict 
was based on considerations outside the evidence is, of course, one of the central con­
cerns of the court in considering whether to exercise its section 33E power. 
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ence also is suggested to the jury in an instruction, any remaining 
interest the jury may have in evidence on this issue may have to be 
satisfied by considering stricken evidence or improper argument. As 
the Bearse decision indicates, the trial court should ignore the formal 
inferences and be alert to indications that extraneous information 
has influenced the jury in assessing the weight of the evidence. 
Finally, it is essential to recognize that trial judges will face 
claims under Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) that are essentially suf­
ficiency claims, necessarily involving weight of the evidence issues. 
The most common is likely to be identification-alibi cases. In some 
jurisdictions these types of cases, which involve "elemental de­
fenses," are treated as belonging to a special category of sufficiency 
cases to which the "prosecution's best case" rule does not apply.52\ 
This is because even where no other procedural device is employed, 
designation of an issue as an "affirmative defense" may eliminate 
effective sufficiency evaluation. 
The "alibi" defense offers an illuminating illustration because it 
is likely to be asserted in cases involving either equivocal eyewitness 
identification or marginal circumstantial evidence that the defendant 
was a perpetrator of the crime. Massachusetts procedure is designed 
to produce a direct confrontation between the evidence of the oppos­
ing parties on this issue. Rule 14(b) of the Rules of Criminal Proce­
dure requires the defendant, in response to a pretrial demand by the 
prosecution, to both plead the issue and disclose to the prosecution 
the names and addresses of the witnesses who will be called to estab­
lish the defense.522 The prosecution must then respond by disclosing 
its rebuttal witnesses.523 
One purpose of Rule 14(b) is to focus the dispute on a reason­
ably precise date, time and place so that the prosecution's evidence 
tending to show that the defendant perpetrated the crime and the 
defendant's evidence of alibi are focused. 524 That is, the proof of one 
should specifically negate the possibility that the other might also be 
true.525 To the extent that Rule 14(b) succeeds in bringing about the 
521. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 416 F.2d 823, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Farrar 
v. United States, 275 F.2d 868, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 1952); People v. Gardner, 35 Ill. 2d 564, 
571-73, 221 N.E.2d 232, 235-37 (1966); People v. McGee, 21 Ill. 2d 440, 444-45, 173 
N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (1961). Compare Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. I, 7-9, 413 
N.E.2d 1099, 1103-04 (1980). 
522. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(I)(A). 
523. Id. 14(b)(I)(B). 
524. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b) reporters notes at 307. 
525. Thus, the prosecution is required, as a foundation for its motion, to state the 
time, date and place at which the alleged offense was comInitted. The defendant's re­
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direct joinder of the factual issues of time, date and place, the proce­
dural device of designating "alibi" as a "defense" serves little pur­
pose in terms of the original rationale upon which it rests. That is, it 
leaves little room for the possibility that the prosecution will be 
called upon to prove a negative of unknown dimension. 
Even when the prosecution's evidence that the defendant perpe­
trated the crime rests on the testimony of one who claims to have 
been an eyewitness, the task of determining the sufficiency of such 
evidence may be very difficult. It is now widely recognized that ju­
ries are likely to be misled in judging what weight to give this kind of 
evidence, which is among the least reliable of the types of direct evi­
dence commonly used in criminal litigation.526 Nevertheless, the 
supreme judicial court has applied a lenient standard in determining 
the sufficiency of eyewitness identification evidence.527 When one or 
more eyewitnesses identifies the defendant in court and places him 
or her at the scene of the crime near the time it occurred, that evi­
dence will justify submitting the case to the jury in the face of an 
alibi defense, even where the identifying witness' testimony is "con­
fusing and uncertain."528 Even where a witness was unable to make 
an in-court identification and stated that the defendant was not the 
person who robbed him, the court has found the testimony of a po­
lice officer that the person in a photograph selected by the witness in 
an out-of-court identification procedure was the defendant to be 
both admissible as substantive evidence and sufficient by itself to 
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
sponse must similarly state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to 
have been at the time of the alleged offense. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(A). 
While there is no explicit link established between this provision and those gov­
erning amendment of the indictment and requiring a bill of particulars, the failure to 
acknowledge the relationship between these procedures can defeat this crucial "issue­
joining" purpose of Rule 14. The result is clearly illustrated in Commonwealth v. 
Woods, 382 Mass. 1,413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980), an alibi case in which the prosecution was 
inexplicably permitted to amend the indictment to allow it to show that the offense oc­
curred on a different date than originally alleged. Consequently, as the court noted, the 
prosecution's case depended in that crucial respect on the vagueness of its own evidence. 
Id. at 6 & n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 & n.7. See supra text accompanying notes 277-95 for a 
detailed discussion of the Woods case. 
526. E.F. LOFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979). 
527. See Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 372 N.E.2d 1267 (1978); Com­
monwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
528. Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 297, 372 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (1978) 
("The defendant contends that his alibi defense is as plausible as the confusing and un­
certain testimony of the Commonwealth's two principal witnesses. . . . But it was for 
the jury and not the judge to determine whether the defendant's explanations should be 
believed."). 
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the robber. 529 
The supreme judicial court's assessment of the evidence in Com­
monwealth v. Woods630 illustrates how the weight of the evidence 
should be assessed in such cases. The court should be sensitive to 
the possibility that the "prosecution's best case" rule has worked to 
present a case to the jury in which it is necessary for the jury to make 
an arbitrary judgment to convict. Similarly, the court should con­
sider whether any prejudicial external influence has affected the 
jury's consideration of the evidence. On this point, Woods suggests 
yet another source of concern: the contrivance of evidence by the 
prosecution in response to the defendant's defensive pleading.531 
Finally, in some cases, a sufficiency claim may have to be enter­
tained for the first time as a weight of the evidence claim. For exam­
ple, in Commonwealth v. Sherry,532 the prosecution presented legally 
sufficient evidence to convict each of three defendants of having 
raped the victim individually as well as having acted as joint ventur­
ers. The prosecution did not ask for, and the judge did not give, 
joint venture instructions. Accordingly, when the jury convicted 
529. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 458-61, 381 N.E.2d 582, 600-01 
(1978). The witness had testified that he was certain of his photographic identification 
when he made it. Id. at 458,381 N.E.2d at 600. But, where the evidence does not clearly 
establish that the witness actually identified the defendant's photograph in the out-of­
court session, it is not sufficient to support such a finding. Commonwealth v. Amado, 
387 Mass. 179, 187,439 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1982). The fineness of this distinction is cap­
tured in the court's characterization of Vitello as evidenced in a later case: 
Neither Johnson nor any of the three police officers who were present at this 
interview testified that Johnson had identified the photograph of the defendant 
as that of the assailant. The testimony of these witnesses tended to prove only 
that Johnson picked the defendant's photograph, gave a description of the as­
sailant, gave the name of the assailant as "Bugsy," and "associated" the name 
of Bugsy with the photograph he had selected. . . . The missing fact, i.e., that 
Johnson had identified a photograph of the defendant as depicting the assailant, 
could not properly be inferred from this testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Certainly a defendant can not be convicted on the basis of nothing more than 
inferences suggested by the sequence in which the questions were put to the 
witnesses. 
Id. The court considered the defendant's alibi evidence to be irrelevant to the sufficiency 
issue. Id. at 181 n.l, 439 N.E.2d at 258 n.!. 
530. 382 Mass. I, 7-9, 413 N.E.2d 1099, 1113-14 (1981). Although this case in­
volved a ruling on a motion for a new trial., the court discussed the sufficiency of the 
evidence and applied the standard of whether there was a serious risk that a miscarriage 
of justice had occurred. Id. It therefore represents an appropriate example of how the 
trial court's verdict revision authority should be exercised on its view of the weight of the 
evidence. 
53!. Id. at 6 n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 n.7; see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,42­
45 (1982). 
532. 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E.2d 224 (1982). 
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each defendant of all three charges, it appeared for the first time that 
the evidence was legally insufficient to support two of the three ver­
dicts as to each defendant. 533 In this situation the weight of the evi­
dence assessment also serves the function of the constitutionally 
required sufficiency assessment. 
D. 	 Selection ofRemedies: New Trial, Reduced Verdict or 
Acquittal 
The trial court's choice of remedies must acknowledge federal 
constitutional double jeapordy principles which require acquittal 
where the court concludes that the conviction rests upon evidence 
that is either legally insufficient or totally lacking on any essential 
element.534 Where the court decides to exercise its authority based 
on the weight of the evidence, double jeopardy principles do not re­
strict the judg'e choice of remedies.535 This dichotomy suggests that 
it is appropriate for the court, when it exercises its authority to weigh 
the evidence, to distinguish those cases in which the sufficiency of the 
evidence has actually been assessed in the usual course of the pro­
ceedings from those in which the actual sufficiency of the evidence is 
being assessed under the rubric of considering its weight. Any find­
ing actually grounded on insufficiency should be given the effect of 
an acquitta1.536 
The supreme judicial court's standards and methods for deter­
mining whether to act to grant a new trial or reduce a verdict under 
section 33E, for the most part, can be adopted directly by trial judges 
seeking guidance in the exercise of their Rule 25(b)(2) (second sen­
tence) powers. Two points regarding flexibility and discretion 
should be noted. The general principle that flaws or mistakes in the 
533. Id at 699-700, 437 N.E.2d at 234. On the theories presented to the jury there 
was no evidence that each defendant was a principal in any more than one rape. Jd The 
proper remedy was required findings of not guilty as to each of these two. Id at 700, 437 
N.E.2d at 234-35. 
534. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1981) (legally insufficient); Thomp­
son v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1960) (no evidence). "Acquittal" in this sense 
includes a reduced verdict where that reduction is based on a finding that the prosecu­
tion's evidence was legally insufficient as to the greater degree of guilt. 
535. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,42-45 (1982). Given the constitutional impact 
of the weight versus sufficiency distinction it is important to honor the distinction scrupu­
lously. Where, for example, the court conducts a weight of the evidence assessment and 
grants relief on a finding that an element of the offense is unsupported by any evidence, 
the remedy must be an acquittal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 699-700, 
437 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1982). See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 40-41. 
536. See Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 469, 457 N.E.2d 275, 278 
(1984); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822-23,323 N.E.2d 294, 301-02 (1975). 
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trial process should be remedied only by a new trial, and inadequa­
cies in the evidence remedied only by a reduced verdict is subject to 
two exceptions. The first exception is that where the two problems (a 
mistake and inadequate evidence) appear together, a reduced verdict 
may be an appropriate remedy.537 The second exception is that 
where the defendant's case has been so inadequately presented; that 
is, where available evidence on a critical issue has not been 
presented and no tactical or strategic justification appears, a new 
trial can be granted in the interests of justice.538 
Overall, the supreme judicial court's exercise of its section 33E 
authority has been marked by considerations of expediency and fair­
ness in the pursuit of the proportional justice of a particular case. 
The court has reduced the jury's verdict in cases involving degree of 
guilt issues where the prosecution's evidence, viewed as the jury's 
verdict implies, was legally sufficient, but not adequate, because the 
case presented on those facts did not satisfy the court's paradigm of 
the offense.539 The court also has reduced the verdict after revising 
the jury's implied findings according to the court's view of the weight 
of the evidence, when the court's revised findings similarly did not fit 
its paradigm.540 Additionally, it has reduced the verdict when its re­
vised findings led the court to conclude that, as revised, the facts 
were insufficient to support the verdict.54l Finally, in Commonwealth 
v. Bearse,542 the court combined its verdict reduction and new trial 
537. See Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 391 Mass. 511, 516,461 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 
(1984); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 394, 274 N.E.2d 795, 801 (1971); Com­
monwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 426, 232 N.E.2d 335, 346 (1967). 
538. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 607, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827 (1975). 
The court found two shortcomings in the presentation which it felt required a new trial: 
first, the jury had not been informed that Daniels had spent at least half his life in an 
institution, nor that his IQ was 53, nor that he was regarded medically as being mildly to 
moderately "retarded;" and second, no evidence--expert opinion or fact-was presented 
in either the motion to suppress or the trial to aid the judge and jury in evaluating the 
impact that custodial interrogation might have had on Daniels' ability to act voluntarily 
in the circumstances under which he was questioned. The shortcomings in the adjudica­
tion process required a new trial because "a substantial injustice may have been done." 
Id. at 608-09, 321 N.E.2d at 827-28. 
539. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dalton, 385 Mass. 190,431 N.E.2d 203 (1982); 
.Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pisa, 
372 Mass. 590, 363 N.E.2d 245, cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977); Commonwealth v. Kin­
ney, 361 Mass. 709, 282 N.E.2d 409 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 274 
N.E.2d 795 (1971); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967), cerl. 
denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968). 
540. See, e.g., Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833 (1975). 
541. See, e.g., Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975). 
542. 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970). 
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powers to overcome institutional limitations to ensure that its sense 
of justice would be satisfied in that case. 
The court in Bearse ordered a new trial of the defendant's sec­
ond degree murder conviction but limited the new trial to only that 
part of the indictment that charged involuntary manslaughter.543 In 
effect, it acquitted the defendant of second degree murder and vol­
untary manslaughter. While the court's disposition of this case 
might at first blush appear to have involved an unwarranted exercise 
of its section 33E powers, a closer look at the evidence and the law 
prevailing at that time supports its correctness and demonstrates its 
ingenuity. The criticism of unwarranted exercise of power might be 
founded upon the argument that the basis of the court's order was 
that the prosecution's evidence on the critical elements of intent and 
malice were legally insufficient. If that were the case, the proper 
course of action would have been to reverse the trial judge's order 
denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on second de­
gree murder, an issue which had been properly presented for appel­
late review.544 Two considerations appear to underlie the court's 
decision to act upon section 33E grounds. First, the defendant's 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial did not extend to 
the voluntary manslaughter charge.545 Second, by acting pursuant to 
section 33E the court was able to exercise a form of control over the 
post-appellate proceedings, a control it could not achieve by exercis­
ing its ordinary appellate review powers. If it found the evidence to 
be legally insufficient, the proper remedy under Massachusetts law, 
as it then stood, was a new tria1.546 Nor could the court instruct the 
prosecutor to proceed only on so much of the indictment as charged 
involuntary manslaughter.547 The remedy ordered a hybrid exercise 
of the court's reduction of verdict and new trial powers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rule 25 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
543. Id. at 488, 265 N.E.2d at 500. 
544. This motion was made and denied at the close of the prosecution's evidence, 
the ruling was excepted to and assigned as error for appeal. It did not address the volun­
tary manslaughter issue. Summary of Record at 2-3, 5-6, Bearse. 
545. See 358 Mass. at 488, 265 N.E.2d at 500. 
546. It was not until 1978 that the Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy prin­
ciples prevent retrial following appellate reversal on insufficient evidence. See Greene v. 
Massey, 437 U.S. 19,24 (1978). 
547. The courts in Massachusetts cannot order the prosecutor to dismiss or file an 
indictment or part of it unless it suffers from some defect in law. See generally A. GOLD­
STEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY (1981). 
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equips the trial judge to meet the demanding, ongoing challenge of 
overseeing the process of proof in criminal trials to ensure that no 
defendant is convicted upon evidence which does not provide some 
reasonable factual basis for the judgments essential to a finding of 
guilt. To the extent that this task involves the judge in evaluating the 
legal sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, it is a federal constitu­
tional duty. The new federal due process standard promulgated in 
Jackson v. Virginia548 requires the judge to assess the legal sufficiency 
of the evidence to determine whether the evidence might support the 
conclusion of a reasonable factfinder that each essential element of 
the crime charged has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.549 
This constitutional imperative is founded upon a recognition that the 
presumption of innocence imposes a burden of production on the 
prosecution and that enforcement of this burden of production is es­
sential to maintaining the integrity of the Winship burden of persua­
sion.550 To effectively serve this purpose, the standard of proof and 
the burden of production must be satisfied before the defendant may 
be required to respond to the prosecution's evidence by either de­
fending or submitting to the jury.551 
This newly articulated level of constitutional protections alters 
the division of fact-finding responsibility between judge and jury. It 
requires the judge to ensure that the prosecution's evidence provides 
a reasonable basis for the choice of inferences, as well as for the 
weight of the evidence and credibility judgments the jury must make 
to convict. Customary rules governing the sufficiency assessment 
process prohibit the trial judge from inquiring into the reasonable­
ness of such judgments. Other rules and practices used to facilitate 
the process of proof often operate, singly or in combination, to dilute 
or defeat the trial judge's ability to use the customary sufficiency pro­
cess to effectively vindicate the Jackson principles.552 
One way to reconcile the old process to the new principles is to 
modify the customary rules that define the division of fact-finding 
responsibility between judge and jury and to limit the use of prac­
tices and proof-facilitating devices which relieve the prosecution of 
548. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
549. Id. at 324. 
550. Id. at 323-24. 
551. Id. at 324. 
552. Examples of these other rules and practices include designation of issues as 
affirmative defenses, assignment of the burden of production on elemental issues to the 
defendant, and the application of proof-facilitating devices to the sufficiency 
determination. 
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its burden of producing evidence in the manner suggested by this 
article. The overall division of fact-finding responsibility between 
judge and jury would change little and no unfamiliar responsibilities 
would be imposed upon the judge. Any new restraints imposed on 
the jury's fact-finding discretion would tend to protect the accused 
and thus would pose no constitutional problems. 
An alternative to modifying the operating rules of the present 
sufficiency assessment process would be to extend that process by 
utilizing the trial judge's postconviction authority as a supplemen­
tary device. Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) grants to trial judges 
the discretion to exercise an equitable power to revise jury verdicts in 
the interests of justice. This power is akin to the supreme judicial 
court's section 33E equitable verdict revision authority and is to be 
exercised similarly. The supreme judicial court has exercised its sec­
tion 33E authority in ways that, in effect, have remedied evidentiary 
inadequacies similar to those that may result from the incongruities 
between the new Jackson standard or rationale and the customary 
rules and practices of the sufficiency assessment and general process 
of proof. 
The trial judge's equitable authority under Rule 25(b)(2) (sec­
ond sentence) is meant to extend beyond the function of supplement­
ing the sufficiency assessment process. This authority grants the 
judge the power and responsibility to review the evidence and the 
issues in a case broadly, without regard to procedural technicalities 
and to take corrective action when it appears that justice may not 
have been done.553 The trial judge is to exercise this authority in the 
manner and according to the standards developed by the supreme 
judicial court in the exercise of its section 33E powers. 
In discharging its section 33E responsibilities, the supreme judi­
cial court has ordered a new trial when shortcomings in fundamental 
aspects Of the process of proof cast doubt on the integrity or accuracy 
of the verdict. It has reduced guilty verdicts when the verdict ap­
peared to be disproportionate to the evidence evaluated on the 
weight of the evidence. The court has employed three identifiable 
approaches in assessing the proportionality of a verdict to the evi­
dence. One approach is to assess the evidence, accepting the prose­
cution's best version of the events. When this view of the evidence 
553. When it appears that there is a substantial risk that a miscarriage of justice 
may have occurred, the trial judge may order a new trial, order entry of a verdict of 
guilty on any lesser included offense or order entry of a finding of not guilty. MASS. R. 
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presents an account which is incomplete or unsatisfactory in some 
major aspect (such as in failing to supply a motive, or where the 
evidence on a key issue is only technically sufficient), the court has 
reduced the verdict. A second approach is to assess the weight of the 
evidence, utilizing a version of events extracted from all that is 
known about the case, against a paradigm of the offense that is 
somewhat less extensive than the formal definition of the offense. 
When the evidence, though legally sufficient, falls short on this ac­
count, the verdict has been considered disproportionate and reduced. 
Finally, the court has reduced verdicts when, on its version of events 
as measured against a paradigm of the offense, the evidence is insuf­
ficient to support the verdict. 
Overall, the court has combined its concerns of basic fairness 
with a degree of expediency to achieve a rough sense of proportion­
ality that addresses two relationships: that between the evidence and 
the verdict in a given case and that between the case before the court 
and the court's paradigm of the offense indicated by the verdict. In 
its choice of remedies, the court has similarly combined an approxi­
mate sense of fairness with expediency, particularly where judicial 
resources may be conserved. 
Recent developments in federal double jeopardy doctrine re­
strict the court's alternatives by requiring entry of an acquittal when­
ever a court determines that the evidence was legally insufficient to 
support a conviction. The court's choice of remedies should be made 
with considerations of finality in mind. If the weight assessing au­
thority of the trial courts is to be used to supplement the sufficiency 
assessment process, remedies that are the functional equivalent of a 
required finding of not guilty should be given conclusive effect. 
In sum, the trial judge's task of regulating the quality of the 
evidence in criminal cases is as complex as the process of proof itself 
and often requires the judge to carefully balance conflicting policies 
and rules. The judge's overriding concern must be to ensure that the 
principle of Jackson v. Virginia is fully vindicated in the trial court, 
preferably through the sufficiency assessment process. Rule 25 em­
powers the judge to do whatever is necessary to discharge this consti­
tutional obligation and to go beyond the due process minimum to 
ensure that injustice is not done in the trial court. 
